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ABSTRACT 
 
 The following study endeavors to synthesize knowledge on what has heretofore 
been an almost entirely unexplored factor in the internationalized Spanish Civil War, that 
of the debate between Roman Catholics and Protestants in the United States. Upon 
examining documentary evidence collected from three different periodicals from either 
denominational camp between February, 1936 and June, 1939, a number of suggestive 
conclusions have been reached.  
 First, American Catholics and Protestants were fundamentally at odds regarding 
the Spanish Republic, the Popular Front, and Francisco Franco's Nationalist insurgency 
which rose five months after the election of that Leftist coalition. This study indicates that 
Catholics universally, but not unfairly, condemned the Popular Front as a Soviet 
construct, bent upon fomenting revolutionary chaos and, hence, supported the rebellion as 
the shield and the sword of Western Civilization and Christendom. Conversely, Protestant 
opinion adamantly defended the Spanish government which, despite containing some 
unpleasant radical elements, would nevertheless be represented as being in consonance 
with the democratic tradition and humankind's hatred of squalid backwardness. 
 Next, throughout the course of the conflict, both segments of Christian opinion  
entrenched themselves in their respective positions and would champion ―their‖ Spanish 
belligerents by employing of a ceaseless stream of proving by assertion, or argumentum 
ad infinitum. This would include a brief, albeit curious, episode in which both sides 
would attempt to correlate either combatant faction in Spain with the revolutionary and 
 iii 
democratic heritage of the United States. 
 Finally, and due in part to the previous item, the almost unswerving partisan 
fidelities of those American Catholic and Protestant publications demonstrated that they 
were, in fact, ignorant as to the underlying issues and the fundamental realities of the 
struggle in Spain. Their reductionist interpretations rendered in black-and-white a 
scenario that was nothing if not a cloudy, ambiguous gray.
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DEDICATION 
 
 For those I love and for those who have left us behind. 
 
―History to the defeated 
May say Alas but cannot help nor pardon‖ 
 W. H. Auden, ―Spain‖ 
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 1 
A Brief Introduction and Historiography
1
 
 The brutal civil war that ravaged Spain for nearly three years between July, 1936 
and April, 1939 has long been a topic of curiosity for professional historians and amateur 
enthusiasts. An exceptionally complicated conflict, textured and nuanced with 
labyrinthine intricacies, it has been burdened with a wealth of historiographical 
interpretations. Often, it has been sentimentally portrayed as the ―last great cause‖ of the 
modern era, the ―good fight,‖ most commonly between the forces of liberal democracy 
on the one hand and those of reactionary, militaristic fascism on the other. Other opinions 
have held that the struggle in Spain stood as an ideological clash between communism 
and fascism, a battle between atheism and religion. But what seems to be an almost 
universal thematic facet of these interpretations has been that the Spanish Civil War acted 
as something of a prologue or dress rehearsal for the European theater of the Second 
World War, if not its actual opening act. This is, of course, not an especially surprising 
conclusion, given the almost immediate ―internationalization‖ of that conflict, which 
transformed Spain's domestic conflict into a proxy war between the Great Powers then 
competing for dominance. 
 In very brief, the war began from a cauldron of purely Spanish forces but was 
quickly contaminated by external interference. Following the fall of the essentially 
dictatorial premiership of M. P. de Rivera in 1930 and the subsequent collapse of the 
Alfonsine monarchy (under Alfonso XIII, of the House of Bourbon) in April, 1931, 
                                                 
1
 For additional information, see annotated bibliography. 
 2 
Spanish popular opinion allowed for the creation of a second Spanish Republic.
2
 The new 
government of Spain had arisen primarily through the efforts of the assorted political Left 
and their immediate aims were to institute a battery of reforms that were inimical to the 
traditionally vested interests of the constituents of the Right. The new Constitution 
stripped the heirs of the Spanish aristocracy of their elite legal status and  disestablished 
the Roman Catholic Church. There would be a movement to reorganize (or rather 
partially dismantle) the bloated Spanish military officer corps; legislative action would be 
undertaken to proceed toward the secularization of education, the nationalization of banks 
and railways, and there would be much discussion on the topic of the redistribution of 
land and wealth.
3
 
 Leftist control of Spain's governmental infrastructure did not last, however. By 
November, 1933, the forces of the conservative and traditionalist Right organized a 
political confederation (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas, CEDA) under 
the leadership of one G. Robles and handily claimed victory in the elections of that year. 
Realigned thus, the government of the Republic took on a reactionary character and 
endeavored to reverse many of the policies put into place by the preceding regime—even 
to the extent of insisting that its efforts were necessarily defensive against the 
encroaching Marxist plague.
4
 
                                                 
2
 The first endured very briefly from February, 1873 until December, 1874. It, like the Second Republic, 
ended ignominiously following a military pronunciamento, albeit much less violently.  
3
 In regard to the Roman Catholic Church in Spain, that ancient religious institution would be subjected 
to incendiary attacks during the formative period of the Republic, as it was probably perceived as 
outcast and unprotected. 
4
 A belief seemingly confirmed by the revolutionary Asturian miners' rebellion in October, 1934 and the 
 3 
 But this, too, did not long endure. By February, 1936, the political pendulum had 
swung again to the Left: this time, it triumphed through the formulation of a Popular 
Front. Simply defined by the standards of the day, a Popular Front existed as a broad 
coalition of elements from the political Left and Center, including every group from 
anarchists, syndicalists, communists, socialists, social-democrats, bourgeois liberals, and 
so forth—and these all applied in the Spanish context.5 Again drastically reorganized, the 
government then sought to overturn the reactionary reversals of the regime which had 
come before.  
 Very soon after the elections, the nation was stricken by a series of crippling 
strikes and faced waves of violence directed by radicals against the Right and the 
Catholic Church. Those in power either could not or would not act decisively to control 
the actions of their allies, the Right accused the administration of abdicating its 
responsibility of enforcing the public order, the government faced parliamentary gridlock, 
and the social turbulence continued to escalate, begetting a cascade of politically-
motivated assassinations and reprisals.
6
 Among this number, there would be two that 
would be the trigger for the beginning of the civil war. During the evening of 12 July, 
1936, one Lt. José Castillo, a socialist activist and Assault Guardsman (Guardia de 
                                                                                                                                                 
contemporaneous Catalonian separatist uprising. 
5
 The idea originated with the Comintern's G. Dimitrov in 1934, and had been devised as the most 
practical way in which democratic nations could resist fascism and reaction at a time when both Hitler 
and Mussolini were growing ever more menacing and nearly every developed country appeared to be 
germinating fascist movements of one description or other. 
6
 Indeed, Spain increasingly appeared to be ungovernable, descending into a state of total social anarchy. 
There would be bold talk from the Right to the effect that if the government did carry out its duty, then 
the Right would have to take the steps  necessary to quell the public disorder. 
 4 
Asalto), would be murdered in the streets of Madrid by a group of four Falangist 
gunmen.
7
 Then, in the early hours of 13 July, 1936, José Calvo Sotelo, a prominent 
monarchist leader, was taken from his home and shot by multiple socialist militants and 
Asaltos. On 17 July, 1936, the military outposts in Spanish Morocco rose in rebellion; the 
following day, the garrisons in the major cities on the Iberian mainland revolted. Spain's 
civil war had begun.
8
 
 The conflict would, again, rage across nearly three years and, in the end, victory 
would be claimed over the Republican ―Loyalists‖ by the Right-wing insurgency, later to 
be dubbed the ―Nationalists.‖ The collective composition of the rebellion would be quite 
as complex as that of the Loyalists: clerical traditionalists, Falangist ―fascists,‖ two 
different factions of monarchists, all united by the upstart Spanish military and abetted by 
the elite, and the Spanish Catholic Church. The progress and eventual outcome of the war 
notwithstanding—though, at the time, it represented something of a signal triumph, a new 
high-water mark for fascism—the conflict would be perhaps most significant for its 
international aspects.  
 Indeed, the whole of Europe had a great deal of interest in the Spanish struggle. 
The Spanish Republic received moral and materiel aid from the Soviet Union (and very 
nominally from France and Mexico). The former power represented the war as a 
                                                 
7
 Note that the Assault Guards (Asaltos) were paramilitary police units established under the auspices of 
the Second Republic; their trust was to maintain order in urban settings. Secondly, ―Falangist‖ denotes 
those belonging to the Falange Española, the party most closely approximating a ―fascist‖ organization. 
8
 Though they might have offered ―bold talk,‖ the fact was that elements of the incensed Spanish Right 
were, by the Summer of 1936, already deep into planning a rebellion—they were merely biding their 
time.  
 5 
microcosm of the battle between the political ideologies of the Left, particularly 
―democracy,‖ and fascist militarism. But, in reality, Soviet investment in the Spanish 
contest was more cynical. Alongside the armaments and logistical support sent to the 
Republic, Soviet authorities also dispatched Red Army officers and agents of the NKVD 
and GRU (respectively, the Soviet secret police and military intelligence agencies); the 
Comintern, meanwhile, sent its own observers and spies. Their intention was to combine 
with the relatively diminutive Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España, 
PCE) and its allies to gradually infiltrate into and exert greater control over the 
government's political, economic, and military apparatuses.
9
  
 French interest in the conflict should be obvious. At the time, a similar Popular 
Front coalition reigned in France and, aside from facing its own troubling episode of 
social strife, that anxious nation had to confront the potentiality of being almost 
completely encircled by admittedly unfriendly fascist states. A fascist Spain would have 
surely meant that France's access to her North African possessions would have been 
imperiled. But, more importantly, Italy and Germany would have been able to add an ally 
in any potential scheme to isolate and neutralize France. Thus, during this early phase of 
appeasement, the French government did not wish to do anything that might provoke the 
totalitarian powers or incite a larger conflagration, and so endeavored to limit foreign 
intervention in Spain. 
 The same might be said to have been true of the government of Great Britain. As 
                                                 
9
 For more on this intriguing topic, see Spain Betrayed, ed. Ronald Radosh, Mary Habeck, and Grigory 
Sevostianov (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011).  
 6 
with the French government, it did not want a general war sparked over the Spanish 
issue, nor could it abide a situation in which the Nationalist rebels reached a state of 
indebtedness to Italy and Germany that the country would be forced into a state of 
vassalage to those two powers. At stake in the Spanish crisis was Great Britain's 
dominance over the Mediterranean—and thereby her access to her vast maritime empire. 
British authorities could not permit Spanish independence to be undermined by the Italian 
and German states, for a Spain under the thrall of those hostile powers, particularly Italy, 
could have been absolutely crippling in that respect. So, too, did British authorities wish 
to restrict the level of external meddling in Spain.
10
 
 On the other side of the equation, Fascist Italy backed the Spanish Nationalists, 
deploying tens of thousands of soldiers, along with valuable armored units and squadrons 
of military aircraft. A major consideration in Italian intervention, as both Great Britain 
and France had feared, involved Mussolini's ambition of restoring ―Roman‖ hegemony 
over the Mediterranean, and he believed that a friendly ―fascist‖ Spain would greatly 
contribute toward accomplishing that formidable goal.  
 Nazi Germany, too, inserted itself into the Spanish arena for similarly selfish 
reasons. Other than arming the Nationalists with sophisticated German weaponry for the 
purpose of testing their tactical applications in real-world scenarios, Hitler wished to 
extract economic, particularly mineral, concessions from Spain in exchange for his 
assistance. Otherwise, the dictator wanted the Spanish fire to burn long and bright. It now 
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 These two nations would be responsible for the creation of the international Non-Intervention 
Committee. 
 7 
seems that he wished to deflect the attention of Great Britain and France away from his 
larger designs of expansion, several vital episodes of which actually occurred during the 
course of the Spanish war.
11
 
 With these elements considered, one might now briefly address the 
historiographical discourse on the Spanish Civil War as it has stretched across the 
decades. Therein, one can delineate a number of tendencies. First, among these, and 
perhaps the most noticeable, has been the relative domination of the topic by non-Spanish 
academicians while native Spanish historians have been slow to synthesize their own 
histories of the struggle between the Republican Loyalists and the Nationalist insurgency. 
Unfortunate though this reality might be, it should nevertheless be understood. The long 
years of totalitarian rule under ―Caudillo‖ Francisco Franco rendered forthright internal 
inquiry into the causes, course, conduct, conclusion, and consequences of the conflict 
rather a formidable impracticality, if not a stark impossibility. Moreover, the unquiet 
ghosts of the civil war have continued to haunt that nation; the discussion of it, even since 
the historic transition of Spain away from a dictatorial regime, has therefore been 
contentious.  
 A second observable propensity in this field of specialization is multifaceted. 
Traditionally, a great deal of emphasis has rested upon the aforementioned  
―internationalization‖ of the struggle and the geopolitical and ideological implications 
                                                 
11
 For a concise, organized overview of the contemporary international considerations invested in the 
Spanish Civil War,  Spanish Civil War, see Michael Alpert's A New International History of the Spanish 
Civil War, 2
nd
 ed. (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004). 
 8 
thereof. Indeed, much scholarly effort has been expended to enumerate the historical 
roles of the foreign powers which actively intervened in the war, whether focusing on the 
narrative of Soviet manipulation, that of the treading of Italian boots on Spanish soil, or 
of the humming of German aircraft in the skies above. And this discussion has also 
extended into the role of the major, ostensibly non-intervening nations: in the case of 
Great Britain and France, the discourse has tended to dwell upon their respective imperial 
interests, their desire to maintain the international status quo, and their frantic efforts to 
keep the Spanish contest from exploding into a genuine international crisis—hence the 
formation of the comically ineffectual Non-Intervention Committee. 
 There is, however, one final nation to consider in the historiographical discourse 
on the Spanish Civil War. Across the Atlantic and far away, the United States became 
acutely interested in the conflict, representative as it was of wider European tensions. In 
any event, there is a special historiographical niche of studies dedicated to American 
interest in the war, but on a relatively limited scale. For example, a substantial corpus of 
literature has been developed on the phenomenon of American volunteerism in Spain, 
emphasizing the (perhaps over-romanticized) Abraham Lincoln and George Washington 
battalions of the XV International Brigade.
12
 Another specific topic involves President 
Roosevelt, the American government, and the paired questions of isolationism and 
neutrality during a time in which the world appeared to be hurtling toward another 
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 See, amongst others: Cecil D. Eby, Between the Bullet and the Lie: American Volunteers in the Spanish 
Civil War (New York: Holt Reinhart & Winston, 1969) and Comrades and Commissars: The Lincoln 
Battalion in the Spanish Civil War (University Part: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007). And 
also: Peter Carroll, The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
 9 
scenario of general warfare. Recently, historian Dominic Tierney published a monograph 
on the evolution of Roosevelt's opinion on the Spanish war as it related to wider world 
events. This author contends that the battle for Spain significantly contributed to the 
president's growing appreciation of the danger of fascist aggression and his desire to 
move the United States toward a policy of internationalism, regardless of the 
contemporary controversy that it aroused.
13
 
 Controversy, indeed, would describe American public opinion in respect to the 
Spanish Civil War: that conflict would, perhaps more than any other contemporary 
European issue, divide the people of the United States. Some scattered monographs have 
been written that have attempted to detailed this division, but they are few and dated.  
 Allen Guttmann's The Wound in the Heart dates from 1962 and undertakes to 
analyze, utilizing source material produced in the United States between 1936 and 1939, 
how Americans broadly perceived the war in Spain, and why some people understood it 
as a ―personal tragedy.‖14 The author explains that, while seeking to understand any part 
of the conflict with exclusively American sources, it would nevertheless begin to address 
the scholarly question of exactly how limited American perception of the war truly was. 
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 Dominic Tierney, FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the Struggle that 
Divided America (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 
 Roosevelt's emerging understanding of the essential danger of fascism, particularly in the Spanish 
context, met in confluence with Latin American affairs. He worried that an ascendent ―fascist‖ Spain 
might adversely affect that region, perhaps inspiring fascist or fascist-esque revolutions there. Though, 
in fact, there were a number of nominally ―fascist‖ regimes in that part of the world, if delineated by 
nothing else then their anti-communist credentials. (See: Argentina and Brazil, particularly, but also 
Chile, Peru, and Venezuela).  
 For an earlier study, see: Richard P. Traina, American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968). 
14
 Allen Guttmann, The Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War (New York: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1962). v. 
 10 
And, moreover, how it was formulated through fractured, frequently tainted knowledge 
from the armed camps within Spain while the rest of the world world stood poised upon 
the precipice of war.
15
 And, published in 1971, F. J. Taylor's The United States and the 
Spanish Civil War discusses the same topic, again with the conception that despite the 
official policy of neutrality of the United States, its citizens somehow felt themselves a 
part of the ideological drama being enacted in Spain, which they perhaps understood it as 
a prism for the future of contemporary Europe.
16
 
 Both of these studies observe the phenomenon of the investment of generalized 
American public sentiment in the Spanish conflagration, yet there is a smaller facet 
contained therein which both authors address very briefly, but which has not yet been 
more thoroughly explored. This gap in the discourse centers upon the question of the 
contentious response of the American Christian community to the Spanish Civil War, 
specifically in regard to the respective organs of the Catholic and Protestant presses. It 
will therefore be the intention of this study to address this particular issue, albeit in a 
limited fashion, and offer a degree of interpretative analysis thereto. 
 Being restricted by both space and time, the scope of this undertaking will be 
necessarily narrow. Nevertheless, it will endeavor to trace the development of Catholic 
and Protestant opinion in the United States in respect to the Spanish crisis from the rise of 
the Popular Front coalition following the February, 1936 elections until June, 1936—that 
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 Allen Guttmann, The Wound in the Heart:America and the Spanish Civil War (New York: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1962).  
 See also: American Neutrality and the Spanish Civil War, ed. Allen Guttmann (Boston: D. C. Heath and 
Company, 1963). 
16
 F. Jay Taylor, The United States and the Spanish Civil War (New York: Octagon Books, 1971). 
 11 
is, until the dust had begun to settle after the fall of the Republic in April of that year. In 
order to maintain relative parity, both sides of this conversation will be explored using 
three individual publications (in addition to some supplementary materials). For the 
American Catholics, America, the Commonweal, and the Sign will be used. And, for the 
American Protestants, the Christian Century, the Christian Evangelist, and the Christian 
Leader will be examined. 
 Amongst the Catholic newspapers, both America and the Commonweal were 
weeklies while the Sign existed as a monthly journal. America was (and remains) a Jesuit 
publication, based in New York City. Over the course of the struggle, this paper would 
demonstrate impeccable anti-communist credentials and never wavered in its support of 
the Nationalist rebels in Spain, which it perceived to be battling for the perpetuation of 
Christian civilization. The Commonweal, also headquartered in New York, initially 
boasted a similarly militant degree of stridency in respect to the Spanish war. However, 
this journal of opinion would later reverse course and, insisting upon more liberal 
examination of the conflict, couched itself within a policy of impartiality. And, like 
America, the Sign was published under the auspices of a Catholic religious society, the 
Passionists, and would also prove itself to be a great moral enemy of the Spanish 
Republic. 
 On the other side of the debate, the Christian Century, a self-proclaimed 
―undenominational,‖ liberal Protestant newspaper situated in Chicago, would offer 
enormous, almost unqualified sympathy for the Republican Loyalists and disdain for the 
 12 
pro-Nationalist stance of the American Catholic Church and, indeed, of the Roman 
Catholic Church in general. Almost exactly the same could be said to have been true of 
the Christian Evangelist, a St. Louis-based weekly produced by the Disciples of Christ 
(otherwise simply known as the ―Christian Church,‖ and often perceived as more of a 
conservative sub-denomination). And, so too of the Christian Leader, a Universalist 
journal from Boston (which, for its part, was often perceived as a more liberal 
denomination). 
 What could be said of all of these publications, however, was that each boasted 
impressive qualities of intellectual acumen, for the topics thoughtfully discussed within 
their columns ranged from theology to contemporary domestic politics and, indeed, to the 
international developments during that troubled time. However, the bubbling Spanish 
cauldron, and its sudden eruption into a scenario of civil war placed blinders on these few 
journals; each of them immediately proclaimed partisan fidelities to one side or the other, 
even before hostilities broke out in earnest, and remained mostly entrenched in those 
positions until the end of the war. This was, as previous historians have posited, 
indicative of the wider scene in the United States, and is partly the inspiration for the title 
of this thesis: ―None Spoke Spanish.‖ 
 This title comes, in fact, from a gibe in the 23 January, 1937 edition of the 
Christian Leader. It ran as such: ―then there was the commander in Madrid who gave the 
regiment a fifteen-minute fight talk, only to find that none of the boys spoke Spanish.‖17 
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 ―Crackling,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 23 January, 1937, 128. 
 13 
The author of this study believes that, apart from lightly mocking the confusingly 
―internationalized‖ nature of the Spanish Civil War, this innocent joke reflected the 
unyielding positions of these small segments of American Catholic and Protestant 
opinion on the struggle and, indeed, the way in which the whole of the United States 
seemed to have interpreted it. In this context, that ―none of the boys spoke Spanish‖ 
might be illustrative of a certain fundamental ignorance as to the realities of the conflict 
itself, the complexities of the combatant factions, and that for which they were fighting—
all of which had been tainted by ideology and befogged by propaganda.
 14 
Chapter 1: Crusade or Class Conflict? 
Early Winter, 1936 – Late Summer, 1937 
The Initial Perceptions of the Spanish Civil War in the American Christian Press and 
the Drawing of the Denominational Battle Lines 
 
―A special word must be given to controversy. Controversy between Catholic and non-Catholic has its 
value...[but] controversy tends to bring out some of the worst traits in people; very often it has its origin 
and motive not in a zeal for God's truth but unconsciously in a desire to demonstrate that I know what is 
right, that our (or worse, my) church alone has got the truth, or simply that the other fellow is wrong. 
...Controversy on important matters...is like war, very difficult to wage without sin and without doing more 
harm than good.‖
18
 
 
I. 
 
 Though the Spanish Civil War would not truly erupt until July, 1936, the 
American religious press demonstrated a remarkable attentiveness to the socio-political 
controversies and growing unrest within Spanish Republic following the elections in 
February of that year. More notable still, these publications, whether Protestant or 
Catholic, established respective partisan allegiances to the Spanish Left and Right well 
before the actual commencement of martial hostilities, fidelities which would remain 
relatively unshaken throughout the duration of the conflict.   
 To begin in the Protestant camp, for example: Chicago's Christian Century, a self-
delineated ―undenominational‖ weekly, ran an editorial which rejoiced that Spain had 
―turned from Fascism‖ toward a more ―moderately liberal‖ regime with the ascent of the 
Popular Front, despite the presence of certain radical elements in that coalition.
19
  
By the end of March, and as Hitler reconsolidated German control over the Rhineland, 
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 Donald Attwater, ―People, Press and Propaganda,‖ The Commonweal, 24 July, 1936, 317-318. 
19
 ―Spain Turns from Fascism,‖ editorial, in The Christian Century, 4 March, 1936, 348-349. 
 15 
this same periodical opined that the Spanish cauldron appeared to be in danger of boiling 
over as politically-inspired tensions mounted. At that time, indications were present to 
suggest that distinct factions had begun to align against one another in that troubled 
nation, potentially being preparatory to an episode of violent civil strife. Specifically, 
another editorial comment in the Christian Century mentioned that the violence seemed 
to be between the forces of ―Marxism‖ on the one side and ―clericalism‖ on the other,  
nebulous though those descriptors may have been.
20
 Recognizing that the Spanish 
Catholic Church had been the recipient of increasing hostility since the rise of the new 
leftist government, this piece extended the hand of Christian sympathy to that suffering 
religious organization. But it then immediately negated its fraternal message by casting 
the stone of blame, implying that the contemporary outpouring of popular anti-clerical 
violence in Spain had been the result of the long-festering detestation of the entrenched 
interests of the Church and its own reactionary determination to defend them.  
Whatever the case, the author believed that the catalyst for these attacks could be traced 
to certain irresponsible and inflammatory elements, and warned that international liberal 
sympathy for the Popular Front would quickly evaporate if the coalition could not bring 
its more radical components to heel. Further, he presciently predicted that some nascent 
strain of Spanish fascism might be given the opportunity to seize the reins of power amid 
the atmosphere of instability, most likely in the form of a military uprising, armed with 
the ostensible excuse of restoring order to the decaying national situation where the 
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 ―Marxism, Clericalism or Fascism in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 25 March, 1936, 451. 
 16 
legitimate government could not.
21
 
 Likewise, the Christian Leader, a Universalist journal based in Boston, 
acknowledged that trouble existed in Spain. Interest in and sympathy for the Popular 
Front appeared to be stronger with the editorial staff of and contributors to this 
publication. Late in March, 1936, the Leader published a full article on the election of the 
new government: authored by one J. Menéndez, this article celebrated that Spain had 
been ―saved from fascism.‖ He wrote of the new government's election in a spirit of 
celebration, asserting that its coming reign represented the hope and the future of the 
Spanish nation—but also that it would act as the instrument of the people's vengeance 
against the hateful, almost criminal, negligence of the reactionary regime which came to 
power following the general elections of November, 1933.
22
 Menéndez asserted that 
though critics of the new regime might insinuate some conspiratorial alliances with 
Moscow, such claims were entirely unfounded; meanwhile, however, definite intimacies 
had existed between the preceding rightist administration and the National-Socialist 
government in Germany. In any event, the author applauded that the nation would once 
more be able to pursue the path of progressive liberalism after nearly two years of 
common misery under a backward political structure that had teetered dangerously close 
to the fascist precipice; indeed, that black tide, peculiarly hued with clericalism, would be 
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 The author was almost certainly the prominent Spanish leftist intellectual who spent some time in the 
United States during the 1930s (and who also contributed to the New York Times). 
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halted decisively with the ―tremendous force of socialism.‖23 
 American Protestant interest would balloon for a short time following the 
February elections, but general interest in Spain would subsequently decline over the next 
months, with a few small exceptions. In late April, the Christian Century commented on 
a governmental shake-up in Spain, resulting in the presidential ouster of the relatively 
moderate N. Zamora; his successor, M. Azaña, leaned considerably further to the radical 
Left. According to the paper's staff, these developments would only embolden the 
dangerous revolutionary elements of the Popular Front.
24
  
 That same issue of the Century, however, also featured a brief article entitled ―We 
of the Left.‖ Evidently an anecdote taken from an actual experience, this piece briefly 
detailed a political discussion shared between the author and two youths who, belonging 
to some unspecified faction ―of the Left,‖ indicted the Catholic Church as being an 
intractable barrier to social progress and a truly democratic Spain.
25
 While perhaps based 
upon a true occurrence, this tale must be held in suspicion, for it seems to have been 
tainted with a subtle degree of anti-Catholic bigotry. Concluding the story, the author 
claimed to have conferred with an unnamed Spanish Protestant clergyman (a rarity in 
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―people's‖ parties to stamp out reaction, fascism, clericalism, and militarism—and that it was in no wise 
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eminently Catholic Spain), who corroborated this rather forceful opinion on the Church 
by stating that those of the ―Left [had] the right of it.‖26 
 Indeed, even as specific coverage of the Spanish ferment waned as the year 1936 
advanced into the summer, these few Protestant publications managed to secure avenues 
by which to attack the Roman Catholic Church. An editorial writer for the Christian 
Century lashed out at what he perceived to be the jeopardized state of the Vatican's moral 
authority in respect to its public sentiments of ―triumphal gladness‖ regarding Mussolini's 
declaration of final victory in his Ethiopian adventure in May of that year.
27
 Likewise, a 
dedicated commentator for the Christian Evangelist, the official organ of the Disciples of 
Christ (a Baptist sub-denomination), wrote that ―fascism translated into religion comes 
very near to the dogma of St. Peter's Chair.‖28  
 Such anti-Catholic hostility on the part of these few American Protestant 
newspapers, as reflected in almost defamatory print, could perhaps be taken as an early 
indicator of the totally contrary position they would adopt as the representatives of the 
Church declared their own partisanship when the Spanish conflict began in earnest. 
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II. 
 Though relatively slower in responding to the emerging crisis in Spain, American 
Catholic publications nevertheless began to report on it with more consistency. The 
interpretative conclusions reached by these periodicals, of course, could not have been  
more different than those reached by the Protestant press.  
 Most interested in the development of the contemporary Spanish political scene, 
the Commonweal, a respected Catholic weekly based in New York, commented on the 
February elections even before they took place. Rather than expressing a tone of hopeful 
optimism for the prospects of a sister democracy, this newspaper portended impending 
doom for that country: the Popular Front and ―Spanish socialism.‖29 Editorializing further 
on this leftist coalition, the Commonweal denounced it as the spawn of Russian 
Bolshevism, and that its election would only invite revolutionary anarchy.
30
 A mere two 
weeks after this prediction, the same paper noted unrest following the election of the 
―united leftist ticket‖ which had been comprised of, on an apparently exclusive basis, 
―anti-Christian Republicans, Socialists and Communists.‖31 
 This same publication continued to bring its readership disquieting news from 
troubled Spain in the wake of the February elections. By then the country had devolved 
into general civil disorder: radical extremists had inaugurated an orgy of terrorist 
violence, setting the torch to churches, convents, Right-wing political offices, presses, 
and so forth. Although retaining hope that the administration would be able to rein in 
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these unstable elements, the Commonweal wrote with authority that the campaign of 
chaos had been deliberately designed by leftist fanatics in order to force the government 
into a ―Marxist revision of the Spanish Constitution.‖32 Week by week, the situation 
seemed to spiral further; the tumult eventually reached such a feverish pitch that the 
government declared an official state of alert.
33
 
 Soon the Commonweal began reporting that sources within Spain had indicated 
that some form of electoral mischief might have taken place, which would have then 
meant that the scepter of power did not truly belong to the Popular Front. Similarly, the 
regime itself (rather than, as previously, bands of lawless incendiaries) faced allegations 
of conspiracy from the Right. Such charges read thus: that the coalition in question meant 
to gain control of the governmental apparatus by any means necessary and to 
subsequently abuse its ill-gained power in the interest of inciting chaos and revolutionary 
upheaval.
34
 And, as the Protestant Christian Leader had posited virtually simultaneously, 
Commonweal asserted that the Spanish military officer corps, while proclaiming loyalty 
to the Republic itself, would be forced to take extra-legal action and intervene if the 
government found itself unequal to the task of quelling the social turbulence.
35
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 These charges of electoral fraud and the revolutionary intentions of the Popular Front (under Soviet 
direction) would occasionally emerge as a point of debate between the Catholic and Protestant 
publications. 
35
 Ibid. 
 This, too, would become an important position taken be either side—the question of whether the 
coming insurrection actually constituted an act of loyalty or disloyalty to the Republic.  
 America, too, would editorialize upon rumors of a possible rightist coup d'état (―Spanish Troubles,‖ 11 
April, 1936, 23-24), potentially with the aim of re-establishing the Alfonsine monarchy (―Spain's 
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 America, another Catholic circular established in New York, only began to feature 
substantial pieces discussing the nervousness of Spain in May, 1936.
36
 O. B. McGuire, a 
regular contributor to the weekly, sought to ―tell the truth about Spain,‖ writing that time 
had not served to mend the disturbances.
37
 He, like many others of the Catholic press, 
wrote that the genuine republican souls of that country had made a grave mistake in 
consolidating an alliance with radical and revolutionary political organizations. 
Moreover, he found himself taken aback as to how certain portions of the American press 
interpreted the woes of Spain, particularly in that so much sympathy had been invested in 
the cause of the Popular Front. McGuire believed the leftist coalition to be the antithesis 
of Americanism, having totally contrary attitudes toward such fundamental issues as 
religious liberty, property rights, the family, and education—but not least because it 
ostensibly favored a dictatorship of the proletariat. He could not conceive of such support 
being lent to the proponents of this pernicious strain of extremism while moderate and 
conservative dissenters (including the Catholic Church) were bracketed wholesale as 
―clericals, reactionaries, and fascists,‖ and summarily denounced by a wide segment of 
the American press.
38
 What concerned the author most, however, remained the possibility 
that such an attitude might yield bitter fruit, and could contribute to a resurgence of 
                                                                                                                                                 
President Removed,‖ 18 April, 1936, 46-47).  
36
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of significance on the Spanish troubles until June of that year. 
37
 Owen B. McGuire, ―The Truth about Spain,‖ America, 2 May, 1936, 81-83. 
38
 Ibid. 
 The name-calling device would remain a critical feature of the discussion of the Spanish Civil War in 
the United States in general, not only in the Catholic-Protestant debate. 
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domestic anti-Catholicism.
39 
 
Meanwhile, crisis succeeded crisis in Spain. Parliamentary gridlock resulted in 
successive dissolutions of the Cortes, ultimately leading to President Zamora being 
removed from office, being accused of betraying the ―popular revolution.‖40 New 
elections had to be arranged for the selection of his replacement which, of course, would 
only lead to further clashes between Left and Right. And even as the Second Republic 
passed the fifth anniversary of its founding, what should have been a prevailing mood of 
celebration was instead marred by a string of apparent political murders, reprisals, 
bombings, strikes, and riots. The government became more repressive against the Right, 
forcibly disbanding the relatively diminutive Falange Española, the party most closely 
approximating to a genuine Spanish fascist movement.
41
 Outrages continued against the 
Church: since the February elections, hundreds of churches and convents had been 
sacked and despoiled by ―Marxist rioters.‖42 America reported that, at that time, the most 
recent wave of attacks against the Church had resulted from wild rumors flying about 
Madrid to the effect that priests and nuns had been feeding poisoned candy to the children 
of leftists. Although the tale had been proven false by a government investigation into the 
matter, an assortment of communists and socialists responded by setting alight three 
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churches, one convent, and four schools.
43
 
 While this particular aspect of the pre-war Spanish feud had been briefly 
portrayed in the American Protestant press as a predictable result of the Church's 
unreformed habits of medieval reaction, the Catholic press rather saw the burnings as a 
component of the communist conspiracy, a directive handed down from the Comintern to 
splinter movements worldwide. Certain writers maintained that the destruction of 
religious institutions, most particularly Catholic Christianity, had been designated as 
essential by the puppet-masters in Moscow wherever they wished to establish and 
maintain a presence, and that Spain stood at the forefront of this crucial struggle.
44 
Successful Popular Front programs, then, represented the culmination of this strategy to 
enslave humanity through means more subtle than active revolution. L. K. Patterson, a 
contributor to America, warned his readers against such platforms. He wrote that however 
they might describe themselves as the patrons of peace and democracy in the face of 
implacable fascist militarism, they only camouflaged the reality that, back of their 
movement, stood the Red colossus which ruled through terror.
45
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 This being the first article published in this magazine on the Spanish situation; commented on the 
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 In the month leading up to the outbreak of the rebellion, the Catholic publications 
seemed to have lost any hope that the discord in Spain might have been ameliorated 
through the concerted efforts of reasonable factions both within and outside of the 
government with constructive input from the opposition. Instead, America reported that 
the respectable and responsible segments of the leftist government had been shunted 
aside to make way for a ―Socialist-Syndicalist-Communist alliance‖ to sit upon the 
throne, an unholy communion headed by a ―Masonic Premier.‖46 And while admitting 
that the traditionally impoverished conditions of that nation had fertile soil for such 
ideologies to take root, the same weekly held that the solution to the fundamental causes 
of the Spain's social and economic woes rested in a ―Christian organization of society‖ 
and Catholic social action, not Marxist radicalism, no matter how those of the Left might 
demonize clerical-traditionalism.
47
  
 This age-old conception of Spanish society, wrote O. B. McGuire of 
Commonweal, found its greatest threat in the person of M. Azaña, who had by that time 
been elected to replace Zamora as the president of the Republic.
48
 In trying to better 
                                                                                                                                                 
to pigeonhole them into the evolving lexicography of the proletarian revolution. 
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 ―The Spanish Crisis,‖ editorial, America, 6 June, 1936, 194-195. 
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community as possible, given that the clerical hierarchy had long damned the order as an anti-religious 
conspiracy. In any event, the charge of ―Masonry‖ would occasionally be applied to the Spanish 
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 By this time, America seemed to have gotten in the habit of leveling invectives against the Republic 
itself, which this editorial also accused of being corrupt from its inception in 1931 and, by 1936, had 
become utterly despicable for attempting to undermine the foundations of a Catholic nation by offering 
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 Azaña, for his part, would remain the Spanish president until the end of the civil war and the fall of the 
 25 
personify the new Spanish executive, McGuire painted a portrait designed to shock his 
readers. According to the author, Azaña abandoned his Catholic faith during his youth 
and shortly turned to radical ideologies, becoming militantly anti-clerical in the process; 
the president faced further charges of wanting to stamp out all vestiges of the Faith in 
Spain for the sake of assuaging his obsession with revolutionary purity. However, while 
the author did not then subscribe to the fearful position adopted by his colleagues that 
Azaña, in collusion with the Popular Front, sought to establish a sort of ―Soviet republic‖ 
in Spain, he nevertheless perceived a lurking danger from the more fanatical elements 
within the leftist coalition.
49
 
 As the heady days of June, 1936 waned, America offered a short piece on the 
unabated public commotion in Spain. Illustrating a situation clearly careening out of all 
control, J. G. Robles rose to address the Cortes earlier that month. This man, a prominent 
rightist and founder of the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA, 
Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right, the conservative coalition that secured 
the 1933 elections) recited a litany of morbid statistics before the leftist-dominated 
parliamentary body. Since the Popular Front assumed power in February of that year, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Republic in April, 1939—but would scarcely be mentioned again by the American Christian press. 
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 A similar position was espoused by L. A. Fernsworth—a journalist who would report extensively on the 
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according to his numbers, over 400 churches had been totally or partially destroyed; 269 
people had been killed, with more than 1,500 having been injured; over forty offices 
belonging to Right-wing organizations had been totally or partially demolished; more 
than 340 strikes had been called. Going further, Robles stated that in the mere two days 
before his address, there had been 65 new deaths, attended by 230 woundings and the 
declaration of some 170 fresh strikes.
50
 
 By then, the apoplectic squabbling and virtual paralysis of the Spanish political 
scene likely gave the impression that the government either could not or would not do 
anything to suppress what increasingly appeared to be an inexcusably extended episode 
of general anarchy—and either possibility damned. Robles' appearance before the Cortes 
might have served as a notice to the administration that the Right-wing had become 
thoroughly disgusted with the government's immobility, and that it might burden itself 
with the restoration of order. Indeed, that day would come, but not before another half-
month of social disharmony, which both the American Catholic and Protestant presses 
covered in detail. 
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III. 
 Even as the waves of rebellion, revolution, and civil war broke over Spain after 
mid-July, the representatives of the Protestant press did not recognize the significance of 
developments in that country for some weeks. Among these, the Christian Century first 
(and tellingly) acknowledged the mutiny of Spain's ultra-conservative military officer 
corps, which it immediately delineated as a ―fascist-monarchist revolt‖ against the 
―socialist government‖ of the Popular Front.51 The Christian Evangelist, too, featured an 
editorial on the newly-born Spanish Civil War at the end of July, but refrained from 
commenting on the relative justice of either cause: this publication opined that the early 
dispatches coming from across the Atlantic were contradictory and misleading to the 
point of rendering sound judgment impossible. And though it attempted to maintain a 
tone of impartiality, the Evangelist quickly revealed its sympathy for the Republic. The 
paper's editorial staff saluted the gallantry of the government and its supporters, motley 
an assortment though they were, for their stand against a concerted ―fascist‖ onslaught, 
led by experienced military personnel. As would become fashionable (both in the 
contemporaneous and historiographical sense), the paper would declare that the melee in 
Spain represented a crucial episode for the whole of Europe in the general war between 
the mutually hostile ideologies of the Left and Right.
52
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 This understanding of the Spanish war in terms of its ideological complexion 
found further articulation in a prominently-featured editorial comment in the Christian 
Leader during the following month. According to this piece, the conflict demonstrated the 
―destructive centrifugal force of extreme class consciousness,‖ and both sides possessed 
the trappings of quixotic, all-or-nothing idealism.
53
 While the Leader expressed sympathy 
for the Popular Front, it nevertheless put forward a position more notably negative than 
either the Century or the Evangelist. It could not recognize the cause of the government 
as being any more democratic than that of the rebels, conceived and maintained with the 
collusion of rabid extremists as the leftist coalition had been.
54
 
 The writers on the staff of the Evangelist could not bring themselves to agree with 
this perspective on the civil war and denounced certain newspapers in the United States 
which, ever wary of international communism, had grown positively inconsolable over 
rumors coming from Spain. However it might be constituted, they argued, and for better 
or worse, the embattled Left-wing government came to power following a legitimate 
election (in which the incumbent rightist regime controlled the electoral machinery), and 
therefore absolutely represented the side of ―democracy.‖55 Moreover, the blanket label of 
                                                                                                                                                 
prevail in Spain, or would the Republican government (honeycombed as it was with radical anarcho-
syndicalists, socialists, and communists) be free to carry forward its confused ideas of revolution? 
Furthermore, it had been asserted that if Spain were to fall beneath the fascist jackboot, France would 
shortly follow. 
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 Indeed, the Leader believed Spanish democracy to have been an abortive experiment from the start, for 
the political pendulum had swung from extreme to extreme thrice in five years and had never found the 
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―communism,‖ as it had been applied to the Popular Front, had been propagated by the: 
 
 
―...forces of black reaction—the fascist, militarist, clerical, landowning groups which 
[had] halted progress for centuries and which [considered] it their duty to serve God by 
halting progress in [the twentieth] century.‖56 
 
Addressing the religious issue, the piece regretted pre-war attacks against the Church, and 
also that the bloodshed had aroused cruelty in the Spanish Left, which had led to 
unspeakable excesses against the Faith. But then this article almost entirely excused the 
violence because ―quite understandably...[the Spanish people have] accepted the Catholic 
Church in their country as a symbol of everything reactionary, privileged, and 
plutocratic.‖57 
 Expressing more interest in the religious embellishments affixed to the uprising, 
specifically by the insurgents and their supporters, the Christian Century remarked in 
early August on the evolution of the Spanish ―holy war.‖58 It should have been no 
surprise that the clash should have been denominated as such by that side, especially as 
the Roman Catholic Church had so much at stake. Much like the Evangelist, the Century 
believed that the Church's age-old union with the ancien régime made it a virtual 
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 The rebels, the editorial maintained, were not really opposed to ―communism,‖ but merely used the 
blanket invective against anything which they disliked—that is, anything trending toward social and 
economic reform that would damage their interests, which had been entrenched over centuries. 
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 The article even goes on to draw a corollary between the historic role of the Church in Spain and the 
Orthodox Church in Russia—both had been the traditional ―servant of the oppressors.‖ Whatever the 
political or religious situation, the Evangelist declared for the government of Spain, even if its victory 
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inevitability that it would throw its formidable weight on the side battling for a social 
order conceived of as:  
 
―...an absolute monarchy defended by a Praetorian guard, a feudal system of land 
ownership and Catholic unity enforced by the inquisition and police power of the state. 
Their cry is against godless communism and materialistic Marxism, but their antipathy 
toward any form of liberalism, republicanism, or parliamentarianism is no less.‖59 
 
Indeed, it had been reported that the most devoutly (if not fanatically) Catholic segments 
of the rebel faction had drawn the sword of the Crusade, proclaiming a new Reconquista 
to drive the heathen Marxists, the modern Moors, from the Spanish fatherland.
60
 
 R. Niebuhr, writing for the Century, would continue the discussion of the religious 
question in the Spanish conflict that seemed to have so absorbed the paper. Reviewing the 
hardships the Church had suffered over the brief progress of the war, the author could 
find precious little sympathy for it, as had become the trend with those writing for the 
other Protestant publications. He perceived unforgivable spiritual arrogance in any 
institution which sought to identify its momentary tribulations with those endured by 
Christ at Golgotha.
61
 What other Protestant writers had merely implied, Niebuhr stated 
more forthrightly his opinion in respect to the case of the Spanish Church: that it had 
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only then under Catholic leadership. 
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richly deserved the drubbing it had received. Though it might drape itself in the martyr's 
cloak and clutch a crucifix to its breast, the author asserted, that did not not change the 
historical reality that it had served as an instrument of reaction which had kept the nation 
mired in backwardness for centuries, a total betrayal of its sacred trust to the common 
people of Spain. In short, the Church had sown the wind of fury over the course of 
generations and therefore had to suffer the furious whirlwind of retribution. For that 
institution to then dissemble with professions of sanctimonious piety could only be 
described as the ―most sinful pretension of the human spirit.‖62 
 Sins of the Spanish Church aside, the initial months of the war saw these 
Protestant publications maintain a powerful interest in the international implications of 
the civil war. The conflict had been quickly represented as potentially problematic for  
Europe—a legitimate concern, given that it might have escalated into a general 
conflagration and, at that time, it appeared as if a number of the major powers had 
already chosen sides. Great Britain and France, for their parts, were desperate to keep the 
peace and, perhaps in an early fit of appeasement, winked at the support lent to the 
rightist rebellion by Italy and Germany. Therefore, with the insurgency enjoying the 
substantial backing of the international ―fascist bloc,‖ it should have been considered 
natural that the Soviet Union would back the Spanish Republic—though into the Autumn 
of 1936, such assistance to either side had only barely begun to arrive in any substantial 
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quantity.
63
  
 On the topic of the ―internationalization‖ of the Spanish war, the activities of the  
hastily-assembled Non-Intervention Committee would become de rigueur for discussion 
amongst the Protestant publications, though opinions on its activities and effectiveness 
would vary somewhat. All seemed to agree that such a program, flawed though it might 
have been (and would, indeed, later prove itself to be), the Committee would serve as a 
useful mechanism for relieving the warlike tensions in Europe, which the Spanish 
question had only exacerbated. In addition, some thought that strict non-intervention 
would be to the exclusive benefit of the Republic. It began the conflict being much better 
armed than the rebellion and, considering the relative poverty of the uprising before its 
allies had poured in aid, it followed that if the flow of materiel into the country could be 
decisively halted, the government's forces would have little difficulty in crushing the 
insurrection.
64
  
 As for their own country, each paper seemed to believe in the course of 
isolationism, the contemporary national standard. Yet on the other hand, the Christian 
Century intelligently posited that the whole of the Western Hemisphere should have been 
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concerned with the potential impact of the war on Latin America.
65
 The Christian 
Evangelist, expressing the strongest opinion, considered it to be the duty of the United 
States to be pro-active in blockading the rebel-held ports in Spain in recognition of 
international law. But the Century took this to be a foolhardy course, for direct military 
action of this sort carried danger that could potentially lead to the heightening of 
international hostilities, if not the immediate declaration of war.
66
 This fear almost 
immediately justified itself: the Evangelist reported on the previous month's unsuccessful 
bombing of the USS Kane, a Navy destroyer, in Spanish waters by a belligerent aircraft 
of unspecified origin. Though the event passed without ill effect, the paper recognized 
that such incidents could be manipulated by the jingoistic ―yellow‖ press to raise the hue 
and cry for retaliation.
67
 
 Meanwhile, the Spanish rebels had arrived in Toledo to relieve the diminished 
garrison which had defended the ancient fastness of the Alcázar since the first days of the 
uprising. Apart from such striking military gains being made by the rebels these 
Protestant papers were finally able to report the announced intentions of the mutiny.
68
 To 
the Christian Century, its platform stood as fascism, naked and unqualified. Interpreting 
                                                 
65
 ―America Refuses to Intervene in Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 2 September, 1936, 1147-
1148. 
66
 ―The Week in Review,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 3 September, 1936, 1140.  
 ―American Neutrality Requires More Than Legal Argument,‖ editorial, The Christian Century,  
 9 September, 1936, 1179-1180. 
67
 ―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 10 September, 1936, 1172. 
 This vessel's objective was to evacuate American citizens left stranded and endangered in Spain with 
the outbreak of the civil war. 
68
 Charles A. Thomson, ―Understanding Our World: Non-Intervention in Spain,‖ The Christian Leader  
 5 September, 1936, 1145. 
 ―The Saving of Our World,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 24 September, 1936, 1234.  
 34 
emotionally, the paper's editorial staff wrote that the rebels' twenty-seven point program 
promised the formation of a dictatorial state based on the precepts of Italian corporatist 
Fascism, but that it also made allowances for the restoration of some of the privileges of 
the traditional ruling elite and the Spanish Church.
69 
But even if the destiny of Spain were 
to be seized by the rightists, certain correspondents wrote that it would not be bought 
cheaply. Repeating the words of J. Allen of the Chicago Tribune, the Evangelist predicted 
ghastly consequences if the fall of the government ever became inevitable: radical 
extremists might endeavor, with their last gasp, to re-enact the September Massacres of 
1792 against their class enemies.
70
 
 By October, 1936, the Protestant papers became fixated upon the insurgents' thrust 
toward Madrid, their seemingly impending triumph, and the potential effect that a 
―fascist‖ Spain would have on international political equations. First, and in spite of the 
work done by the Non-Intervention Committee, there continued to be external 
involvement in the Spanish war; the Christian Evangelist nominated Italy, Germany, and 
Portugal as the worst offenders. Such flagrancy, wrote the Evangelist, could only invite 
war—especially as the Soviet Union promised before the committee that it would openly 
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declare for the Republican cause if aid to the rightists did not cease. In any event, this 
same piece held that a rebel victory in Spain, should it be achieved, would have done so 
only through the force of foreign arms.
71
 And while one might conclude that an ascendent 
―fascist‖ Spain might not have been so worrisome on its own, the papers expressed great 
anxiety that the total political reversal promised by the rebels (achieved, again, with 
extensive foreign assistance) would do much to upset the delicate balance of power in the 
Mediterranean. What concerned them most in this scenario, however, was the fate of 
France; their fearful deductive logic concluded that a defeated Spain implied that the 
French Republic would be the next to crumble beneath the fascist wheel.
72
 
 Other important developments that month received due recognition. First, after 
months of waging warfare against the Republic while fighting its own internal battles, the 
rebellion proclaimed General F. Franco as its leader and, indeed, as the leader of  all 
Spain.
73
 Second, the Vatican extended unofficial sympathy to the Spanish insurgency, an 
event which received predictably extensive commentary in these few Protestant 
publications.  
 The Christian Century noted that the Pope had addressed certain ―serious lessons‖ 
                                                 
71
 ―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 15 October, 1936, 1332. 
 ―The Attack on Madrid Continues,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 28 October, 1936, 1411-1412. 
 Reporting likewise, an editorial in the Christian Century (―How Near to War Is Europe,‖ 21 October, 
1936, 1382-1383) added the Vatican alongside Italy, Germany, and Portugal in the list of the natural 
allies of the Spanish rebels. 
72
 ―Spanish Rebels Near Madrid,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 7 October, 1936, 1309. 
 ―The Week in Review,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 8 October, 1936, 1300. 
 A later editorial in The Christian Century (―The Fascist Pressure Grows in France,‖ 14 October, 1936 
1348-1349) reinforced this opinion, stating that fascist elements were already in place in that country, 
biding their time to stage their own rebellion. 
73
 ―General Franco Proclaimed Dictator of Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 14 October, 1936, 
1348. 
 36 
being taught to the world in troubled Spain, where Providence had elected to stage the 
modern episode in the struggle for the survival of Christian civilization.
74
 This 
newspaper's staff took indignant exception to this religious inflection, as well as to the 
ostensible blessing of the uprising and its portrayal as an earthly instrument of the 
Kingdom of Christ; its writers interpreted this as a disingenuous attempt to obliterate the 
political, social, and economic factors which so obviously defined the war.
75
 This 
Protestant publication, alongside its peers, maintained that the contemporaneously radical 
and violent strain of Spanish anti-clericalism had not been born out of hatred for the Faith 
itself, but rather out of a justifiable sense of animosity toward a Church that had become 
the defender of wealth and privilege, the abettor of class oppression.
76
  
 Yet the Christian Leader still thought it worthwhile to reprint certain 
sensationalist stories indicting the Loyalist forces of heinous anti-religious atrocities, 
even though they had apparently been confirmed to be total fabrications by 
correspondents on the ground in Spain. Included among these ―outrages against 
Christianity‖ were stories of a female communist militant who mutilated the eyes of a 
dying priest with a hatpin, the public beheading of eight monks, and, in what stands as a 
truly bizarre mental image, a ―Red beauty queen‖ who engaged in the torture of a large 
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group of helpless nuns.
77
 
 Even more galling to the Protestant press than the sympathies of the Vatican in 
respect to the Spanish crisis would be Pope Pius XI's invitation to Protestant Christendom 
to join with the Roman Catholic Church in its worldwide struggle against communism. 
The Christian Century found this to be a curious development, as for centuries the 
authorities of that religious institution had refused to acknowledge as legitimate the 
schismatic branches of the Faith. In any case, the paper urged the rejection of this 
proposed anti-Marxist crusade, for Protestantism, in its turn, did not recognize the claims 
of the Roman Church to either spiritual or temporal authority.
78
 F. D. Kershner, of the 
Christian Evangelist, believed much the same, although one can detect in his opinion a 
far greater degree of bigoted anti-Catholic paranoia. He thought that such a proposed 
partnership could be positively identified as a component of a conspiracy to subtly 
corrupt the foundations of Protestantism (particularly American Protestantism) in order to 
further the agenda of conquest nurtured by the medieval Church.
79
 
 Protestant interest in the international developments in relation to the Spanish 
conflict and the complex Catholic dynamic thereof remained high during the last two 
months of the year. Even as F. D. Roosevelt secured the American presidency for the 
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second time and the Italian and German dictators solidified the foundation of the alliance 
that would come to be called ―the Axis,‖ Franco's rebels and his auxiliaries were 
hammering on the gates of Madrid.
80
 These papers reported that European tensions 
remained high as the provisions of the non-intervention agreement were routinely 
violated on an enormous scale. Men and materiel from various foreign sources continued 
to flood into Spain daily, more completely transforming the civil war into an international 
brawl. And though the opinion seemed to prevail that the odds were increasingly 
weighted against the defenders of the embattled Republic, the Century and Evangelist 
carried weekly editorials proudly informing their readers that the ―fascists‖ had not yet 
passed.
81
 
 Praising the Spanish Republic's stand against aggression though they might, these 
papers leveled charges of rank cowardice against the major European democracies which, 
in their self-interested urgency to maintain the wider peace of the Continent, had allowed 
non-intervention to become a sham at the expense of a sister democracy. To their 
thinking, it appeared as though Great Britain and France were content to abandon Spain 
to the consuming plague of a ―fascist‖ insurgency, equipped through the largess of Italy 
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and Germany, a theory which gained more credence when those totalitarian powers 
formally recognized Franco's legitimacy at the end of November.
82
 Indeed, as it then 
appeared that Mussolini and Hitler would soon be gaining a grateful fraternal ally in a 
Franco-dominated Spain, the Christian Century offered the estimation that the greatest 
menace to the world should no longer have been considered to be the Soviet Union, but 
rather the ascendent ―fascist internationale,‖ which held nothing sacred except the rule of 
the sword.
83
 
 At the same time, these newspapers continued to ponder the Vatican's proposal of  
a joint Catholic-Protestant, anti-communist action; these few sources replied, 
unsurprisingly, with scathing and resounding negativity. The Christian Century 
strengthened its already-established position, opining that this proposed campaign against 
leftist radicalism existed primarily as a means to shore up the power and privilege of the 
Church wherever it might be threatened—and not necessarily by Marxism alone, but also 
by political, social, and economic liberalism. To join such an effort would only be to 
promote reaction, if not to foster a strain of clerical-fascism. Furthermore, the editorial 
staff of the Century thought that this Christian ―anti-communist front‖ could not be 
scrutinized in isolation from the ongoing struggle in Spain. There the Church had a great 
deal to lose and had responded by calumniating the recognized government while 
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essentially beatifying the ―fascist‖ rebels.‖ 84 The only logical option open to Protestants, 
the paper would conclude in a later editorial, would be to ―stay out,‖ unless the suggested 
offensive against communism could be amended to include fascism.
85
 
 There ended the American Protestant commentary for the last half of 1936. 
During this period of time in which the Spanish Civil War broke out in earnest, the 
evidence presented above demonstrates that each of these weekly newspapers adopted 
attitudes favorable to the Republic from the very outset of the conflict, despite their 
denominational differences.
86
 In analyzing these sentiments, one comes away with the 
impression that, by and large, they were inspired by genuine sympathy for the 
beleaguered Spanish government and its ―Loyalists.‖ One cannot, however, entirely 
escape the likelihood that these opinions might have been motivated in part by anti-
Catholicism. Each of these publications put forth certain editorial comments and articles 
which positively dripped with venomous dislike of the supranational Roman Church. And 
often, too, were these pieces written in connection to the Church's position on the Spanish 
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war, its apparent tendency to see communists lurking in every shadow, and its supposed 
mutual understanding, if not alliance, with reaction and fascism. 
 But, in any event, as the year came to a close, the Christian Leader remained the 
sole publication to send holiday greetings, divorced from all politics, to all of suffering 
Spain.
87
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IV. 
 The American Catholic press entertained a very particular degree of interest in the 
Spanish turmoil as it finally erupted into open warfare in July, 1936. And whereas those 
Protestant newspapers cleaved onto their interpretation of the emerging civil war as a 
class struggle (almost with the trappings of Marxist inevitability), the Catholic 
publications tended to see it as a conflict informed primarily by a religious dynamic. 
 Into the month that would witness the beginning of the Nationalist uprising, the 
Catholic journals would note that the discord which had plagued Spain since the February 
elections had not abated. Rumors circulated that a number of the nation's middle- and 
upper-ranking military officers had been arrested for their supposed involvement in an 
alleged conspiracy to effect a coup d'état.
88 
Both America and Commonweal would 
comment on the unrestrained political violence in unhappy Spain following the 
assassination of J. C. Sotelo on 13 July.
89
 This politician, a prominent Catholic 
monarchist and and important member of the rightist opposition to the Popular Front, had 
stood before the Cortes earlier in July and denounced the government for its apparent 
abdication of authority and seeming disregard for public order. He further charged that 
the administration had allowed a certain Spanish ―Red Guard‖ of extralegal paramilitary 
organizations, though political in outward complexion, to subvert the rule of law.
90
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 Events would escalate quickly after the death of Sotelo, though the American 
Catholic papers would, understandably enough, report on Spanish developments with 
confusion for some time. America would offer that while information on the emerging 
war had been proven contradictory or, at best, uncertain, it had been established that the 
revolt had been ―apparently well planned by Fascists and Conservatives later joined by 
Royalists in fair numbers,‖ but had enjoyed a then-undetermined degree of success.91 Yet 
further dwelling in confusion, the editorial staff of America struggled to define the 
rightist movement: sources had ―variously described‖ it as monarchist, fascist, and 
―Restoration[ist].‖92 Whatever the case, this paper held the opinion that the rebellion 
stood as a justifiable ―protest against the prolonged inability of the leftist regime to 
maintain order.‖93 
 It did not take long, however, for these Catholic publications to amend their 
muddled opinions on the civil war and adopt what would become their own standardized, 
nearly unyielding form of rhetoric with in respect to the Spanish conflict, which would be 
notable for its particular emphasis on both Catholic solidarity and anti-communist 
stridency.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Castillo, himself a Guardsman and an active socialist, at the hands of a Falangist gang. These dual 
assassinations, demonstrative of a national crisis careening out of all control, are also considered to be 
the events which precipitated the rebellion. 
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 Indeed, less than a month into the war, America would declare war-ravaged Spain 
to be a ―delightful playground for moralists, special pleaders, [and] propagandists,‖ 
especially for all those ―lovers of Communism and Sovietism‖ who foolishly exalted the 
cause of the Popular Front, though its revolutionary underpinnings and anti-religious 
hatreds had been clearly exposed.
94
 L. K. Patterson, a Jesuit contributor to America, 
commented likewise. However, this author wrote that while the embattled Spanish 
government coalition had been conceived with the sole objective of adding a territorial 
possession to the communist bloc, he reluctantly admitted that the opposing faction likely 
sought to realign the nation under some form of fascist-like regimentation. And though he 
determined neither to be particularly palatable alternatives, he thought better of the latter, 
for whatever its politics might have amounted to, it stood in defense of the Faith against 
the radicals that would have seen it obliterated and scattered to the wind.
95
 America 
would continue with its commentary on the war in this vein for some time, once even 
going as far as to delineate the ―communist‖ cause in Spain, ostensibly espoused by the 
government, as a kind of ―neo-Islam,‖ and hence the greatest threat to Christendom and 
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her civilization.
96
 
 Meanwhile, the Commonweal provided information on the conflict with more 
marked sobriety than had its sister publication, though it did tentatively agree with the 
general hypothesis that, for better or worse, the rightist rebels had more claim to 
righteousness than did the ―radical‖ Spanish government.97 As had the Protestant papers, 
this Catholic journal quickly demonstrated a sensitivity to the potential complications the 
civil war might impose upon the wider stage of international politics. Even as early as 
mid-August, when the rebellion had only just begun, the editors wrote fearfully that the 
Spanish conflagration could become the flashpoint of another general European war, not 
least because the major powers in that part of the world appeared to have declared for one 
side or the other for reasons of irreconcilable ideological sympathies.
98
 
 Catholic interest in this facet of the war would, of course, endure through the 
remainder of that year. Yet, during these few months, these representative Catholic 
publications demonstrated a shift from cautioned skepticism to partisan certainty in 
respect to the civil war in approximately the same fashion as had the Protestant journals. 
During this period of time they became fixated upon the religious aspects of the war and 
dwelt ever more upon the ostensible march of anti-religious communism in Spain that 
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bordered on obsession. This could be considered reasonable, of course, as the Spanish 
branch of their Church had undoubtedly been subjected to horrific persecution as the war 
smoldered through its first phase. Regardless, and perhaps to an extent more so than their 
Protestant contemporaries, these newspapers began to define the war in the sense of stark 
moral absolutism that often attends uncompromising religiosity: in Spain, thereafter, the 
issue was ultimately determined to be between communism and Christianity.
99
 
 Even Commonweal, despite its temperance in previous months, became 
increasingly disturbed with the unceasing reports from Spain detailing the revolutionary 
desecration of the Spanish Church wherever the Popular Front retained power, which the 
weekly concluded to have been enacted with the connivance of Soviet Russia.
100
 The 
Sign, entering the stream of Catholic discourse for the first time since the rising, 
subscribed to this understanding. It further offered that it had been perfectly natural that 
the Spanish clergy committed to the ―conservative and decent‖ rebel coalition against the 
―atheistic communism of the Loyalists,‖ which had been fully unleashed earlier that year 
by radical proselytizers to fulfill their wish to remake Catholic Spain into a Soviet 
possession.
101
 Yet, while urging Catholic Americans to lend their sympathy to tormented 
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Spain as directed by the Vatican, Commonweal retained some of its moderation and 
insisted that Catholics, and more particularly their press, avoid stances of alarmist 
militancy in response to the Spanish Civil War. Its staff appeared to entertain a not-
unfounded fear that uncritical militancy might only arouse latent anti-Catholic feelings 
among certain quarters of public sentiment in the United States which tended to support 
the cause of the Spanish government.
102
  The editorial staff of America, on the other 
hand, scoffed at Commonweal's suggestion. Rather than choosing the route of 
conciliation, the journal scorned all those who defended the ―liberalism‖ of the Spanish 
Republic and the ―communistic‖ Popular Front. It appeared to that journal's writers that 
the definition of the word in contemporary Spain had been corrupted to mean the freedom 
from the restraint which made civilization itself possible.
103
 Indeed, one contributor to 
that publication, J. P. Delaney, would declare that the Catholics of Spain had but ―one 
choice‖ in the matter, and that was either for or against the defense of their God, Country, 
and Civilization in what he (and other Catholics) had already delineated as a religious 
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 ―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 17 October, 1936, 26-27. 
 Especially irksome to the staff of America was the tendency of certain segments of the American press 
to identify the cause of the Republic with ―democracy‖ without qualification; to the editorial staff of 
that publication, this only demonstrated gross political illiteracy. (31 October, 1936, 84-85). 
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crusade against the foreign contagion of atheistic communism.
104
 
 Based upon the evidence presented above, it can be demonstrated that, at least in 
the columns of these few publications, the American Catholics rather quickly adopted the 
conception of the Spanish Civil War as being a struggle between the hateful, atheistic 
barbarity of Moscow and Roman Christian civilization—and then proceeded to reiterate 
it ad infinitum. This pattern would continue throughout the remainder of 1936,  and the 
Catholic press would never acknowledge what troubled their Protestant contemporaries 
about the conflict. That is, of course, the seeming allegiant confluence between the 
Church and Franco's Nationalist movement, which to the Protestants appeared to be an 
emergent iteration of fascism.
105
  
 Indeed, the last two months of the year saw very little development in their 
commentary. But there was, to be sure, a brief period in which a few Catholic writers 
turned their attention away from communism to focus on another whipping-boy, the 
anarcho-syndicalists of Catalonia. To some, these radicals were considered to entertain 
their own conspiracy, born of another poisoned doctrine; to others, they were merely 
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another of Moscow's creeping tentacles. Whatever the case, the anarchists were deemed 
to have been just as injurious to the Faith as the communists.
106
 
 America did, however, report on one interesting event that seems to have escaped 
the notice of the Protestant press. In early November, the so-called American League 
against War and Fascism held a meeting at Madison Square Garden in which 
representatives of the Spanish Popular Front addressed an audience of considerable size 
and presented their country's plight. They apparently argued that their government was 
not at all communistic, but rather proudly democratic. At the same time, according to 
America's commentary, each of the constituent elements of the opposition (including the 
Church) were tarred black with the unsophisticated brush strokes of broad generalization, 
and were depicted as the appendages of advancing fascism.
107
 
 Catholic interest in the internationalized complexion of the Spanish conflict 
naturally endured as the year ended. Perhaps more interestingly, though, one can glean a 
sense of simmering resentment amongst certain Catholic writers in response to the 
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 The substance of this address would actually be turned into a pamphlet entitled ―Spain's Democracy 
Talks to America,‖ which would be published and distributed by the American and Canadian Leagues 
against War and Fascism. This meeting (and the subsequently produced pamphlet) would receive more 
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swelling of anti-Catholic opinion in the United States, ostensibly due to the the civil war. 
Indeed, one F. H. Spearman wrote a piece for America in which he expressed bitterness 
over the fact that Catholic Americans were being forced to ―eat dirt‖ by their neighbors 
and that their Church faced constant defamation from the non-Catholic press.
108
 On the 
other hand, D. C. O'Grady wrote to the Commonweal and endorsed that publication's 
established belief that hysteria or militancy in the Catholic position on the war would 
only elevate anti-Catholic sentiment in the United States, and would contribute to the 
arsenals of those who would place the whole of the Church in the camp of the fascists.
109
 
 But hysteria and militancy had, by the end of 1936, essentially become the 
standard position on the Spanish Civil War by most of the contributors to these few 
Catholic periodicals, and not to mention by the respective staffs thereof. Almost perfectly 
encapsulating this trend, one need only reference the Sign's final relevant article on the 
subject for the year, entitled the ―New Crusade,‖ which called for good Catholic souls to 
declare a modern crusade (that glorious, thoroughly Christian institution) against the 
modern enemy of the Faith, communism, the ―last great heresy of the East.‖110 According 
to the author, the time had then come to confront that mortal enemy as Christ once 
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enjoined: ―...not with peace, but with a sword.‖111 And most Catholic Spain was certainly 
to be the first battlefield. 
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 Ibid. 
 By the end of the year, both Commonweal and America began to press the argument through editorials 
and articles that the use of force by Catholic Spain against its oppressors was justified by religious 
doctrine. (America, 28 November, 1936, 180-181). (The Commonweal, 6 November, 1936, 42-44). 
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V. 
 
 As 1936 faded into 1937, these American Protestant newspapers had, in respect to 
their understanding of the Spanish Civil War, shifted from a position of caution to one of 
entrenched partisanship. For most of 1937, the rhetoric adopted and employed by these 
publications would change very little, and thereby assumed a character of rote 
predictability.
112
 For the Protestants, of course, that would mean a continuation of the 
emotional interpretation of the war as an ideological struggle between democracy and 
reaction (or fascism), however imprecise those terms might have been.
113
 Otherwise, they 
continued to be interested in the internal politics of wartime Spain, the progress of the 
conflict and the way in which the international situation developed around it, the troubled 
work of the Non-Intervention Committee, and the moral dilemma over whether more 
steps should have been taken by the democracies to aid the Republic. There also 
continued, albeit briefly, the derisive discussion of the Vatican's proposed campaign of 
mutual Catholic-Protestant cooperation to confront and destroy the supposed menace of 
communism.
114
 
 Opposite their own interpretation of the war, these publications worried over the 
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extent to which rank-and-file Catholic opinion in the United States trended toward 
sympathy for the Nationalists' ―holy war.‖ They already knew that certain important 
members of the American Catholic hierarchy had come out in favor of the uprising. 
Specifically citing the Archbishop of Cincinnati, J. T. McNicholas, the Christian Century 
summarily denounced him as a pro-Franco propagandist who uncritically towed the 
Catholic line. This clergyman attacked the ―communist‖ government of Spain while 
totally ignoring the ―fascist‖ complexion of the supposedly Christian rebellion.115 The 
Christian Evangelist would express similar concerns: even while the eminently 
conservative Chicago Tribune had concluded that the uprising stood as a reactionary 
assault on a progressive democratic government, Catholics of all descriptions seemed 
unwilling to amend their established definition of the rightist movement as anti-
communist and thoroughly Christian.
116
 Further, the Evangelist held such pro-Franco 
vehemence as a rather foolish blunder, for its staff believed that the Nationalist movement 
had amply demonstrated its fascist proclivities. And fascism, being at its core hostile to 
religion, could never be regarded as a true friend of the Faith; indeed, the paper wrote that 
the ―church which trusts the fascists is a church which walks knee-deep in folly.‖117 
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 The Century would also review with disdain at the Catholic ―American Committee for Spanish Relief‖ 
(chaired, in fact, by the Commonweal's own chief editor, M. Williams). Its editorial staff believed that 
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117
 ―Again, Catholicism and Spain,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 27 May, 1937, 679-680. 
 B. Y. Landis, writing for The Christian Leader would offer likewise. (12 June, 1937, 754-755). 
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 Such charged commentary naturally brought the various editorial staffs of these 
Protestant newspapers again to the consideration of the Catholic Church's conception of a 
pan-Christian anti-communist crusade. Without exception, these writers considered the 
whole idea ludicrous, especially as it seemed to them that it would force Protestantism 
into a sort of stooping vassalage in order to battle an enemy designated exclusively by the 
Pontificate—which, in this case, they believed to be nothing more than a man of straw. 
The Christian Century, as it had earlier established, continued to assert that this proposed 
movement had been born from the Church's desire to preserve its power and privilege 
wherever it faced diminution or destruction, with Spain then being the most obvious 
pressure point.
118
 Moreover, it had become increasingly clear to these journals that the 
whole concept had been fueled by the insufferable arrogance which typically attends 
assumed entitlement, and that the Church did not much care who or what rallied to its 
standard so long as its interests were upheld.
119
 
 Moving away from the more intangible ideological considerations, the staffs and 
contributors to these Protestant newspapers maintained their discourse on the practical 
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1005-1006). 
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 Randall S. Hilton, ―Our Greatest Need,‖ The Christian Leader, 30 January, 1937, 144-145. 
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aspects of the Spanish conflict. As before, they reported on the military undertakings of 
either belligerent faction, expended many column inches on the speculative discussion of 
Spain becoming the casus belli of another general European war, and bemoaned the  
already-compromised mission of the Non-Intervention Committee.  
 They continued their discussion on the complications that the civil war had 
introduced into the arena of international relations, particularly as it then appeared that 
the mastery of the Mediterranean hung in the balance—a question as critical to the 
existing imperial interests of Great Britain as it was to the dearest ambitions of the Italian 
dictator.
120
 And, as Europe had not then been plunged into war over the Spanish crisis, the 
Protestant journals often highlighted the work of the Non-Intervention Committee, 
though they entertained no illusions as to that body's effectiveness in preventing 
international meddling in the conflict, specifically on the part of Italy and Germany. 
These papers offered many editorial opinions on why that necessity had justified such 
contemptuous non-compliance for the fascist powers. They had, during late 1936, 
recognized the legitimacy of the Nationalist movement, and to renege on their Spanish 
commitments would have meant not only the sacrifice of the valuable concessions that 
Franco had supposedly promised them, but would have also constituted a disastrous blow 
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to their international prestige.
121
 
 To have read these Protestant journals without any additional context, one might 
have come away with the conclusion that Franco's rebellion had been fought for him by 
foreign militants and mercenaries of the worst description. Indeed, an early January issue 
of the Christian Leader featured an update on the progress of the conflict, which jokingly 
offered the opinion that the only genuinely Spanish aspect of his campaign had been ―the 
target.‖122 Purporting to understand the object of all this, these publications argued as 
they had for months: that the mutiny had been abetted by Italy and Germany for the sake 
of ensuring the creation of a fascist stronghold on the Iberian Peninsula in order to bolster 
the strength of the previously-delineated ―fascist internationale.‖123 But however the 
Protestants might have been determined to preserve their certitude that the complexion of 
Franco's coalition was more specifically Italian and German than Spanish, they could not 
deny the momentum of his military adventure, which despite his continued frustration 
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before the gates of Madrid, had achieved significant gains across the north of Spain and 
in the Basque provinces.
124
 
 Clearly, then, the Protestants believed that the Non-Intervention Committee had 
failed in its trust and the contemporary military situation reflected it. This aside, there 
were, by the end of the summer of 1937, two more facets of the conflict that captured the 
attention of these newspapers and perhaps bear mentioning.  
 First, they expressed interest in the development of the internal politics of the 
Loyalist camp, particularly after the conclusion of the so-called ―May Days,‖ which 
decisively shifted political patterns within the Republic. In what would later be described 
as a miniature civil war within the wider Spanish Civil War, there transpired in Catalonia 
a series of events which led to an anarcho-syndicalist and ―Trotskyite‖ socialist uprising 
that forced the government to act decisively against it. In the aftermath, the Prime 
Minister, F. L. Caballero, himself a socialist firebrand, faced ejection from the 
government, as did every vestige of anarcho-syndicalist and radical socialist 
representation. This dramatic governmental reorganization received positive commentary, 
particularly by the Christian Century. Its staff offered the opinion that those certain 
uncooperative elements which refused to compromise on their revolutionary ideals for 
the common interest of the Republic had to be jettisoned if the ―fascists‖ were ever to be 
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vanquished.
125
 
  Secondly, a number of Protestant writers confessed to anxiety over the 
contradictions they perceived in the enforcement of American neutrality in respect to the 
Spanish war. While they admitted that the policy would serve as a considerable barrier to 
prevent the United States from becoming entangled in the quarrels of the Old World, it 
definitely constituted a breach of international law in that it refused to acknowledge the 
right of a recognized, friendly government to defend itself in the face of an internal 
revolt.
126
 On a similar note, the Christian Century editorialized on the potential danger 
posed by illegal American volunteerism in the conflict. Though making it clear that its 
sympathies lay with the cause of the Republic and those fighting for it, this paper damned 
the phenomenon as the product of unthinking irresponsibility, for it held the potential to 
undermine the basis of American neutrality.
127 
On the other hand, W. E. Davies, writing 
for the Christian Leader, doubted the traditional route of neutrality. He believed that the 
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Spanish Civil War had forced liberals to confront the discomfiting dangers of the 
contemporary day and arrived at the conclusion that the world had become at once so 
intimately intertwined and simultaneously hostile that isolationism had been rendered 
obsolete. And while he never necessarily advocated for American intervention on behalf 
of the Republic, he did stress the importance of the leadership of the United States against 
the aggressor nations and nascent fascist movements, wherever they should threaten the 
peace.
128
 
 By the Autumn of 1937, as demonstrated by the material discussed above, 
Protestant opinion in respect to the Spanish crisis had remained fundamentally the same 
and, indeed, had been further reinforced. Their faith in the essential righteousness of the 
Republican cause endured, as did their disdain for the ―fascist‖ Nationalist insurgency 
and all those who supported it—most pointedly, it then seemed, the Catholic Church. All 
which one might say had changed was the emergence of the (perhaps limited) opinion 
that the United States owed the Spanish Republic unwavering support, not only out of  
the rightful recognition of international law, but also for the sake of the so-called 
―democratic tradition.‖ This latter line of reasoning would soon become important to the 
next phase of the Protestant discourse on the Spanish Civil War. 
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VI. 
 The year 1937 would see the Catholic press's interpretation of the Spanish Civil 
War transform in a number of ways, some more subtle than others. For example, it 
became increasingly uncommon to read of it as a war of religion or a holy crusade, 
although these papers could never entirely escape from that early judgment.
129
 But 
Catholic writers maintained their fixation on the primacy of international communism as 
the villain in the Spanish drama while continuing to argue for the relative virtues of the 
Nationalist insurgency—all of which came at the expense of somewhat lackluster 
reporting on the progress of the war and the international developments which 
surrounded it. However, there would develop some dissension within the ranks of these 
few Catholic publications. Commonweal began to insist that the conflict be reviewed with 
a greater degree of sensitivity to its nuances, cautioning against reductionist 
interpretations of it, and became something of a voice of reasoned moderation amongst 
its more hysterical peers. This development would be met with outraged incredulity, most 
particularly by America.
130
 Otherwise, there would be some discussion on the notion of 
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old-fashioned anti-Catholicism being a major factor in non-Catholic Americans' support 
of Loyalist Spain. Here again one might perceive a certain tendency amongst the Catholic 
publications: the effort being expended to defend Franco's Nationalists was also a 
convenient reflexive mechanism to protect the denomination they represented.
131
 
 Definitely shifting away from the previous definition of the Spanish war as being 
one of religion, there began in 1937 a veritable Catholic drumbeat to prove that the side 
of Franco's Nationalists more precisely represented liberty than did the Republican 
Loyalists. America even forwarded the notion that the ostensible popularity of the 
uprising represented something akin to a democratic vote, which had clearly stated that 
the ―people of Spain would no longer submit to a government which had allowed chaos 
to prevail.‖132 This same newspaper (along with the monthly Sign) would even solicit 
commentary from G. Robles, the noted Spanish rightist. He would reinforce their 
convictions of the Popular Front being illegitimately constituted, and whether it had sown 
discord itself or merely allowed ―chaos to prevail,‖ it had been the right of the Spanish 
people to revolt.
133
 O. B. McGuire and B. Grimley, writing for the Sign, took further 
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interpretative liberties and asserted that duty to God, no less than patriotism, had impelled 
them to strike against the baleful combine of radical elements which had seized control of 
their country.
134
 
 The Catholic press would naturally continue to pillory this leftist government 
coalition as a purely Soviet construct. These few papers maintained their rhetoric on the 
mortal danger posed to the civilized world by international communism, holding the 
example of contemporary Spain aloft to demonstrate a contextual microcosm of what the 
Comintern envisioned on a global scale.
135
 And yet both America and the Sign would 
again feature articles on Spanish anarcho-syndicalism, indicating that some of their more 
savvy (or perhaps reasonable) contributors understood ideological distinctions and that 
the whole of the Loyalist bloc had never existed as an entirely communist entity. This 
particular strain of radicalism would receive negative commentary, namely in that it 
relied upon terror and violence.
136
 In any event, these papers primarily condemned the 
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agents of Moscow as the primary antagonists in the Spanish crisis. 
 Most particularly concerning to these Catholic newspapers seemed to be the florid 
professions of eternal friendship and brotherhood lavished upon the democracies of the 
world by the Comintern, amounting to its desire for them to join in solidarity against its 
own denominated enemy of fascism. They were of the opinion that these were rather 
naked attempts to lure the democracies into devastating anti-fascist wars to the exclusive 
benefit of the communist cause. Auxiliary to this, on a smaller scale and closer to home, 
the staffs of both America and the Commonweal warned against those native Leagues 
against War and Fascism and pseudo-Popular Front organizations, which they interpreted 
(not necessarily incorrectly) as Trojan Horse-like stratagems for the purposes of  
domestic infiltration and the manipulation of public opinion.
137
 They believed such 
―Trojan Horses‖ to be adept at propagandizing, most especially in the tactic of applying 
damning labels to those who either remained aloof or otherwise refused to participate in 
their anti-fascist adventures—in this case, the Roman Catholic Church.138  
 These Catholic journals assigned blame to the publications of the American Left 
for their apparent role in contributing to this process, especially in their prejudiced and 
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dishonest treatment of the Spanish war, which had led the mass of otherwise decent 
citizens to support the ―Reds.‖139 More specifically, the editorial staff of the Sign 
expressed great anxiety over its perception that substantial elements of the liberal 
Protestant press seemed to be enthusiastic subscribers to the cause of the Republican 
Loyalists, perhaps emboldened by a resurgent anti-Catholic bigotry.
140
 Correspondingly, 
contributors to the Sign would insist upon the necessity of ―enlightening key Americans 
on Spain‖ in order to break the hypnosis that ―Red‖ propaganda held over non-Catholic 
souls.
141
 This may have been a response to the appearance of a certain joint statement, 
published by approximately one hundred American literary figures, in which they 
appealed to all members of their craft to align themselves with the Spanish government, 
which they interpreted as being ―in harmony with American traditions.‖142 A. Beck 
believed that this campaign to arouse non-Catholic Americans had to be taken further, 
and proposed the formation of an organization of Catholic ―Minute Men,‖ which he 
defined as a ―group of letter-writers for protest and correction against the Church in the 
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press.‖143 While obviously an instrument meant to combat (and seemingly escalating) 
anti-Catholic bias, this phenomenon should not have been considered apart from the 
developments relating to the Spanish Civil War. 
 On the opposite side of the same token B. B. Carter, writing for the Commonweal 
did not advocate for the over-simplification of the Spanish issue. She criticized the 
Nationalists, cautioning that it would have been a major embarrassment for American 
Catholics to express unqualified enthusiasm for Franco's cause, only to have it become 
indecent or barbaric later. In her measured opinion, while unpredictable radicalism or 
communist manipulation might have been the rule in Loyalist Spain, the rightist 
insurgency held the potential to institute a regime of reactionary subjugation upon their 
victory.
144
 Indeed, G. N. Shuster, also of the Commonweal, repeated an almost identical 
line in two separate articles. He explained his stance against the ideological streamlining 
of the civil war in that however Catholics might rail against the ―Left‖ in the United 
States for its supposed contributions to the communist propaganda machine, the Church 
had its own apparatus for the same, but opposite, purpose. According to the author, it 
tended to castigate the Spanish Republic and the Popular Front whole-cloth while 
championing Franco's movement, which he believed had amply demonstrated its capacity 
for tyranny.
145
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 As remarkably restrained in tone as these opinion pieces might have been they 
drew intense criticism from the staff of America and some of its contributors. Those 
offended believed that only fundamental ignorance about the realities of Spain could have  
inspired anyone to comment thus.
146
 In fact, the journal felt such a sense of betrayal over 
this issue that its editor, F. X. Talbot, issued a pair of articles in which he sought to clarify 
some truths on the Spanish conflict for his wayward coreligionists (and not to mention  
the general American reading public).
147
 On the other hand, it might seem to disinterested 
observers that America merely seemed resentful that a sister publication would dare to 
break the lockstep of the Catholic phalanx.  
 On the part of the Commonweal, its founder and chief editor, M. Williams, 
responded to America and attempted to explain the appearance of the items which had so 
enraged the staff of the other newspaper. He wrote that while his journal would always 
side with the Church, its mission also required that it serve as an open forum for a variety 
of perspectives.
148
 Regardless, he would proclaim his staunchness of attitude when it 
came to the war. Subscribing to the general Catholic interpretation of the conflict, he 
remained firmly within the pro-Nationalist camp and attacked the American press at large 
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for what he considered to be its poisoned bias, which he explained over a series of five 
―open letters.‖149 
 Indeed, this internal wrangling over interpretative norms (not to mention the 
preoccupation with the almost paralyzing fear of some master communist conspiracy) 
occupied a great deal of the attention of the Catholic press. So much so, in fact, that three 
other important aspects of the war received significantly less discussion than they had 
previously: the actual fighting in Spain, the evolution of the contemporary international 
scene, and the lingering question of religion. 
 Concern naturally endured over the progress of the war and its continued potential 
for it to become another major European confrontation—albeit perhaps to a degree less 
so than could be found in the Protestant papers. Emphasis tended to lie with Franco's 
positive momentum across Spain; these papers tended to ignore his inability to capture 
Madrid, but sang his praises with his triumphant entry into Bilbao, where he had 
apparently been greeted as a savior.
150
 The tragedy of Guernica received some treatment 
by these papers, but they did not, as the Protestant journals had, attribute the crime to the 
Nationalists' German aviators. Rather, in what would become a standard pro-Franco 
rebuttal, they blamed the unworthy act of malice on retreating communist and anarchist 
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incendiaries.
151
 They would also relate their impressions of the ―May Days,‖ which they 
interpreted as perhaps being the death knell for the ―Red‖ government; it then seemed to 
them that the internal unity of the Loyalist coalition faced imminent and catastrophic 
collapse.
152
 Upon the wider stage, there remained a rather markedly infrequent interest in 
the internationalization of the war, most particularly on the botched work of the Non-
Intervention Committee and the unbroken flow of men and materiel into Spain.
153
 
Related to this topic, the Catholic press reported on the danger posed to American 
neutrality by the foreign civil war. They commented positively on the Spanish embargo 
and worried over the problem of the thoroughly illegal practice of American citizens 
sneaking abroad to join in the battle, particularly on the side of the the Republic.
154
  
 And, as for the matter of religion, the Sign continued to dwell thereupon, almost 
alone amongst its peers to do so. That monthly pursued its fixation on cataloging the 
atrocities committed against the Church by the Spanish ―Reds‖ under Russian tutelage, 
According to J. Q. Murphy, this even included a ―Cheka-like‖ police force, designated to 
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the task of running religious figures and the ardently faithful to ground before dispatching 
them in devilish public spectacles.
155
 Commonweal, however, did offer some little 
commentary on the question of religion. E. A. Peers wrote of the ―Spain that had no 
Easter,‖ which he damned as an enduring crime forced upon a bleeding nation by the 
―Reds.‖156 As with the Commonweal, so too with America. Surprisingly, that newspaper 
spent but little space in attempting to refute the charge that had been leveled against the 
complicity of the Spanish Church in fomenting the rebellion, which had been ostensibly 
inspired by the reflexive desire to protect its power and privilege.
157
 Even when America 
and its contemporaries did address these accusations, they tended to treat the very notion 
as if it should have been beneath the contempt of any decent Catholic soul. 
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VII. 
 The evidence presented above indicates that, from the election of the Popular 
Front until the outbreak of the civil war, and into the early Autumn of 1937, the opinions 
of the American Catholic and Protestant presses remained strongly polarized and, indeed, 
fresh developments from Spain only seemed to encourage each camp to further entrench 
themselves. Correspondingly, their respective narratives interpretative the evolving 
Spanish conflict remained in virtual stasis, almost as do broken records. 
 The Catholics maintained their stance on the evils of the embattled Spanish 
government, believing it to have been the product of a malignant foreign doctrine while 
the Nationalist insurgency represented something approximate to the ―true‖ soul of Spain. 
But, while the representative American Catholic journals initially attached enormous 
religious significance to the conflict, they eventually retreated  from this position. 
Although one could never be entirely sure, one might suggest that this might have been 
due in part to a natural emotional response to the supposed horrors being visited upon 
their supranational Church in a foreign land, one which cooled over time. Of course, 
another possible interpretation might suggest that Catholics writers might have restrained 
their religious readings of the conflict out of a fear of provoking the latent anti-
Catholicism of their co-religionists on the other side of the Schism. 
  The Protestant journals, for their part, had entrenched themselves firmly in the 
pro-Loyalist camp from the beginning and served as its rather vocal champions. These 
defenders of the Spanish government were active in dismissing denunciations of 
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radicalism (most especially that of communism) as being the dominant factor in the 
Popular Front. Rather, they insisted upon the government's adherence to the so-called 
―liberal tradition‖ but still retained some vague notions of the almost Marxist inevitability 
of the conflict in Spain. On the other hand, they were quite as active in casting stones at 
the rightist insurgency, which they denounced as being a malicious fascist combine, only 
made possible through the connivance of Italy, Germany, and the authoritarian Roman 
Catholic Church. Here, amongst the Protestant papers, there seemed to be a curious 
mixture of wishing to be the most in line with the spirit (anti-clerical) Left, which might 
have allow them to justify their own proclivities to heap abuse upon the Church. 
 Whatever the case might have been for either side, there would be printed in July 
of that year a certain pivotal document, a joint pastoral letter from the ranking members 
of the Spanish Catholic hierarchy. This missive would not be recognized by any of these 
Christian publications until late August, but it would soon serve as the impetus for a new, 
albeit brief, phase of discussion of the Spanish Civil War in religious press of the United 
States, a phase of discussion centering around an unique conception of religion.
158
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Chapter 2: ―A Species of Religious War‖ 
Autumn-Winter, 1937 
The ―American Civil Religion‖ and the  
Public Climax of the Catholic-Protestant Discourse on the Spanish Civil War 
 
―Well, there's somethin' else to turn to and its just as good as religion. I refer to patriotism. That ain't played 
out. Not only has it not played out; its organized for you just as neatly as religion was when people were 
still religious. Not as many units and individuals, but a better organization than the church ever was. It's 
better because it can use pressure as well as propaganda to put itself over.‖159 
 
 I.  
 However vehement the disagreement had been between American Catholics and 
Protestants in respect to their fundamentally irreconcilable interpretations of the civil war 
in Spain, the waning months of 1937 would witness a dramatic episode that would 
demonstrate the passionate sincerity of commitment with which each Christian faction 
defended its perspective on the Spanish conflagration. Up to that time, the developing 
interdenominational dispute over the distant conflict had been relatively muted by virtue 
of it being essentially relegated to the variously diverse organs of the nation's religious 
press. That comfortable distance from the secular outlets of the news media would be 
significantly reduced beginning in September, 1937 and would continue through October 
of that year; thereafter, the Catholic-Protestant debate would once again become almost 
totally submerged into its accustomed milieu of denominationally-oriented publications.  
 What lends this specific affair its remarkable peculiarity lies in the fact that it took 
shape within the distinguished pages of the New York Times and thereby provided a wider 
reading public with an intimate snapshot of the uncompromising ideological duel even 
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then developing between two distinct blocs of the American Christian intelligentsia. Such 
a prestigious and widely-circulated platform provided each side with the opportunity to 
enunciate the arguments they had been formulating in relation to the bloodshed in Spain 
since the inception of the rightist rebellion in July, 1936 and the subsequent eruption of  
civil war in that country. Furthermore, it is compelling that both the Catholics and 
Protestants took exceptional care in their published missives to conflate their respective 
sentiments regarding either of the belligerent coalitions in Spain with particular reference 
to the ―liberal-democratic tradition,‖ or what might otherwise be delineated as the 
―American civil religion.‖  
 Here, of course, one must address what is meant by ―civil religion,‖ specifically as 
it applies to the United States. It must first be understood that this concept is distinctly 
sociological in its origin and rather flexible, if not nebulous, in its definition. One might, 
however, cite the religious and cultural scholar W. Herberg as a primary historiographical 
progenitor of the theory. He writes that ―civil religion‖ in the United States is the 
enshrinement of the so-called ―American Way of Life,‖ a certain category of civic faith 
held implicitly in common by the nation's citizenry, which tends to operate as a unifying 
force.
160
 The primary determinant of this peculiar dogma of Americanism, Herberg 
further emphasizes, is the intensely romantic and idealistic notion of the immortal 
struggle of democratic liberty against the tyranny of arbitrary authority.
161
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 R. N. Bellah, moreover, has earned recognition as another definitive promulgator 
of the theoretical principle of the American ―civil religion.‖ In an article from latter 1977, 
he posited broadly that: 
―...there are...certain common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of 
Americans share. These have played a crucial role in the development of American 
institutions and still provide a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, 
including the political sphere. This public religious dimension is expressed by a set of 
beliefs, symbols, and rituals...‖162 
 
Bellah further asserted that the sacral lore and iconography of the American Revolution 
represents perhaps the deepest fount of this supposed ―civil religion,‖ which has 
contributed to a shared national experience that is: ―...genuinely American,‖ having ―...its 
own prophets and its own martyrs, its own sacred events and sacred places, its own 
solemn rituals and symbols.‖163 
 It follows, then, that such a ―creed of Americanism‖ in the United States would be 
primarily constructed upon a highly romanticized (indeed, pseudo-religious) history of all 
that which contributed to the roiling ferment of ideological passion at the nation's 
conception—which could further be defined as a sort of legitimizing ―origin myth.‖ 
Indeed, one need not reach far to identify the underlying legendary trappings in the 
American ―civil religion.‖ The prophets, heroes, and saints of the American myth would 
certainly be the righteously rebellious Founding Fathers, the Continental Congress and 
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Army. The mortal victims of the repression of the Crown, most notably those fatally 
wounded in the so-called ―Boston Massacre‖ of 1770, could correspondingly fill the 
―religious‖ role of the martyred dead. Likewise, the signing of the Declaration of 
Independence (itself a ―holy‖ American text) in 1776, General George Washington's bitter 
encampment at Valley Forge in the Winter of 1777-1778,  and the fateful Siege of 
Yorktown in 1781 all serve similar ―religious‖ functions. Such factors, perhaps, 
compound to form a sense of a common national doctrine of civic faith or, as Bellah 
writes, ―...the civil religion is...a genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent 
religious reality as seen in or...as revealed through the experience of the American 
people,‖164 which ―serve[s] as a genuine vehicle of national religious self-
understanding.‖165 
 With this essentialist definition in hand, it might now be posited that, at least in 
part, it was through this unique prism of the ―American civil religion‖ that the Catholic 
and Protestant factions in the United States had come to observe the unfolding events of 
the civil war in distant Spain. It seems as if, by the autumn of 1937, either 
denominational bloc had determined, whether consciously or not, to interpret the highly 
politicized conflict in the familiar context of their own nation's formative revolutionary 
experience and ideological traditions, the fundamental essence of ―Americanness.‖ 
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II. 
 The clearest evidence to suggest such a phenomenon might be found across three 
specific, denominationally-oriented articles featured prominently in the New York Times 
between 3 September, 1937 and 14 October, 1937. This short series of articles laid bare 
the intensity of a curious religious segment of the antagonisms wrought in the United 
States by the Spanish Civil War, wherein both Catholics and Protestants publicly and 
most fully integrated their arguments with the principles of the national ―civil religion.‖ 
 The most remarkable feature of these opinion pieces is that they illustrate, in a 
general sense, how certain groupings of concerned Americans projected themselves into 
the Spanish trenches based upon lines of religious fidelity. Moreover, the pro-Nationalist 
Catholics and their pro-Loyalist rivals, as reflected in the contributions to  their press 
organs, imbued their respective factions in Spain with the most heady, enlightened 
principles which energized the American Revolution, the so-called ―Spirit of 1776.‖ 
Furthermore, these uncompromisingly sectarian letters positively overflow with 
acrimonious trans-factional denunciations. Either camp accused its opponent of 
lamentable political irresponsibility (if not gross political illiteracy) and essential moral 
bankruptcy for supporting the ostensibly ―wrong‖ combatant alliance in the Spanish 
conflict. Such charges naturally lent themselves to mutually opposing indictments 
suggesting the deplorable American character and ideological extremism of one side 
against the other.  
 This highly publicized episode of the theretofore obscured clash within the 
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American religious press between Catholics and Protestants began to take shape as the 
war raged into the summer of 1937. On 1 July of that year, a number of the upper Spanish 
Catholic hierarchy issued a joint pastoral letter to the effect of justifying the position of 
the Church in relation to the civil war. It would be reprinted in the New York Times on 3 
September, 1937, ultimately becoming the catalyst for the intensification of the 
denominational dispute in the United States; moreover, it would serve to encourage the 
discussion of the American ―civil religion‖ in the context of the Spanish Civil War. 
 This piece must first be noted for its length, being in excess of a full page. The 
mere fact that it received such a substantial amount of space in what can certainly be 
nominated as a premier American publication suggests that a great deal of 
contemporaneous importance had been attached to it. Yet one must also question, 
however unprofitably, why there had been a delay of two months between the letter's 
original publication abroad and the date at which it appeared in the columns of the Times. 
Whatever the case may have been, one must next recognize the editorial introduction to 
the letter, which stated that it represented the ―...official and authoritative Catholic 
position with regard to the war in Spain‖ by virtue of it being ―...signed by two Cardinals 
six Archbishops, thirty-five Bishops, and five Vicars Capitular.‖166 
 Given the prestigious ecclesiastical background of the letter's signatories and the 
generally discomfiting experiences of the Spanish Church since the founding of the 
Second Republic, it should be of little surprise that this clerical interpretation accentuated 
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the religious dynamic of the conflict. Rather than identifying the war as a product of 
exploded political, social, and economic tensions, the prelates referred to it primarily as a 
kind of modern holy war, a ―...decisive struggle for or against the religion of Christ and 
Christian civilization.‖167 Indeed, the prelates expended a great deal of space in 
enumerating the radical attacks mounted against the Church by the Republican 
government—ostensibly an insufferable series of heinous crimes that had been ongoing 
since 1931. While the hierarchs asserted that the organs of Spanish Catholicism had acted 
in the properly submissive manner toward the legally-constituted political authority in the 
interest of the national weal, they also wrote that the forces of secularizing liberalism  
offered no quarter to the Church and her orders, and had acted determinedly to abolish 
the ancient rights. To the clergymen, this perfectly encapsulated the unreasoning and 
uncompromising hatred of the Faith by the political Left. In response to the virulence of  
Republican anti-clericalism, they further claimed to have expressed their disagreement 
with the government through peaceful protest, for they believed that such a direction 
represented a potentially fatal deviation away from the traditional union of the Faith with 
the functions of temporal government in Spain.
168
 
 Though the electoral mechanisms of the Republic provided for the ascent of a 
conservative administration (as aligned beneath the banner of G. Robles' CEDA coalition) 
after November, 1933, the prelates emphasized that the threat embodied by the militant 
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forces of the Left had not been ameliorated. In fact, their letter suggested that the political 
frustrations of the Left had left it sullen and seething. Over time, the danger from that end 
of the political spectrum compounded, reaching its essential apex as the diverse factions 
of the Left unified in a pact of mutual solidarity—the Popular Front. Aligned thus, the 
Left managed to secure the general elections of February, 1936. To the clerics, however, 
this novel political confederation had triumphed at the ballot box only through fraud, 
intimidation, and violence. Moreover, the Popular Front represented little more than a 
puppet to certain ―...hidden powers which controlled its functions,‖ a rather thinly veiled 
reference to the Communist International and the Kremlin.
169
  Therefore, Catholic 
authorities insisted that the legality of the government existed only in name, and that the 
Popular Front stood merely as a mirage to conceal the sinister collusion between the 
Communist Party of Spain (Partido Comunista de España, PCE), its allies, and the Soviet 
Union. Naturally, they wrote, this conspiracy had been carefully designed to maneuver 
the nation into position for positioning the nation for a sanguinary Marxist revolution 
with the ultimate aim of shifting governmental power from an ―irresponsible autocracy of 
a parliament‖ toward ―a more terrible one of a dictatorship without roots in the nation.‖170 
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 According to this ―authoritative‖ Catholic interpretation the military uprising in 
July, 1936 should have been lauded, in spite of the terrible civil war it wrought. The 
hierarchs wrote that even as the former failed to attain its immediate objective and the 
latter took shape, the looming prospect of wholesale revolutionary upheaval had been 
mercifully preempted, at least partially quelling the attendant Red terror that would have 
moved to extinguish the torch of Christian civilization in Spain for all time. They 
believed that such a claim found ample justification in light of the breathtaking number of 
sacrilegious outrages committed against the Church throughout the reign of the Popular 
Front and the course of the war.
171
 
 And yet, it would have likely been interpreted as highly unseemly if 
representatives of this transnational, ostensibly peaceful Christian institution asserted so 
openly belligerent a position. Even while the signatories affirmed the righteousness of the 
Nationalist cause in the defense of the Faith, traditionalism, and sound government, they 
also contended that they did not wish for the war and, indeed, lamented it. However, they 
believed that the fury of war could sometimes act as a facilitator of peace, for ―...war...[is] 
yet sometimes the only remedy for replacing things on the center of the pivot of justice 
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and bringing them back to the Kingdom of Peace.‖172 And, to this end: 
 
―...the Church, even while she is the daughter of the Prince of Peace, has blessed the 
emblems of war, has founded the military orders, and has organized the Crusades against 
the enemies of the Faith.‖173 
 
 One need not dwell on this statement, for it is readily apparent that the clergymen 
had already delineated the Republic (or, perhaps more specifically, the Popular Front and 
its Loyalists) as the ―enemy of the Faith,‖ the principal target of a cleansing ―Crusade‖ 
for the purpose of replacing the nation ―on the center of the pivot of justice.‖ This 
―center‖ could have been fairly interpreted by any critical audience to suggest an 
aggressive return to a more traditional and authoritarian Spain, with the former temporal 
powers and privileges of the Church restored unto her. Through this argument, then, the 
clerics would have certainly appeared to have married the religious elements of their 
supposed holy war with the broader, more mundane socio-political aspects of the 
struggle. 
 Even as these members of the Spanish hierarchy clearly emphasized the conflict 
as a necessarily Christian campaign against the savage throngs of Marxist infidels, they 
also posited that the war had been required to correct a dire political imbalance in Spain.  
Indeed, they insisted that the rebellion represented the popular will given martial form, a 
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natural manifestation of the mass murmurings of the dissatisfied and disillusioned 
citizenry. The rightist insurgency stood as a ―civil-military movement,‖ an ―armed 
plebiscite‖ and, in so being, actually demonstrated unimpeachable loyalty to the liberal 
ideals of popular government. Therefore, the Nationalist coalition embodied the only 
truly patriotic spirit of modern Spain, essentially reflecting the traditionalist impulses of 
the general public, which simultaneously harmonized with the ―historical essence of 
Spain.‖174 
 For all the support lent to the counter-revolutionary Right, the representatives of 
the Spanish Church also seemed to have had some reservations against fully committing 
to the cause of the Nationalists, for: 
―...[it] has not been able to identify herself with [the] conduct, tendencies, or intentions 
which at the present time or in the future might be able to distort the character of the 
national movement, its origins, manifestations, and ends.‖175 
 
Moreover, the clerics urged prudence from the leaders of the insurgency—specifically in 
that when the time came to establish a new regime in peaceful Spain, that: 
―...they [would] not accept foreign models for the structure of the future of the State, but 
that they [would] consider the requirements of the national life from within, and the 
course marked by past centuries.‖176 
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 Given their highly privileged vantage point, these two statements probably 
indicate that the clergy felt at least a certain degree of apprehension in respect to the 
rebelling faction. That they were not willing to more forthrightly express such any such 
misgivings regarding their ostensible defenders should be obvious. Whatever the case, it 
seems that their not unfounded concerns were twofold. First, while the prelates' letter 
underscored the crimes of the Republic against the Faith and the atrocities that followed 
the ascent of the Popular Front, there remained the unsettling reality that the Nationalists, 
especially their Moorish auxiliaries, could be unnecessarily cruel and bloodthirsty. 
Yet again, for the seeming double-mindedness on this first point, the ecclesiastical 
statement partially reversed direction and claimed that if any unseemly or barbaric 
conduct could have been attributed to the Nationalist camp, then it had been essentially 
defensive in nature—an unfortunately necessary countermeasure against a guileful and 
merciless foe.
177  
 
Considering their second statement, the clergymen apparently had cause to worry 
that the Nationalists, pending their victory, might unduly impose some alien system of 
governance upon the nation, something hazardously foreign to the traditions and 
historical essence of Spain. Such a reference hearkened to the reality of the rather 
substantial Italian and German intervention on behalf of the Nationalist upstarts: the 
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Spanish prelates seemed to have feared, as did international observers, that the rebels had 
become so beholden to their benefactors that a triumphant Nationalist Spain would have 
been essentially forced into a humiliating state of vassalage, if not puppetry, to the Fascist 
and National Socialist regimes. Once again, a critical audience might have interpreted 
this position as being one that embraces authoritarianism—albeit in form thoroughly 
Catholic in its conception and execution, as dictated by ―the course of past centuries.‖178 
 The signatories concluded their apostolic letter with a prayer that the passionate 
hatreds rampant in Spain might be dampened, and for the love of Christ to be restored for 
the sake of sanity, justice, and order. In the meantime, however, they stressed the  
necessity of Catholic solidarity, primarily through the steadfast adherence to the line they 
had established by ―watching over the Catholic press and propaganda, rectifying the 
mistakes of that which is indifferent or adverse.‖179 
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III. 
 The Spanish hierarchs' letter, following its rather belated publication in the United 
States, floated about unanswered for approximately one month. Then, on 4 October, 
1937, a group of some 150 assorted American Protestant clergymen and laypersons—
educators, literary figures, and sundry—issued a vitriolic (and, perhaps, presumptuous)  
challenge in the New York Times to the Spanish prelates and, by an immediately obvious 
extension, their Catholic brethren in the United States. Therein, one might find one of the 
very few significant instances of the secular publicization of the Catholic-Protestant 
debate on the American ―civil religion‖ as it related to the Spanish Civil War. 
 In their reply to the Spanish hierarchy, the Protestant signatories dismissed out of 
hand the interpretative notion of the distant conflict as any sort of holy war or Crusade; 
rather, they diagnosed the war as being one borne of long-festering political, social, and 
economic tensions within that unhappy nation. Furthermore, they asserted their profound 
disquiet that ranking officials of the Spanish Church would attempt to justify a military 
insurrection against a legally-constituted democratic government to the world at large, all 
for the ostensible purpose of defending the worst sort of regressive traditions of the 
establishmentarian Roman Catholic Church.  
 As such, the Protestants' missive denounced the Spanish clergy for its 
unapologetically reactionary position, which offended a number of the fundamental 
components of the American experiment (or, perhaps, certain tenets of the liberal-
democratic tradition that act as the infrastructure for the national ―civil religion‖): ―[the] 
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principle [of] democratic institutions, the freedom of worship, and separation of church 
and State.‖180 These Protestants felt so strongly about the socio-political stance adopted 
by the Spanish Church that they condemned it as being an essentially medieval entity—
thus the mortal enemy not only of the Republic and the Popular Front, but also of the core 
precepts of liberalism and parliamentary government in general. They reviled this 
―authoritative‖ position of Spanish Catholicism, holding it aloft to demonstrate it as being 
singly representative of a hopelessly obscurantist worldview; indeed, they found it 
―...hard to believe that [it] was written in the twentieth century.‖181 
 Further lambasting the Spanish clerics, the Protestants reiterated the prelates' own 
assertion that following the legal incorporation of the Second Republic in 1931, the 
Spanish Church had dutifully bent the knee to the secular authorities of a dawning 
political regime. Then, expressing mock puzzlement, they wondered why the Catholic 
position had been so thoroughly reversed after the elections of 1936. Essentially leveling 
an accusation of rank duplicity and cynical opportunism against the Spanish hierarchy, 
the Protestants queried that if the Church had truly honored the democratic mechanisms 
of the Republic, why had she rallied to the banner of an unseemly coalition of 
seditionaries which fomented open rebellion with the express intent of usurping the 
power of the duly constituted government administration of the Popular Front? This was 
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considered to be doubly heinous in that the Church had conspicuously lauded the election 
results of 1933, after which the political pendulum in Spain swung heavily toward the 
traditionalist Right.
182
 
 Thereby, the Protestants declared, this ―authoritative‖ stance of the Spanish clerics 
could only be interpreted as a malignant sally against the fundamental ideals and 
institutions of liberal democracy, and also as a naked expression of longing for a 
wholesale return to the Church's preeminent position of worldly power in Spain, with all 
its attendant privileges restored. They found further cause for dismay in the hierarchy's 
assertion that the rebellion represented an ―armed plebiscite‖ of the Spanish people—for 
if this were to be accepted as truth, would it have not also been just to describe the 
Moorish, German, and Italian ancillary forces supporting the Nationalists as ―imported 
voters?‖183 Indeed, though the mainline Catholic position never hesitated to illuminate 
and condemn Soviet intervention in the civil war (and not to mention the ostensible 
international communist conspiracy embodied in the Popular Front), it consistently 
ignored, evaded, or dismissed the embarrassing complication of the collaborative 
relationship shared between Nationalist Spain and the two ―fascist‖ behemoths of the 
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Continent. 
 According to the Protestants, these elements coalesced as certain ranking clerical 
officials of the Spanish Catholic Church stated that their support of the rightist insurgency 
emerged from their interpretation of the movement as being a defensive maneuver, a 
preventative measure from having the nation shift from the ―irresponsible autocracy of a 
parliament‖ toward ―a more terrible one of a dictatorship without roots in the nation.‖184 
Naturally, the Protestant's challenge subscribed to the logic that such a statement would 
imply that the only fitting form of autocracy or dictatorship for Spain would be one with 
roots in the nation—that is, one defined by a traditionalist and authoritarian power 
structure, reinforced by a virile military apparatus, the unassailable moral authority of the 
Roman Catholic Church, and so forth. 
 To the citizenry of the United States, presumedly inculcated in their peculiar ―civil 
religion,‖ such an condemnatory interpretation of the stand taken by eminent Catholic 
ecclesiastics would certainly seem to reflect a base contempt for the basic criteria of 
enlightened, liberal democracy. However, for this self-appointed group of Protestant 
prosecutors, the problem of the Catholic position on Spain ran far deeper. They worried 
whether the Spanish hierarchy spoke merely for itself, or if it echoed the enshrouded 
sentiments of the governing authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, as directed from 
the resplendent halls of the Vatican. Might, they further reasoned, the clerical leadership 
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of the Church in the United States hold a similar degree of disdain for the institutions of 
liberalism and popular government? Could the American Catholic hierarchy and 
priesthood have the ability to leverage moral or spiritual suasion over their collective 
flock to inculcate and entrench such a point of view? They believed this to be a plausible 
scenario with a reasonable basis for alarm, for during the approximate month after the 
publication of the prelates' letter, no detectable voices from the estate of American 
Catholicism had raised the hue and cry of incredulity against their Spanish co-
religionists.
185
 
 Concluding their response, the Protestants expressed their profound regret that the 
issue of religion had been dragged into the fray by the Spanish clerics, especially when 
the true battle in Spain could so obviously be delineated as one between the avatars of 
progressivism and democracy versus those of reactionary elitism, if not militaristic 
fascism. While lamenting the meteoric upsurge of popular anti-clerical (as opposed to 
simply anti-religious) violence mounted against the Church in Spain, they regarded the 
scenario as almost unavoidable—implying that such acute suffering had been the just 
reaping for a centuries-old tradition of institutionalized reaction. Regardless, the 
representative Protestants believed that it had been quite unfortunate that the Spanish 
hierarchy had situated itself on the ―wrong‖ side of the conflict, and that the official 
position of the Church in that country had unflinchingly expressed ―...contempt [for the] 
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principles that are precious to the heritage of the American people.‖186  
 This concluding statement, then, might be fairly nominated as an interpretation of 
the Spanish war through the lens of the American ―civil religion,‖ as it seemed to evoke 
certain ―sacred‖ tenets of Americanism—particularly those which have been thought to 
have propelled the course of the nation's Revolutionary past and endured to define its 
enduring politico-cultural ideology. As such, the concerned Protestants seem to have 
rallied to the ostensibly democratic ideals which they believed to have been the animating 
force behind the Republic—rather than attempting to present any sort of comprehensive 
defense of the beleaguered government administration itself. On the other hand, they did 
not hesitate to place the the Spanish Catholic Church alongside the selfsame forces of 
tyranny against which the American revolutionaries of generations past had waged a war 
of liberation. And, to this effect, the Protestant signatories seem to have offered a 
challenge to the Catholics of the United States to establish a case in defense of their own 
righteous adherence to the unspoken precepts of ―Americanism.‖ 
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IV. 
 A mere ten days after the publication of the American Protestants' open letter, a 
group of some 175 American Catholic clergymen and miscellaneous laypersons issued a 
bitter riposte, again published in the New York Times. Prior to scrutinizing the content 
therein, it must be noted that this bloc, ostensibly representative of American Catholicism 
as a whole, could not countenance being upstaged by the assailants of their denomination, 
and so assembled twenty-five more signatories for the purpose of strengthening their 
retaliatory missive. Moreover, they seemed particularly interested in ensuring that only 
the very best and brightest of the American Catholic intelligentsia, the opinion-shapers of 
their sect, signed the document. Indeed, their list of signatories includes over twenty 
presidents and deans from numerous American universities, colleges, and seminaries, an 
approximate number of individuals occupying professorial posts, and, in an amazing 
display of professional solidarity, nearly eighty editors and managers of Catholic 
publications from all around the nation. 
 While their response dwelt briefly upon the primarily religious interpretation of 
the conflict, as originally established by their Spanish brethren, they also felt a natural 
compulsion to pick up the gauntlet of ―Americanism,‖ which had seemingly been cast at 
the feet of American Catholicism by their Protestant countrymen. Herein one might 
discern a continuation—and even and intensification—of the quarrelsome domestic 
discourse on the ―civil religion‖ of the United States in respect to the civil war in Spain.  
 Positing that the Spanish strife had been grossly misrepresented, these Catholics 
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insisted emphatically that the general understanding thereof had been perverted by the 
non-Catholic American press through a pronounced lack of anything even remotely 
resembling an objective, adequately nuanced presentation of the conflict. Naturally, such 
a charge indicted both the the secular and Protestant presses on the count of open 
partisanship in favor of the Republican Loyalist cause. Given the dominant influence of 
these (rather generalized) presses, it had become an unfortunate contemporary reality that 
the balance of the American public had been induced ―...to favor the Madrid government 
and to condemn outright those who were immediately designated as rebels.‖187 They 
argued that the dynamics of the struggle had been rendered more glaringly apparent as 
the war raged into the latter half of 1937, and that therein had been created an opportunity 
for a genuine reappraisal of either belligerent coalition then active in Spain. 
Striking at the vital center of the issue, these select Catholics immediately declared their 
support for the Spanish Nationalists, heralding the rightist alliance as the collective 
champion of ―civic and religious freedom for all men.‖188  
 Wasting neither space nor ink, this formidable group of eminent Catholics 
immediately registered their profound disgust with the statement issued to their suffering 
Spanish coreligionists from the camp of American Protestantism. They not only 
denounced the contrarian interpretation of the contest in Spain as misinformed and 
irresponsible, but further accused the Protestants of malicious intent, in that their position 
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―...[had] also tended to create a species of religious war in the United States.‖189 While 
obviously a tremendous exaggeration of the rhetorical skirmishes in which the conflicting 
denominations of American Christianity had engaged over the Spanish Civil War, such an 
assertive comment evidences the depth of passion that the debate had engendered in this 
supposedly representative section of the American Catholic intelligentsia. In any event, 
the counter-response sought to defend the essential consonance of Roman Catholicism 
with the principles of ―Americanism,‖ while simultaneously challenging the ostensible 
foes of the Church with a similar volley of searching criticism.  
 In reality, the Catholics believed that the test had been put to their denominational 
antagonists. How, they demanded, could these self-appointed delegates of American 
Protestantism endorse a governmental regime that had been founded upon the 
predominant participation of dangerously radical socialist, communist, and anarcho-
syndicalist elements, and which further had actively pursued a relentless campaign of 
anti-Christian persecution since its fraudulent ascent in February, 1936. How, in short, 
could American Protestantism ―...champion a regime that [had] consistently violated in 
theory and in practice the fundamental principles of liberty and democracy guaranteed by 
the Constitution of the United States?‖190  
 After having thus established such a framework, which obviously incorporated a 
number of the elements critical to the infrastructure of the American ―civil religion,‖ the 
Catholic clergymen reinforced the argumentative foundation previously established by 
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their Spanish brethren. Namely, they reaffirmed that the Nationalist uprising represented 
a justifiable strike against the malevolent forces of Bolshevism and anarchism, as 
embodied in the Popular Front coalition. Although the Catholics' rejoinder tended to 
disregard certain inconvenient, anti-democratic statements made by the Spanish 
hierarchy, it nevertheless attempted to inject a certain element of ―Americanism.‖ Indeed, 
they insisted that the treacherous conspiracy impelling the Popular Front government 
sought only to usurp the liberty afforded to the people of Spain by the institutions of the 
Second Republic. To that effect, the Catholics seized upon the prelates' declaration of the 
insurgency as an ―armed plebiscite,‖ and applauded it as being in keeping with the most 
noble principles of the American revolutionary experience: 
―The citizens of Spain...were justified by the right of self-defense in rising up against a 
malign power that was surely and inevitably destroying their country. Those who would 
deny them the exercise of this inalienable right would with equal logic have denied to the 
American people in 1776 the exercise of their inalienable right to rebel in arms against a 
government which suppressed their liberties.‖191 
 
 Here the Catholic signatories obviously attempted to craft a thematic corollary 
between the American War of Independence and the Spanish Civil War. To complete this 
dramatic narrative of interpretation—however curious it may have been—one needed to 
substitute the patriotic thirteen colonies with Nationalist Spain to fill the role of the 
protagonist; similarly, the villainous British Empire had to be replaced by the Popular 
Front (with, of course, the ―imperial‖ might of the Soviet Union lurking just behind it). 
However, the Catholics did not attempt to overburden this image. To have done so would 
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have necessitated the portrayal of Soviet intervention and the Loyalists' deployment of 
the Comintern's International Brigades as essentially ―Hessian‖ in complexion; yet that 
would have perhaps suggested the troubling notion of leaving the heroic roles of the 
Marquis de Lafayette and the Baron von Steuben to Fascist Italy and National Socialist 
Germany. 
 Yet, for this heightened exposition on the heady precepts and ―sacred‖ 
iconography of Revolutionary America (or, rather, on the national ―civil religion‖), the 
representatives of American Catholicism could not seem to totally escape from the 
religiously-oriented interpretative framework established by their Spanish counterparts. 
Citing the words of Paul Claudel, former French ambassador to the United States, they 
posited that: 
―It is impossible to understand the Spanish Revolution...unless one sees it not as an 
attempt at social construction as in Russia, with the idea of substitution one order for the 
other, but an enterprise of destruction, long prepared and guided, particularly against the 
Church.‖192 
 
As had the Spanish Catholics before them, the Americans strongly emphasized the 
elements of early Republican anti-clerical secularism, which had metamorphosed into 
repressive anti-religious brutality under the auspices of the communist-directed Popular 
Front. 
 However, while their sentiments definitely echoed those of the Spanish hierarchy, 
even a cursory reading of the American Catholics' letter would suggest that they 
recognized a great deal more importance in the ideological frameworks then conflicting 
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in Spain. This may have been, of course, a defensive maneuver against the Protestants' 
broadside; after all, the Catholics necessarily had to marshal their counter-arguments on 
the rhetorical battlefield of their adversary's choosing. Whatever the case, they concluded 
by brooking absolutely no compromise with their opponents. They did not waver in their 
conviction that the administration of the Popular Front stood as a perverse Soviet 
connivance and that the Loyalist military apparatus represented the vanguard of a 
revolutionary Red Army for the pending Bolshevization of Spain. Meanwhile, the 
Nationalists exemplified the patriotic cause of God and Country, the insuperable will of 
the Spanish people, as transmitted through the anguished plea of the valiant prelates of 
the Church. Collectively, theirs betokened the true spirit of liberty then struggling to 
emerge in Spain, for the Nationalists championed: 
―...the principles enunciated by George Washington and the founders of the American 
Republic and embodied in our democratic laws and institutions: the freedom to worship 
God in peace, freedom to educate one's children according to the dictates of one's 
conscience, freedom from the interference and tyranny of foreign States and alien 
agitators.‖193  
 
 Any potential analyses of the American Catholics' response notwithstanding, one 
must acknowledge that the Protestants did not invoke the iconography of the national 
―civil religion‖ to nearly this extent. Whether culling forth these ―sacred‖ principles 
demonstrated either the fundamental strength or weakness of their contextual translation 
of the Spanish turmoil is, again, a matter of individual interpretation. 
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V. 
 Brief in duration though it may have been, the series of articles which appeared in 
the columns of the New York Times in Autumn, 1937 must have served to inform the 
general reading public as to the intensity (if not the mere existence) of this contemporary 
denominational conflict in the United States. Meanwhile, this peculiar war of words 
continued apace in the pages of the various organs of the nation's religious press.  
 Even as the Spanish prelates' appeal passed before the eyes of the American 
public for the first time on 3 September, 1937, the respected Catholic publication 
Commonweal, published a brief editorial on the controversial topic of the Spanish war. 
This particular piece discusses the position of Cardinal Isidro Gomá y Tomás, the 
Archbishop of Toledo and the Primate of Spain—certainly the highest-ranking member of 
the Catholic clergy to survive the violent anti-religious campaign in that troubled country. 
Gomá y Tomás, in adhering to the Catholic interpretative line, emphatically denied that 
the struggle in Spain had anything to do with the competing tyrannies of atheistic 
communism versus totalitarian communism. Rather, the war stood as the crucial modern 
struggle between antithetical civilizations, the first tilt of the final duel between the 
spiritual bankruptcy of Marxist materialism on the one hand, and the redeeming grace of 
Christianity on the other. Leaving no question in respect his prejudices, the Primate 
situated himself firmly within the Nationalist camp, those so-called ―fascists‖ who 
wielded the holy sword in the name of most Catholic Spain. 
 Closing on a note of tempered frustration, this article confirmed that the opinions 
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of Gomá y Tomás represented the authoritative Catholic position in Spain, at least as far 
as hierarchical preeminence had been concerned. And, being such, Commonweal believed 
that the Primate's irreproachable word should have contributed to the general efforts of 
the Catholic press to awaken the American public to the true dimensions of the war in 
Spain.
194
 
 Only by the next week's issue, however, did Commonweal recognize the 
existence, to say nothing of the importance, of the Spanish clerics' missive. The news-
sheet restated the arguments set forth in the prelates' letter: that the Church had in no wise 
been culpable in fomenting the war, that the Church faced a malevolent opponent who 
sought to occasion its extinction, that the Nationalist revolt had been a preemptive 
measure against an impending Marxist revolution, and so forth.
195
 When taken together 
with the previous editorial, the discussion of this, the truly ―authoritative‖ Catholic 
position on the Spanish strife could only have served to sharpen the sense of rectitude 
entertained by some of the more zealous Catholic elements in the United States. 
 Indeed: as in Commonweal, so in America. By 11 September, 1937, this weekly 
newspaper noted that the Vatican had afforded de facto recognition—and therefore moral 
subscription—to the legitimacy of the cause of Nationalist Spain. Its editorial staff also 
acknowledged the existence of the joint pastoral letter and further insisted upon the 
document's significance as the only reasoned, dignified (and ostensibly truthful) 
statement to have emerged in respect to the Spanish conflict. To that effect, the paper 
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insisted that the dictates of conscience should require every responsible thinking 
American to review and contemplate the clerics' missive.
196
 It hardly needs to be stated 
that America obviously believed that this plaintive letter from distant Spain would serve 
to win more American supporters to the pro-Nationalist camp. 
 Presumably, hardline Catholic publications like America would have liked to have 
seen a greater prevalence of opinion like that demonstrated by one A. F. McGovern, 
whose letter saw publication in the 17 September edition of Commonweal. He wrote of 
the Spanish Loyalists and their international supporters as being not unlike the pro-British 
Loyalists and their Tory masters in the American Revolution: that is, of course, those who 
stood as the enemies of the true cause of liberty. Meanwhile, the Spanish insurgents, in 
spiritual consonance with the bygone American upstarts, represented the side of 
intelligence and dignity, of God and Country—with Franco as their man-on-horseback, 
their twentieth-century Washington. As freighted with elements of the national ―civil 
religion‖ as this sentiment might have been, McGovern still partially leaned upon the 
clerical insistence that the Spanish Civil War stood as a fundamentally religious conflict 
between the competing civilizations of communism and Christianity.
197
  
 This particular facet of the Catholic argument found more support in an article 
entitled ―Further Processes in Spanish Sovietization‖ in America. The author believed 
that no true Christian soul who also bent the knee before the altar of democracy should 
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either condone or support the Loyalist cause—Moscow's most obvious marionette in the 
international communist conspiracy against the Faith in the pursuit of global ascendency 
for its heretical creed. Contrarily, the article denounces the oft-repeated calumniation 
against the Church for situating herself amidst the ―fascists.‖ Returning to the Spanish 
clerics' assertion, the author reiterates that the Church's alliance with Nationalists had first 
been borne from the necessity of self-preservation; nevertheless, the Church had come to 
recognize and bless the banners of the insurgents, those crusaders for God and Country.
198
 
 Though the September, 1937 edition of the Sign did not (or more likely had been 
unable to) acknowledge the appearance of the Spanish prelates' appeal, it remained in 
lockstep with its sister publications. As to the Nationalist movement, of course, the 
magazine retained the uniform Catholic stance of it being the champion of the spirit of 
Christian civilization and humanitarianism.
199
 For the ostensible respectability of Loyalist 
cause based upon its ―anti-fascist‖ credentials, as asserted by many non-Catholic 
publications, the editorial staff of the Sign had little patience. Rather, they believed (not 
without justification) that the aegis of ―anti-fascism‖ could be extended to cover a 
veritable menagerie of non-rightist political affiliations, but that the whole apparatus 
stood definitively as a contrivance for the international expansion of communist 
influence. Moreover, as universally inclusive as the general anti-fascist movement 
pretended to be, it would not suffer the membership of any elements even remotely 
critical of the Soviet Union or of communism in general. And as for the charges leveled 
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by the anti-fascist camp against the Roman Catholic Church for her supposed sympathy 
with militaristic fascism, this same editorial stated plainly that it had merely been 
exploited as a convenient outlet for virulent anti-Catholic prejudice.
200
 
 Almost as if to punctuate the collective sum arguments offered by the disparate 
Catholic publications in the Autumn of 1937, the September edition of the Sign also 
featured a curious article, essentially approximating a contemporary ―human interest‖ 
story. Entitled ―Two Funerals,‖ and penned by noted foreign correspondent W. P. Carney, 
this piece purported to tell the story of one E. M. Alonso, a physician who had been 
dragooned into medical service at the front with the Loyalist forces. Although he had 
initially been an ardent supporter of the Republic and the Popular Front, the doctor 
apparently grew disgusted with the routine nature of violent revolutionary intemperance 
that attended the Loyalist cause. Despairing at the prospect of any sort of rational system 
of governance emerging from the anarchic Left, and living in perpetual fear of being 
denounced as a covert ―fascist‖ agent for his inability to save more ―anti-fascist‖ lives, 
Alonso stole into Nationalist territory where he could breathe more freely.
201
  
 This story, to be sure, has a certain ring of authenticity, given the range of well-
documented excesses perpetrated by radical leftist elements throughout the war. On the 
other hand, a close reading of this version of the refugee's tale—it having been reported 
by a foreign journalist, and therefore hearsay—might seem to raise suspicions against its 
almost too-neat formulation as a microcosmic glimpse into the supposedly unrelenting 
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and irredeemable sadism of the whole of the Loyalist camp. Perhaps, indeed, such 
suspicions might be carried to the point where one would probably not be too far afield in 
attributing to this testimonial certain echoing qualities more generally applied to the 
sensationalist propaganda, the ―atrocity stories‖ of the Great War. Whatever the case, this 
textual recreation Alonso's harrowing experience served to accentuate without 
discrimination the generic characteristics of frothy-mouthed radicalism that ostensibly 
animated the Loyalist coalition opposite the supposedly stainless dignity of the 
Nationalist movement. 
 By the following month's issue, however, the Sign acknowledged the appearance 
of the Spanish prelates' letter and duly lent it credence as the resounding voice of 
Catholic Spain. Commenting likewise, the magazine's editorial staff underwrote the 
justice of the Nationalist uprising as in accordance with Catholic orthodoxy on the 
grounds of ―resisting an unjust aggressor,‖ in this case being a defiant reflex to stand 
against the forces aligned against Christian civilization itself.
202
 
 This wholly Christian ―Spirit of the New Spain,‖ indeed, had been what certain of 
the magazine's correspondents had believed to be the motivating force behind the 
Nationalist movement. Catherine de Hueck, for example, wrote of her extended visit to 
insurgent Spain and found there a nation in arms, battling for deliverance for itself and 
                                                 
202
 ―Current Fact and Comment: Spanish Bishops' Pastoral,‖ The Sign, October, 1937, 133. 
 ―Current Fact and Comment: Resisting an Unjust Aggressor,‖ The Sign, October, 1937, 133. 
 ―Current Fact and Comment: A Case of Directed Anarchy,‖ The Sign, October, 1937, 133-134. 
 The Sign's comment further denies any charge that the anti-religious violence in Spain had been strictly 
spontaneous; rather, it was believed that the attacks on the Church had been ―a case of directed 
anarchy.‖ From the Catholic view, this indicated a characteristic fingerprint of communist infiltration 
and manipulation. 
 103 
for all Christendom. While the author admitted that a certain degree of blame for the 
conflict could be laid at the doorstep of the overly regressive conservative elements of 
Spain, she nevertheless insisted, in typical Catholic fashion, upon the Nationalist bloc as 
being representative of the very best of the nation. De Hueck wrote that the movement 
stood as the only instrument that could effectively offset the designs Red Moscow had for 
Spain. Further, Franco's proposed system of governance—the supposedly benign, 
ambiguously Fascist-like ―corporate state‖—would stand as an iron bulwark against 
future communist encroachment into Western Christendom. And, perhaps seeking to allay 
the fears of those unconvinced by the Catholic interpretation of the Spanish scene, the 
author sought to assure her audience that the underlying complexion of the Nationalists' 
political ideology did not draw nearly so much influence from either the Italian or 
German variants of totalitarian nationalism as had been so anxiously suggested by other 
contemporary observers.
203
 
 America, too, maintained this pattern into October, 1937, even if it did seem to  
contradict the general ―non-fascist‖ interpretation of Franco's rebels held by other 
American Catholic publications. Earlier that autumn, the paper had dispatched a 
correspondent to Nationalist Spain, one N. Belmonte, who had secured an audience with 
Generalissimo Franco himself. Truly a notable accomplishment, the interview provided 
America with what could only be interpreted as the authoritative justification for the 
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rising, coming as it did from the very fount of the movement. As had the Spanish prelates 
before him, Franco established his staunchly pro-Republican credentials and insisted 
upon his belief that it had never been the province of the Spanish military apparatus to 
entangle itself in the wranglings of the political arena. However, as the misruled Republic 
careened toward anarchy—most particularly after the Popular Front, clearly a Soviet 
manufacture with revolutionary intentions, had acquired power—a natural caveat against 
that apolitical conviction had been found. Thus the reasoning followed that the 
insurrection Franco inherited stood as a campaign to rescue a nation wallowing in the 
sanguinary chaos instigated by Red provocateurs bent on executing the will of a certain 
hostile foreign power.
204
  
 Interestingly enough, Belmonte's article indicated that Franco offered little, if any, 
indication of battling on behalf of the Faith against the great Satan of Moscow; with her, 
rather, he dwelt upon the political interpretations of the struggle. To the Nationalist 
chieftain, the battle for dominance of Spain primarily represented a chapter in the mortal 
struggle of civilization against the ill-bred barbarity of rootless Marxism. Secondarily, of 
course, the war stood a fight to save the nation from the bottommost depths of acute and 
destructive disorder. To this end, his cause had been forced to accept succor from 
whichever hands had offered it, but in no wise did that mean that Spain would become an 
outpost of the contemporary regimes in either Italy or Germany. Indeed, Franco asserted 
that his victory would preserve and restore the ―heritage of Spain‖ foremost, though that 
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objective would necessitate the establishment of a temporary military dictatorship as the 
immediate precursor to what he labeled an authoritarian ―corporate state.‖205 
 As October began to wane, both America and Commonweal began to couple their 
blandishments of Franco's movement with outraged incredulity over the Protestants' reply 
to the Spanish pastoral letter. Commonweal, with measured sobriety, indicated that such 
an inflammatory response merely demonstrated that those Protestant leaders who had 
affixed their names to the offending document had been ―thoroughly and completely 
hoodwinked on the real issues of the Spanish Civil War.‖206  
 Meanwhile, America reacted with more marked severity. In its turn, the paper 
demanded answers from the 150 signatories and pondered whether the opinion expressed 
in the open letter represented the wider attitudes of the whole of American Protestantism 
in respect to the conflict in Spain and to the Catholic Church. If this were true, remarked 
the editorial staff, then it could be put down as yet another episode in the sordid legacy of 
anti-Catholic bigotry in the United States, and would further tarnish the ideals of 
tolerance and the liberty of conscience for which the nation ostensibly stood. And, like 
Commonweal before it, the editorial staff of America stated that the true significance of 
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the war, the ―real issues‖ of the contest which had so totally escaped the Protestants, 
could be summarized as a question of communism versus Christianity, of tyranny versus 
civilization.
207
 
 Responding similarly, the following month's issue of Sign opened with a scathing 
editorial invective from the pen of Father T. Maguire against the Protestants' open letter. 
While first accusing the signatories of being possessed of a not altogether unexpected 
strain of putrid anti-Catholic bigotry, the author leveled the charge of their being, at the 
very least, co-opted dupes of the insidious Red propaganda machine; for all their sallies 
against the alleged excesses of the Nationalist insurgency, the Protestants had little but 
adulation for the ―democratic‖ Loyalist coalition while ignoring its obvious domination 
by dangerous revolutionary elements. According to the author's interpretation, what 
should have been considered as the most concerning aspect of the Protestants' statement, 
endorsed as it had been by leading figures on that side of the schism, was the impression 
it gave of ―reveal[ing] the value in which Protestant clergymen...hold their religion.‖208 
And, furthermore, that the Protestants: 
―...[were] of the pure-blooded American type who bubble over with patriotic fervor at the 
mention of our American Revolution. They imply that it was glorious to revolt against 
taxation without representation. But they are amazed and alarmed that men should resort 
to arms to protect their civil and religious liberties and their most cherished 
institutions.‖209 
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 From a militantly Catholic perspective, these could hardly be considered to be 
unfair charges—especially as the Church in Spain had ostensibly been targeted for 
liquidation on the orders of a reprehensible governmental regime, which pretended to 
liberal democracy while in reality being a Soviet construct, a device in the hands of 
communists and anarchists to further the cause of world atheism. From that assumption, 
then, it would not be a difficult leap to assume that in their declaring solidarity with the 
Loyalist cause, the Protestants were siding with the swelling forces of anti-religion. In 
fact, Maguire elucidated such a train of logic against the Protestants, lamenting that while 
―they [had] definitely and publicly committed themselves,‖  such a revelation carried the 
benefit demonstrating to observant American Catholics that American Protestantism (or, 
more realistically, some vague and unquantified segment of it) could not be counted upon 
as allies in the monumental struggle of Faith against Godlessness.
210
 
 J. A. Toomey, writing for America, believed very much like his colleague from 
Sign, although he sensed a kind of larger, communist-directed propaganda conspiracy in 
the American press that extended far beyond the Protestants' volley against the Spanish 
prelates and seemed willing, even eager, to assign the status of victim to the Catholic 
Church in the United States and around the world. For his part, the author specifically 
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nominated the case of what he considered to be the unjustified and unjustifiable 
misrepresentation of the civil war in Spain and the rough treatment afforded to the 
ancient Church in that unhappy country by the several organs of the American media. 
Though the press had delivered innumerable thrusts against the Church for its support of 
the rebellion (which, after all, had been conceived as the only way to forestall the 
―reddening of Spain‖), it had worked tirelessly to dilute public notions of unseemly 
radicalism within the Popular Front and to render the Loyalist enterprise more palatable 
by portraying the coalition as being made up entirely of respectable, freedom-loving 
democratic republicans.
211
 Either the unwitting participation or outright complicity of 
sections of the American press in this vast and insidious plot, Toomey contended, only 
furthered the determined march of uncompromising atheism that had been violently 
dismantling the Faith in Spain, but that the latent power of the Catholic laity could be 
leveraged to redirect the press onto the path of righteousness.
212
 
 Especially among its contemporaries, America could not seem to let the dust from 
the inter-denominational duel settle. Rather, the editorial hierarchy of the publication and 
its contributors seemed more keen than ever to flog away at the eternal bogeyman of 
communism, both as it existed in the United States and abroad. For example, the 
remaining weeks of November, 1937 featured editorials and articles on such subjects as: 
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Loyalist Madrid's red-festooned commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the 
October Revolution, the return of two treasonable International Brigadiers from Spain, 
the attitude of disgust on the part of prominent American socialist leader and POUM 
sympathizer S. Baron in respect to his investigation of communist domination and 
manipulation of the Loyalist cause, and the entrance of a Popular Front organization onto 
the American political scene in the form of the Farmer-Labor Party.
213
 
 As 1937 entered into its final month, there appeared to be something of a slight 
decrease in the focus on the Spanish conflict amongst the Catholic publications, though 
each featured small pieces in respect to it. One such article in Commonweal, for instance, 
discussed the circulation of carefully tailored Loyalist propaganda in the United States, 
which originated from the respective Red commissariat of Barcelona (and, one would 
assume, from those situated in Madrid and Valencia), and which, in turn, issued forth 
from the Republican embassy in Washington and from more subterranean outlets. Of 
course, from the contemporary interpretation of the inflexible Catholic partisan, any such 
pro-Loyalist literature, regardless of how it might be attired in the raiment of liberal 
democracy, could by then only be interpreted as a component of the massive Soviet 
conspiracy to sow misinformation and engender bewilderment—for the task of the 
propagandist is to lie and to lie in enormity—as a method to foment or stoke 
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revolutionary crises.
214
  
 Most alarming to certain contributors to America appeared to be the seeming 
reality that such devious propaganda actually found a substantial degree of resonance 
with the middle class intelligentsia, the natural defenders of liberalism. This being more 
particularly true if the propaganda erected romantic analogies linking the American 
Revolution and the contemporary ―war of Independence‖ in Spain, and most especially 
true if it also bore heavily implications that all those who did not support the Loyalists in 
the struggle against reactionary tyranny were scarcely liberal democrats, but were 
actually fascist in their sympathies—an odious charge no good liberal could abide, 
making him or her a far easier target to manipulate by radical agitators.
215
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VI. 
 Differentiated by theological sectarianism though it may have been, this 
representative section of contemporary American Protestantism remained wholly 
unsympathetic to the Catholic position in respect to the Spanish Civil War, even if some 
of the organs of the generalized Protestant press had been slow to recognize the 
significance of the Spanish hierarchs' appeal. 
 Remarkable amongst its contemporaries, in fact, the Christian Leader 
demonstrated an acuity lacking among its other contemporary publications. A mere day 
after the appearance of the Spanish prelates' letter in the New York Times, the paper 
printed an article concerning what the author, one G. Seldes, believed to be the 
intertwined factors of fascism and religion in the civil war. Scarcely bothering to veil his 
sentiment, the author had little but disdain for what he believed to be the proclivity of a 
certain Christian denomination to arouse unnecessary parochial division over the 
specious question of religion as it pertained to the conflict. Indeed, he wondered whether 
the famous dictum of Samuel Johnson might be amended to substitute ―religion‖ for 
―patriotism‖ as being the last true refuge of the scoundrel. After a trip to six various 
European nations, Seldes came away with the impression that the lines between progress 
and reaction were starkly drawn across the water; meanwhile, ―...America is the only 
country...where a war whose causes are social and economic has been turned by 
obscurantists into a religious issue.‖216  
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 While clearly a broadside against the hierarchy of the Spanish Catholic Church 
(and probably those who subscribed to the claims made in their missive), the author's 
attack also went on to emphatically deny that any truth whatsoever existed in the prelates' 
position that the Popular Front government existed only as a formality to disguise 
communist domination, or that the real seat of Republican power lay within the walls of 
the Kremlin. Yet on the other hand, Seldes wrote that little complexity existed in the 
Nationalist rebellion: it stood exposed as a naked attack on democracy, a bid made by the 
forces of backwardness to establish a fascist (or perhaps fascist-esque) state or, at the 
very least, one grounded in reactionary traditionalism.
217
 By this, one could reasonably 
infer that by this he merely meant Catholicism.
  
 
Secondly, he wrote that the reports of atrocities against the Church had been 
systematically exaggerated without denying the essential reality of violence perpetrated 
against the Church. Rather, he denied charges that such violence existed as an 
immediately contemporaneous phenomenon and insisted that such incidents had an 
ancient tradition in Spain, very often erupting from socio-economic frustrations of the 
lower classes and its conception that the established Church represented a substantial 
contributor to their eternal submersion. In any event, wrote Seldes, the outbursts of 
violence could be attributed to mostly isolated incidents of mob action executed by the 
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irresponsible radical fanatics beyond the control of the government in the chaos which 
followed the uprising. The same could not be said to be true of Franco's movement, 
which the author wrote as having acted with precise considerations to inflict brutality.
218
 
 Seldes concluded his article by emphasizing that the chief antagonists of the true 
spirit of modern Spain were the twinned evils of medieval clericalism and militarism, and 
that the thinking Catholics of Europe had come to the realization that the Spanish conflict 
represented not a war of religion, but rather an episode in the class struggle—and that the 
Spanish Church had betrayed her secret trust and had aligned with the forces of black 
reaction and militaristic fascism for purely self-interested reasons.
219
 
 The Christian Century, for its part, did not acknowledge the Spanish hierarchs' 
letter until nearly the end of September, 1937. Characteristically, the Protestants of this 
―undenominational‖ periodical hurled stones at the statement, denouncing it as grossly 
misrepresentative and deliberately untruthful, particularly in its portrayal of Republican 
Spain as being nothing but an instrument of Moscow, while none dwelt in the rebel camp 
but saints and patriots. This, the editorial asserted, stood as definitive proof of the 
reactionary tendencies of the Catholic Church in Spain, born of a jealous love of privilege 
and power that had been inculcated over centuries. Concluding on a vaguely threatening 
note, the Century promised something almost like an authoritative response from the hold 
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of American Protestantism.
220
 
 In the meantime, however, this paper focused on emphasizing that the continued  
Nationalist triumphs in Spain, particularly the seizure of the valuable port of Santander in 
northern Spain, had been achieved only through force of Italian arms.
221
 Similarly, the 
editorial staff continued to nurture their then-ingrained habit of worrying that the war in 
Spain had the potential to ignite a larger conflict. Specifically, it had been not 
unreasonably posited that because the Nationalists' totalitarian allies had risked a great 
deal and had already incurred substantial expense to ensure the victory of the insurgent 
Right in Spain that they would risk a general war before suffering a potentially 
devastating loss of prestige by reneging on their Spanish commitments. This could be 
considered to be no less plausible because rumors also flew that they had been promised 
certain economic and territorial concessions from Franco, pending his victory.
222
 
 As to the idea of the American ―civil religion‖ or the ―liberal-democratic 
tradition,‖ as it developed in the discourse of the Spanish crisis, the final September 
edition of Christian Century featured an article on the ―Tragedy of Spain,‖ wherein the 
author discribed his journey to the traditional ―backwater of Europe,‖ but there he 
discovered a new Spain being constructed by a romantic, ill-disciplined, but nevertheless 
―great-hearted‖ people.223 The author expressed great sympathy for the democratic 
people's revolution of the Left in Spain, locked as it was in mortal battle against the 
                                                 
220
 ―Letter of Spanish Bishops Elicits Strong Replies,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 29 September, 
1937, 1187-1188. 
221
 ―Italy Hails Santander as Italian Victory,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 8 September, 1937, 1091. 
222
 ―Will the Spanish Blaze Spread,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 15 September, 1937, 1126-1127. 
223
 Sherwood Eddy, ―The Tragedy of Spain,‖ The Christian Century, 22 September, 1937, 1163-1165. 
 115 
historically repressive oligarchy of the degenerate and obsolete aristocracy, the military 
officer corps, and the high Church (itself being the most noxious of the offenders). 
Though admitting that the Loyalist coalition included a not insubstantial communist 
presence, the author insisted that Spanish communists had never been of the Bolshevik 
brood, and that they had renounced their revolutionary imperatives in favor of 
statesmanlike cooperation within the Republican political infrastructure. Finally waxing 
romantic, the author wrote that the struggle of Spain represented a continuation of the 
strife-wrought heritage of democracy and independence, a legacy reaching back to those 
heady days of 1776, 1789, and even unto 1917.
224
 
 By the following month, Seldes's article, ―Spain Fights Fascism, Not Religion,‖ 
previously featured in the 4 September issue of the Christian Leader had been reprinted 
in the Christian Evangelist. Adding only the subtitle ―Some Facts for Misled Americans,‖ 
the reappearance of the article in unaltered form probably served as a convenient, 
agreeable way for the editorial staff of the publication to acknowledge the prelates' letter 
and might also be interpreted, in however slight a way, as a small glimmer of the essential 
solidarity of Protestant opinion in relation to the Spanish war.
225
 
 More rounded than Seldes's sentiment, however, was that of R. T. House, who 
commented on Spain's ―holy war‖ in the 6 October issue of Christian Century. Rather 
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than taking sides in what had clearly become a passionate issue, even in the United 
States, the author wrote that partisanship had blinded supporters of their respective sides' 
shortcomings. Catholics believed that God had spoken in Spain and that the rebels wore 
blessed armor in a modern crusade; liberals and radicals, for their part, seemed eager to 
swallow leftist propaganda and to dismiss the questionable conduct (if not organized 
sadism) of the Loyalist factions as a necessary evil in the fight against reaction, itself a 
kind of holy war. House argued that if cold light of disinterested reasoning were applied 
to the belligerent factions active in Spain, then the moral allies of both sides would be 
forced to realize that precious little justice existed in either, and that Loyalists and 
Nationalists alike heartily deserved condemnation.
226
  
 Several miscellaneous articles regarding the war in Spain aside, very little 
mention of the Protestants' reply to the Spanish hierarchy or, indeed, of the Catholics 
counter-riposte to the Protestants' thrust could be found in these columns of the Protestant 
press. The 13 October edition of Christian Century merely mentioned in passing the 
appearance of the letter signed by the 150, assigning responsibility for the tract to G. E. 
Shipler, editor of the Churchman, an Episcopalian fortnightly. Otherwise, this mention 
simply reiterated the editorial position that the Church in Spain only had itself to blame 
for the particularly violent iteration of contemporary Spanish anti-clericalism. Agreeing, 
the 16 October issue of the Christian Leader commented likewise.
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publication of the American Catholic response, the Christian Century would only merely 
acknowledge its publication briefly and summarize its content thus: Catholic luminaries 
charged Protestants of merely rehashing irresponsible charges made against the Spanish 
Church that had been thoroughly discredited and they had grown concerned that 
American Protestantism had sided with a Red-hued regime grounded in and committed to 
diabolical heresy.
228
 
 During the final two months of 1937, the substantive volume of pieces 
specifically relating to the Spanish Civil War (and, indeed, to that autumn's public 
eruption of the Americanized Catholic-Protestant discourse) dwindled slightly in these 
representative Protestant publications. However, these papers continued to feature items 
which actively criticized what their contributors interpreted as the pro-fascist proclivities 
of the Roman Catholic Church and other miscellaneous fear-mongers of the anti-
communist stripe.
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 In fact, the Christian Century featured no real articles on the Spanish crisis during 
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the month of November, merely brief editorials lamenting the continued ineffectiveness 
of the Non-Intervention Committee, summarily reporting this institutional condition as 
working for the exclusive benefit of the insurgent faction and its foreign abettors, 
however certain other participant nations might be discomfited by this reality.
230
 S. E. G. 
Priestley, writer for the Christian Leader, wholly agreed with such sentiments, adding 
that Italian and German involvement in the civil war did not necessarily come from a 
genuine sense of fascist or ―anti-communist‖ solidarity with the Spanish rebels, but rather 
out of the knowledge that the conflict could be leveraged as a pressure point for coercive 
negotiations with both France and Great Britain.
231
 The editorial staff for this publication 
evidently thought this to be a reasonable scenario, and furthermore warned that it could 
hold dire consequences in the immediate future. Specifically concerned about the nations 
of South America, the Leader held that the ostensible crusade of ―anti-communism,‖ so 
readily trumpeted by the Spanish rebels and their totalitarian allies could easily encourage 
the intrepid little tyrants of that continent to hoist hastily-sewn white banners and await 
international fascist assistance to install and entrench unwelcome fascist or reactionary 
regimes in the Western Hemisphere.
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 Editorial commentary on the international dimensions of the war aside, however, 
there were some reverberations of the inter-denominational debate in the Protestant press; 
some even revisited the theme of the ―civil religion.‖ For example, the 9 December issue 
of the Christian Evangelist briefly discussed the findings of J. T. Whitaker, special 
correspondent to the Chicago Daily News. On a journey into Nationalist Spain, the 
journalist discussed the conflict with a officer on Franco's staff who, in marshaling 
chilling language of the fascist variety, advocated a policy of extermination in Spain. 
According to this solider, up to one-third of the Spanish population (in fact all those 
―rats‖ who sympathized with the Republic) would, for the sake of necessity, be ground 
beneath the wheel of this great political culling to ensure that control of the country 
passed forevermore into the hands of the ―right people.‖ While this, too, has something of 
the ring of ―atrocity stories‖ from the Great War, the commentator from the Evangelist 
interpreted it with marked seriousness: 
―This officer, if he had lived in 1776, would have talked about the 'rats of Valley Forge' 
and would have argued for their extermination. Americans who sympathize with Franco 
are the lineal descendants of the Tories who sabotaged Washington and supported 
Benedict Arnold. If the people who voted for a republic in Spain are rodents, their 
opponents might well be characterized under a familiar species of the feline family which 
has a more or less malodorous reputation.‖233 
                                                                                                                                                 
Christian Century (24 November, 1937, 1450-1451), for a brief examination of what the author 
believed to be a sort of Quebecois clerical-fascism, which also claimed ―anti-communism‖ as its 
doctrine. 
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 Finally, then, and as a parting shot to the Roman Catholic Church for the year 
1937, the Christian Century printed an article entitled ―the Catholic Heresy‖ by K. P. 
Reinhold Niebuhr, the eminent theologian and intellectual. In this piece, the author 
lambasted the Church, stating particularly that it had become ―daily more apparent that 
the Catholic Church [had] cast it lot with fascistic policies.‖234 Furthermore, he mocked 
the justification with this moral alignment of one of the world's great religious institutions 
with fascism on the grounds that the alternative extremism, communism, meant to 
destroy religion entirely. To Niebuhr, such reasoning had severe structural weaknesses. 
He questioned whether the stated anti-religious ethic of communism should be 
considered any worse than the intention of fascism to opportunistically co-opt religion, 
particularly the Christian faith, force it to submit to party discipline, and bastardize it to 
the point of essential nihility.  
 In this piece, the author specifically selected the Spanish Church and its hierarchy 
as being the most obviously guilty of this ―Catholic heresy,‖ which he defined as the self-
representation of the Church as being the infallible, Earth-bound manifestation of the 
Kingdom of God when, in reality, it remained a thoroughly human institution—and 
therefore susceptible to all manner of human failings. In the case of Spain, for example, 
Niebuhr cited that the Church in that country had traditionally indulged in temporal 
selfishness, nurturing intimate connections with the ruling class of a rigid feudal social 
order as it had. And, with respect to the prelates' missive, he echoed the opinion voiced in 
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the Protestants' open letter of October by writing that it never seemed to have occurred to 
the Spanish hierarchs that the profanation of the Church did not necessarily come from a 
place of Marxist-inspired anti-religious hatred. Rather, perhaps lacking imagination, they 
never considered the possibility that such violent passion against the Church might have 
been the expression of the common Spaniard against what he identified as the human 
organization that had been historically allied with the forces of oppression.
235
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 This article quickly shifts from being a screed against the Roman Catholic Church to being a celebration 
of liberal Protestantism, which the author considered to be the only bulwark against totalitarianism, 
including the spiritual totalitarianism of the Vatican—though admitting that Protestantism did have its 
own set of faults. Furthermore, Niebuhr's article would receive a response in the following week's 
edition of the Century (―The Protestant Heresy,‖ 15 December, 1937, 1550-1552). This piece would, 
however, focus more on what its author perceived to be the arrogance of Protestantism, which the 
Spanish Civil War had only elevated to new heights of sanctimoniousness. 
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VII. 
 There ended the discourse on the Spanish Civil War in these but few diverse 
organs of the American Christian press for the year 1937. The evidence presented above 
would seem to indicate that as the flames of conflict continued to consume unhappy 
Spain, the dimensions of the war mounted to almost bewildering complexity, especially 
to foreign observers—and particularly to those in the United States. Facing an 
increasingly incomprehensible scenario of ―internationalized‖ civil strife in a foreign 
land, certain segments of the American public (distinguished, in this case, by 
denominational affiliations) came forward with contrasting interpretative frameworks 
with which either side attempted to cast the Spanish war in more familiar, or 
―Americanized,‖ terms. These separate models were predicated upon what might be 
described as the American ―civil religion,‖ that peculiar litany of all that is ―sacred‖ to the 
experience of the United States as a revolutionary experiment and as a democratic 
republic. In fairness to both factions, both American Catholics and Protestants were able 
to marshal relatively well-crafted and effective, though overly emotional and 
unreasonably idealized, arguments for their chosen avatars in the war based upon their 
congruence with the ideals of ―Americanness.‖ In other words: always were the 
Nationalists or the Loyalists, according to their respective champions, represented as 
being the inheritors of the most noble tradition of the revolutionaries of 1776, while their 
antagonists were billed as the contemporary incarnation of immortal tyranny. Always 
were the Nationalists or the Loyalists, according to their respective champions, fighting 
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the good fight of liberty, of democracy, and of common decency. And so forth. 
 One can, of course, indicate the appearance of the Spanish prelates' missive in the 
New York Times, belated in appearance though it may have been, as being the catalyst for 
this phenomenon and the subsequent Catholic-Protestant debate that it inspired within the 
columns of the same eminent national publication. Shortly thereafter, however, this inter-
denominational conversation reverted its erstwhile channel of the religious press, where 
editors and contributors were content to hurl stones at one another. All this did, perhaps, 
was to exacerbate and intensify the inter-denominational discourse on the significance of 
the civil war in Spain, producing a great deal of heat and smoke, but little light as to the 
actual truths of the struggle or the justice of either belligerent coalition. Both American 
Catholics and Protestants, by the end of 1937, merely continued to talk past each other to 
the effect of contributing to the spinning of tires in an essentially undifferentiated morass 
of facts and opinions, conjecture and reality. 
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Chapter 3: ―The Tyranny of Semantics‖ 
 
Early Winter, 1938 – Summer, 1939 
 
The Denouement of the Spanish Civil War and the  
 
Last Considerations of the Catholic-Protestant Dialog in the United States 
 
―...Fallacy creeps in when a word comes to stand for an ill-defined object, or for a loose generalization, or 
for an abstraction that is not recognized as one, or for an object or concept blurred or obscured by an 
emotional coloration or an established reaction pattern that has become inseparable from the word. 
...Having decided that communism—or fascism—is a hideous monster ready to devour civilization, we 
have a convenient label by which to damn any other program that seems objectionable.
236 
 
I. 
 
 From the rise of the Leftist Popular Front government in Spain and the subsequent 
inception of the Nationalist insurgency in 1936, the desperate conflict in that country had 
been a crucial topic of passionate discussion in the American Christian press. However, 
throughout 1938 and into 1939, the Spanish Civil War began to fade in importance in the 
American Christian press.
237
 
 The reasons for this relative de-emphasis on the dramatic Spanish struggle are at 
once multifarious, and yet simple. In the estimation of the respective staffs of these 
papers and their contributors, Spain had by that time ceased to be the critical arena of 
Europe. Indeed, it seems as if they believed that if a general war had not broken out over 
the Spanish question by the time the war approached its second anniversary, it was not 
likely to at all. During this period of time, of course, the Continent experienced other 
emergent issues which were considered to be much more pressing and which held more 
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potential to become flashpoints. For example: the general expansion of Hitler's Reich 
with the Anschluss, the crisis over the Czech Sudetenland, the capitulation at Munich, the 
German seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia, Italy's invasion of Albania, the 
escalation of European rearmament, and, finally, the rumblings over the Polish issue, and 
so forth.
238
 
 And yet, even though there would be somewhat less content on the Spanish Civil 
War than there had been previously, these Catholic and Protestant newspapers would, by 
and large, maintain their partisan fidelities on the befogged conflict as it was fought to its 
bitter conclusion, and as it continued to demonstrate the comparable evils of both sides 
and, indeed, the ultimate evil of modern warfare itself.
239
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II. 
 
 For their part, the Protestant newspapers seemed to appreciate, however 
grudgingly, that by 1938, the shadows were lengthening for the Spanish Republic after 
Franco's Nationalist movement formally established a civil government, but most 
especially after his brilliant Teruel offensive, which penetrated to the blue waters of the 
Mediterranean, summarily cutting the remainder of Republican territory in two. In the 
opinion of the staff of the Christian Century, the success of Franco's military maneuvers 
had only been made possible through a fresh surge of aid from his unscrupulous allies.
240
 
At the same time, however, the Spanish Civil War had begun to recede as the flashpoint 
for all Europe and, accordingly, these papers began investing more attention in the 
successive crises faced by the Continent as they arose, most of which were instigated by 
Germany, and, furthermore, those created in East Asia by the ambitions of Japan.
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essence of this decrease in the interest in the developments in Spain might be best 
embodied in a piece authored by one S. E. G. Priestley, who offered in early 1938 that 
―with the Spanish Civil War gradually ceasing to contain the potential causes of a major 
world crisis...Europe looks with anxiety and fear at the gathering clouds which hang 
heavy and dark over Central Europe.‖242 
 Indeed, 1938 would not be long advanced in days before these Protestant 
publications were reporting on the latest Hitlerian triumph: the annexation of Austria, his 
homeland, into the greater Reich. To the Christian Century, it seemed as if the 
―Bohemian corporal,‖ already bestriding Europe, would ride his cresting wave on to new 
victories, and that it seemed likely that Czechoslovakia would be his next objective. Yet, 
on the other hand, the staff of this paper also believed that such limitless expansion would 
not be tolerated, especially by Great Britain—for German domination of the mainland 
would have been as abhorrent to British authorities as would Italian suzerainty over the 
Mediterranean. The latter of these two fears the Century held to be a potentiality, pending 
the conclusion of the Spanish conflict in the favor of Franco's Nationalists.
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 Not long after the Anschluss, these few papers began to worry over Hitler's next 
target. One I. Domonkos, writing for the Christian Leader, suggested the multi-ethnic 
muddle of Czechoslovakia as the primary candidate for victimhood. In this case, the 
author wrote that however wildly the dictator might gesticulate in his harangues that all 
those of German blood deserved to live on German soil, his true aim in what then seemed 
to be his intention to undermine Czechoslovakian territorial sovereignty was his desire to 
obtain the valuable industrial infrastructure of that country to further expand his war 
machine.
244
 
 Yet, despite the unquestionable de-escalation of the international primacy of the 
contest in Spain, these Protestant publications continued to express interest in it for the 
same reasons that had been established during the previous months, primarily in that a 
sister democracy faced destruction and an innocent people enslavement under a ―fascist‖ 
regime—and that it had been to the eternal shame of the free world that it had not aided 
Spain in her hour of greatest need.
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discussion on the merits of the embattled Leftist government of Spain, or, indeed, the 
progress of the war itself, these newspapers at least managed to produce glowing reviews 
of the ongoing relief efforts in that country administered by (Protestant) American 
organizations, even if they only dealt with the programs established in what little 
remained of the Republic.
246
 
 But where these newspapers could no longer offer positive comment on  the 
prospects for ―their side,‖ they could at least find solace in attacking the Roman Catholic 
Church on the question of its commitment to the ―democratic tradition.‖ Again, one must 
take this position to have been one adopted in response to what appeared to be American 
Catholics' uncompromisingly pro-Nationalist position on the Spanish war, which had 
been thoroughly couched in anti-communist sentiment. The Christian Leader would 
attempt to shame the American branch of the Church and its Roman authorities for its 
attempt to ―[do its] level best to convince the American people that the government of 
Spain is 'dangerous' and that lovers of liberty should show their sympathy and support to 
Franco,‖ as he apparently stood as a defender of Christendom against the encroaching 
blight of communism.
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neither belligerent faction held any true claim to absolute virtue, and acknowledged that 
there certainly existed an element of undesirable radicalism within the Loyalist camp, it 
nevertheless asserted that the cause of the Spanish government more closely represented 
the ideals enunciated in the American Declaration of Independence, a definite echo of the 
―civil religion‖ debate of the previous year. 248 Whatever the actual attitudes of the 
various branches of the Roman Catholic Church, its clergy, and its faithful, such anti-
communist militancy, of course, would be interpreted by these weeklies as veiled 
sympathy for fascism. An assessment of this sort, while somewhat sensational, might be 
considered reasonable, for from the earliest days of his post-Great War political activism,  
Mussolini's own platform had strongly emphasized anti-communism. 
 Assuming thus, S. H. Fritchman, writing for the Christian Leader would 
summarily denounce this perceived relationship between a generalized ideology of 
fascism and the Church as ludicrous and impossible to maintain for, at the bottom of the 
matter, ―fascism and Christianity [could not] combine.‖249 Not only did organized 
religion require an atmosphere of freedom, which fascism totally denied its subjects, but 
the ideology also sought to bring glory unto itself by way of the sword, a practice 
contrary to Christian teachings. Further commentary by contributors to the Leader would 
offer that in no wise could any good Christian soul countenance the inhumane tactics 
employed by the Spanish Nationalists, that ostensibly Catholic-fascist combine, which 
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included the aerial bombardment of defenseless civilian centers.
250
  
 In spite of this heated anti-Catholic antagonism, and as the noose slowly tightened 
around the doomed Republic, there remained genuine curiosity as to the role of the 
Church in the coming regime; such would be commonplace in the Protestant press. The 
Christian Century believed that the Spanish Church had gained a unique chance to 
redeem itself, and that, given the appropriate change in spirit, it could act as a force for 
moderation and progress. But, by that same token, it had also been afforded an 
opportunity to return to her reactionary traditions and oppress yet further generations of 
Spaniards, which would inevitably result in the repetition of the contemporary cycle of 
bitterness and violence.
251
 F. D. Kershner, of the Christian Evangelist, took a more 
markedly pessimistic view as to the future of the Church in that country, believing that 
ancient institution to be impatiently waiting for the restoration of its privileges and a 
chance at vengeance.
252
 The Christian Leader's S. E. G. Priestley would comment 
likewise, believing that with the impending fall of the Republic, another light had gone 
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out in Europe and that Franco's Spain, in which the Church would most certainly be 
participatory, would be the ―Spain of yesterday and not tomorrow.‖253 
 The Spanish war, then, had obviously retained a significant degree of interest in 
the Protestant press, but coverage upon it shrunk as emerging crises took hold of Europe 
with the expansion of Hitler's Reich and his seemingly insatiable appetite for the 
acquisition of new lands. Nevertheless, the conflict in Spain remained important, for the 
papers appreciated that, while it might have no longer held as great of a potential to be a 
flashpoint for another major war, there were still substantial geopolitical and strategic 
considerations bound to its outcome. All the while, the partisan fidelities of these 
particular newspapers remained essentially unshaken, even if they did seem to realize that 
the eleventh hour had arrived for the embattled Spanish Republic and its motley array of 
Loyalists. And so, too, did they continue their narrative on the ―fascist‖ aspects of the 
Roman Catholic Church. 
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III. 
 
 On the part of the American Catholic press, journalistic interest in the Spanish 
Civil War endured, unsurprisingly, in much the same fashion as it had throughout the 
conflict. Into the last phase of the war, these representative publications hailed, perhaps 
somewhat jeeringly, the impending victory of the Rightist rebellion and the ostensible 
salvation of their Church in Spain while continuing to vilify the Loyalist cause as Soviet 
in design and apocalyptic in purpose. The applause for what increasingly appeared to be 
the coming of Franco's triumph grew ever louder, ostensibly due to two factors: his 
decisive drive to the Mediterranean through Teruel during the early months of 1938, 
isolating Catalonia from Castile, and the preliminary processes to the extension of formal 
diplomatic relations and eventual recognition of Nationalist Spain by the Vatican by late 
May of that year.
254
 
 More markedly, however this same period demonstrated a definite increase in the 
amount of content devoted to illuminating the subversive menace of international 
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communism, which these papers and their contributors believed to be gradually, subtly 
expanding in influence, even unto the shores of the United States. These newspapers 
seemed determined that their respective readerships should share their convictions (which 
seemed at times to border on the pathological), even to the extent that bearded Bolshevik 
bomb-throwers lurked beneath every bedstead. Apparently meaning to demonstrate this, 
America would run a pair of editorial comments, which related the experience of one of 
the journal's own editors, who suffered an attack by a pro-Loyalist—and therefore 
presumably pro-communist—picketer armed with an ―iron cane‖ while attending a 
reception held on behalf of visiting Catholic Spaniards by Catholic Americans.
255
 
 While the following year would witness a disturbing increase in the activities of 
the pro-Nazi German-American Volksbund, these Catholic journals would find far more 
the fear in the habits of CPUSA and its allies, which had apparently transformed in 1938. 
J. E. Westfield, reporting America, would comment on a mass meeting at Madison Square 
Garden in March, which attempted to appropriate the rhetoric of ―Americanism‖ in the 
party's assault on fascism.
256
 Still others would comment on the continue efforts of that 
organization, abetted by its assorted allies and miscellaneous dupes, to foster a domestic 
Popular Front-esque movement in the United States, tamper with the nation's policy of 
neutrality, and, pointedly, to lift the Spanish embargo.
257
 Their anxieties would only be 
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exacerbated by the extension of the ―brotherly hand‖ to American Catholics by E. 
Browder, secretary of CPUSA, that they might reconcile with the revolutionary 
movement and join in the common struggle against fascism and reaction.
258
 More 
specifically, this would be in relation to an address and subsequently published pamphlet, 
entitled ―A Message to Catholics,‖ published under the auspices of the Workers' Library 
Publishers (New York, June, 1938). In it, as stated, Secretary Browder wished to make 
inroads toward Catholic-communist understanding and friendship. He declaimed at 
length upon the commonality of spirit in politics and social justice shared between the 
two groups. And, in respect to the Spanish crisis, it seemed as if Browder hoped to 
convince American Catholics that only the upper Spanish clergy had joined in supporting 
the Rightist insurgency, that the communist party fought for the liberty of the 
impoverished Catholic souls of that country, and that it did not in any way seek to destroy 
their ancient Faith.
259
 This would naturally elicit a derisive response, as contributors to 
these publications cautioned against communists bearing gifts.
260
 
 In any event, these newspapers also seemed to have believed that the 
contemporary swelling of American anti-Catholic bias had been fueled, at least in part, by 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Gault McGowan, ―The Popular Front Is Baloney,‖ America, 2 April, 1939, 606-607. 
 ―Points and Lines: Neutrality—Then and Now,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 13 May, 1938, 75-76. 
 ―Spanish Embargo,‖ editorial, America, 14 May, 1938, 132. 
 ―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 21 May, 1938, 146-147. 
 ―Week by Week: the Trojan Horse,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 10 June, 1938, 169. 
258
 Gerard Donnelly, S. J.,  ―Secretary Browder Extends a Brotherly Hand,‖ America, 18 June, 1938, 
 244-245.  
259
 Earl Browder, A Message to Catholics (New York: Workers' Library Publishers, Inc., 1938), 3-15. 
260
 Gerard Donnelly, S. J., ―Secretary Browder Extends a Brotherly Hand,‖ America, 18 June, 1938. 
 244-245.  
 David Goldstein, ―Come into My Parlor Says the Communist Spider,‖ America, 25 June, 1938. 
 274-275. 
 136 
the supposedly ballooning power of the Comintern and its efficient propaganda 
apparatus. And they would undertake the counter this phenomenon in a manner most 
fitting for organs of a free press.
261
 First, there would arise a campaign, proposed by T. 
Maguire (then executive editor of the Sign), designated as the ―Catholic Minute Men.‖262 
This effort, in brief, would seek to organize teams of Catholic letter-writers on a 
nationwide basis; these specialized correspondents, making vigilance their code, would 
undertake to combat anti-Catholic ―propaganda‖ in the wider American press.263 Then, 
shortly thereafter, America took up the call, announcing its intention to hold a ―Bias 
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Contest,‖ beginning in March of that year.264 This paper encouraged its readers to select 
articles from the more notable national publications, as well as from their local press, that 
contained notes of anti-Catholic bigotry, whether overt or subtle. There were to be a 
number of cash prizes awarded to those who sent in the most offensive pieces. No fewer 
than three of the nine prizes, including second place, went to individuals who provided 
clippings of articles which were vociferous in their denunciation of Franco's Nationalists 
and the Church which ostensibly supported his particular strain of ―fascism.‖265  
 Obviously, then, neither of these efforts should be considered apart from the 
developments surrounding the Spanish Civil War. As to the campaigns undertaken by 
America and the Sign, the Commonweal's D. Hayne would urge a more reasoned 
response to this apparent anti-Catholic ―propaganda,‖ offering that caustic, knee-jerk 
backlash would only cause the non-Catholic press to further solidify its impressions of 
the Roman Catholic Church, especially its Spanish branch, as being allied with 
fascism.
266
 But this stood as only one example of the Commonweal acting the deviant 
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amongst its sister publications. In April, 1938, the weekly underwent significant changes 
in ownership, attended by a reorganization in its editorial staff. M. Williams, the founder 
and, since 1924, executive editor of the newspaper would step down from his position. 
He would, however, retain his own weekly column of opinion.
267
 During this transitional 
period, the journal would ―affirm and reaffirm‖ its stance of fundamental opposition to 
totalitarianism in any form, whether of the Left or the Right.
268
 
 Yet this same transformational period would witness a new official editorial 
position adopted in respect to the conflict in Spain. In a statement from late June, the 
newly reorganized Commonweal would admit that the discussion of the Spanish Civil 
War in the United States had devolved into little more than polarized partisan bickering, 
which had been distinguished ―more for its heat than for any light cast upon the 
significance of events,‖ a reality made worse due to the fact that little, if any, reliable 
information had ever come out of bloodied Spain.
269
 To the staff of this newspaper, there 
had been little to admire in either belligerent coalition: one identified, at least partly, with 
the evils of the revolutionary Soviet regime; the other espoused malodorous totalitarian 
doctrines of reaction similar to certain other regimes condemned by the Church. In 
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essence, the leading writers for the Commonweal felt as if no good choice existed 
between comparable evils, and announced that, thenceforth, the publication would do its 
best to encourage attitudes of ―positive impartiality.‖270 
 Meanwhile, Williams, the former editor of the paper would comment on this 
piece. He applauded some elements of it, but lamented its content on the while—for 
under his direction, Commonweal had adopted a strong pro-Nationalist stance. However, 
he recognized his limited power to change the position of the publication after his 
resignation, and did not wish to muddy the waters further by pursuing his version of the 
narrative; nevertheless, he rejected ―positive impartiality,‖ in favor of his established, 
reductionist simplification of the conflict in Spain as being one between Bolshevism and 
Christianity.
271
 
 Apart from the apparently paired issues of communism and anti-Catholicism, 
interest dwelt upon wider international events as these publications began to perceive, 
however slowly, that Spain had ceased to be the point of greatest danger in Europe, 
especially after the Anschluss in March, 1938. And, as with the Protestants, many 
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contributors would enumerate the Sudetenland, if not the whole of Czechoslovakia, as the 
next target for absorption into the Reich.
272
 
 But, exhibited thus, the evidence indicates that the conflict in Spain, the issue of 
international communism and its attendant dangers were more or less all-consuming to 
these few Catholic newspapers. Summarily, they were tardier than their Protestant 
counterparts to respond to the escalating tensions in other parts of Europe as Hitler made 
further strides toward his dream of imperial domination over a significant portion of the 
Continent. This was, perhaps natural, as questions of the Faith and of the Catholic 
denomination were still enmeshed in the Spanish war, which they seemed to have felt 
obliged to lend further commentary. Moreover, this might also have been due to the 
strength of non-Catholic opinion in the United States on the foreign civil war, which 
many Catholic writers believed to have trended increasingly toward anti-Catholicism. 
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IV. 
 
 For the latter half of 1938, and as the second anniversary of the civil war passed, 
the contributions of these Protestant newspapers to the discourse on the declining Spanish 
war, including the general Catholic factor, and wider world events did little to alter their 
established narrative on those respective topics.
273
 Yet even while the Republic seemed 
doomed to defeat, there lingered some slight degree of enthusiasm for its cause, which 
some still believed to be ―fighting for the future of Spain.‖274 
 On the larger stage, the discussion of the Spanish struggle remained somewhat de-
emphasized in importance, particularly in its latent potential to spark another general 
European war. However, there were some briefly-expressed concerns over the enraged 
promises of the Republican Loyalists to retaliate for the insurgents' targeting of ostensibly 
unarmed civilian centers. These threats were not directed against non-military settlements 
located inside Nationalist territory; rather, the violence they intended were to be directed 
against the nations where the Nationalists' auxiliary forces had originated—that is, of 
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course, Italy and Germany.
275
 Contrarily, and perhaps as a result of these sensationalist 
claims, the Christian Evangelist reported that in Spain there still existed more than a 
glimmer of a spark that could ignite a wider conflict. But more than the bombing of 
innocent Spanish settlements (and the supposed attacked mounted against French villages 
by Nationalist air forces), the Evangelist worried more over the British dynamic: stories 
had surfaced that rebel aircraft had been attacking her merchantmen.
276
 Amidst this fear, 
there would be some brief coverage on the struggling efforts of the Non-Intervention 
Committee to reach some sort of compromise to cut off all foreign intervention in Spain. 
The Christian Century believed this to be an exercise in the realm of fantasy: two years 
of working toward this very objective had demonstrated the depth of international interest 
in the conflict and that, in any event, none of the interloping nations could be trusted to 
withdraw, even if by October of that year the tide of ostensible foreign invasion appeared 
to be ebbing.
277
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 Similarly, there would be an increasing level of discussion on the topic of 
American neutrality and non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War, which had apparently 
become distasteful to a growing number of citizens. In early August of that year, the 
Christian Evangelist reported on a rather strange incident to this effect: the White House 
received two postcards, allegedly the largest in existence, bearing the signatures of some 
5,000 individuals who would have had the government of the United States lift its 
embargo against Republican Spain, which they collectively considered to be a ―shameful 
discrimination against a people fighting for world peace and democracy.‖278 
 Otherwise there would be somewhat more commentary on the attitudes of 
appeasement that had so enraptured the fearful governments of Great Britain and 
France— which had already allowed for the creation of an enormous German continental 
empire—and speculation on the topic of where German jackboots might next march that 
might trigger a general war.
279
 This paired discussion would also naturally dovetail with 
the question of American neutrality in respect to general European affairs. The general 
consensus on the former topic seemed to be that with Hitler's aggressive posturing toward 
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Czechoslovakia over the issue of the Sudetenland, and Germany's concerted effort to 
encourage pro-German agitation on the part of K. Henlein's Czech National Socialist 
Party, he had made his intentions fairly obvious to these Protestant journals.
280
  
 This anxious uncertainty over the Czech problem would, of course, be answered 
by the Autumn of 1938, following the Munich Agreement of September. These 
newspapers recognized this event as a historic watershed and would collectively 
condemn its outcome (essentially entailing the willful abandonment of an innocent 
democratic nation) as perhaps the greatest example in the shameful legacy of diplomatic 
capitulation in the face of fascist bullying on the part of Great Britain and France. Many 
contributors to and, indeed, the respective staffs of these publications believed that this 
folly would only briefly forestall a reckoning of blood and tears.
281
  
 F. D. Kershner, ever vociferous, wrote in agreement with the former British Prime 
Minister D. L. George, who had fervently expressed his disappointment with the 
readiness of the Chamberlain government to give in to the demands of a tyrant, which 
                                                 
280
 ―Another War Scare,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 18 August, 1938, 884. 
 ―The Protection of Minorities,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 13 August, 1938, 979-800. 
 ―Peace or War?,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 7 September, 1938, 1054-1056. 
 Vera Micheles Dean, ―Understanding Our World: New Storm over Czechoslovakia,‖ The Christian 
Leader, 10 September, 1938, 1096. 
 ―Hitler's Peace,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 21 September, 1938, 1118-1119. 
 ―A Tragedy Is Played in Europe,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 22 September, 1938, 1939-1040. 
281
 ―Hitler Bestrides Europe,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 28 September, 1938, 1150-1152. 
 ―On the Edge of the Abyss,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 5 October, 1938, 1184-1185.  
 ―Peace or an Armed Truce?,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 6 October, 1938, 1095. 
 ―Europe after Munich,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 12 October, 1938, 1124-1126. 
 Frederick D. Kershner, ―As I Think on These Things: Tragedy,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 13 October, 
1938, 1122. 
 Sherwood Eddy, ―The Critical Hour,‖ The Christian Century, 19 October, 1938, 1258-1260. 
 ―Our Horrible Indifference to Wrong,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 29 October, 1938, 1299. 
 Henry Wilder Foote, ―An Armistice Day Meditation on the Price of Peace,‖ The Christian Leader, 19 
November, 1938, 1413-1414. 
 145 
had led to the ―British flag becoming the jest of nations.‖282 Following the conference at 
Munich, this author would offer further disdain for Chamberlain and the policy of 
appeasement as a whole, as well as his developing belief that the time for such moral 
cowardice had passed; duty bound the democracies to stand together against the fascists 
and say ―no more.‖283 But the question of Spain would not be entirely divorced from the 
contemporary proceedings in Central Europe. Significantly, as the Czech crisis 
approached its tipping point, the Christian Century would report that Franco had rather 
hastily declared that his Spain would be neutral in a general European conflagration, a 
pronouncement which this paper interpreted as an unqualified slap to the faces of his 
benefactors in Italy and Germany.
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 Outside of the realm of geopolitics, religious interest in the Spanish conflict, and 
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in the world at large, endured. There would be a massive, outraged response to the 
meteoric escalation of the anti-Jewish campaign inside the Reich following the 
assassination of vom Rath in Paris and Krystallnacht. And there would continue the 
familiar rhetoric of criticism against the Roman Catholic Church, which many writers 
believed to have surrendered every last vestige of spiritual fortitude by wearing a mask of 
mask of anti-communist zealotry, which only concealed the reality that it stood as an 
authoritarian construct that propped up unjust systems and promoted fascism—the most 
egregious example of which could have been found its unwavering support of Franco's 
Nationalist Spain.
285
 F. D. Kershner, in typical fashion, agreed with such sentiments. He 
wrote that a ―real problem‖ existed with the very fabric of the Catholic Church when, in 
Detroit, the local Council of Catholic Organizations had been working relentlessly to 
suppress the works of E. Hemingway, ostensibly for his unapologetic sympathy for the 
Loyalist cause in Spain.
286
 This, to this author, represented a crime against the freedom of 
expression and that no institution, not even one as venerable as the ancient Church, 
should be able to ―penalize‖ those who held views contrary to its own—for such was the 
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―essence of fascism.‖287 
 Considering the above, it should have been of little surprise that the comments 
and articles published by these journals at the conclusion of 1938 were exceedingly 
dismal. The Spanish Republic faced imminent defeat, seemingly forsaken by those who it 
should have had as its allies and the democratic Czech government had been deserted, 
sold to an unpredictable dictator for a moment's peace. Indeed, the European aggressor 
nations had gained further, virtually unimpeded victories with the promise of more to 
come in the future, the armies of the Japanese Empire continued to maraud across China, 
and, to these papers, it seemed a logical conclusion that the world once again teetered 
upon the brink of yet another catastrophic conflict.
288
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V. 
 
 For these Catholic publications, the remaining half of 1938 reiterated much of the 
established narrative on the Spanish Civil War. By this phase of the conflict, Franco's 
Nationalists were capitalizing on the decisive advantages afforded to them following the 
Teruel offensive, and were slowly capturing Loyalist territory (with the ultimate 
objectives of Barcelona, Valencia, and Madrid). The Republic appeared to be in its death 
throes—even if, as the Catholics believed, the ―Reds‖ administering the government and 
their puppeteers in the Kremlin refused to admit it.
289
 The editorial staff of America 
would even note what it believed to be the beginning of a tidal shift in American opinion 
in favor of Franco, ostensibly because it had become increasingly evident that his 
coalition would emerge triumphant from the struggle, but most especially after the 
Loyalists' catastrophically-botched offensive across the Ebro River (from July until 
November of that year).
290
 And also, in the view of the Commonweal's J. A. Magner, that 
more American citizens had decided to embrace Franco might have been attributed to the 
extension of de facto recognition to Nationalist Spain.
291
 
 In short, circumstances allowed for these Catholic journals to demonstrate a more 
marked degree of optimism than they had previously: the faction they had championed 
seemed to be marching inexorably toward a total victory, and the Spanish ―Reds‖ were 
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soon be routed. But yet their contributors would continue to play upon the dangers of 
international communism, insisting that even where it had failed to wash over Spain, the 
Red tide threatened to engulf the United States, given the development of the proper set 
of conditions.
292
 Here, again, there would be an absolute wealth of articles on the topic of 
the apparently pervasive efforts of native agitators, foreign infiltrators, and their culpable 
dupes to manipulate and mislead American public opinion for the combined interest of: 
fostering both pro-communist sympathy and anti-fascist hatred, reinforcing solidarity 
with the Spanish Loyalists, and undermining isolationist neutrality for the sake of leading 
the nation into some grand anti-fascist military alliance with the European democracies in 
combination with the Soviet Union, where it did not belong..
293
 These efforts, America 
opined, also extended into Hollywood and liberal literature circles.
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 Similarly, America reported that it had been due to the efforts of these penetrators, 
CPUSA, and its front organizations, that so many American volunteers had illegally 
traveled to Spain to fight alongside the Loyalists, a fact seemingly confirmed by W. P. 
Carney, of the New York Times, who visited a forlorn POW cage in Nationalist territory. 
There he interviewed a number of young men who had served in the Abraham Lincoln 
Battalion (of the larger XV International Brigade). They apparently confirmed the truth 
behind these suspicions of communist influence in the phenomenon of pro-Loyalist 
American volunteerism.
295
 
 Indeed, Catholic commentary on these subjects during this period remained nearly 
identical to what it had been during the previous months of the conflict: pro-Nationalist, 
pro-Franco, mixed with fervent anti-Loyalist sentiment, which these publications insisted 
to be perfectly congruent with the most fundamental sort of anti-communism (and 
perhaps anti-radicalism). However, it will be remembered that the Commonweal broke 
the apparent lockstep of Catholic opinion after that newspaper underwent reorganization. 
After June, 1938, its staff asserted that the Spanish issue had been so befogged with 
                                                                                                                                                 
 17 December, 1938, 248-249. 
 Here one hardly need mention the continued outrage at E. Browder's ―Message to Catholics,‖ which 
would continue to face criticism as an ―outstretched hand that grasp[ed] only to destroy.‖ 
 J. Edgar Westfield, ―Communist Effrontery Designs New Trojan Horses,‖ America, 17 September, 
1938, 560-561. 
295
 ―Chronicle: Spain,‖ editorial, America, 23 July, 1938, 376. 
 ―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 3 September, 1938, 506-507. 
 ―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 29 October, 1938, 74. 
 By this point in 1938, the men of the Lincoln Battalion began returning to the United States. America, 
of course, had nothing but disdain for these volunteers, whom it considered to be traitorous criminals 
for so desecrating the name of that great American president in service to a toxic cause. The journal 
would also attach sentiments of anti-Semitism and xenophobia to its opinion. Its staff claimed that the 
returning militiamen were ―mostly Jewish,‖ or otherwise ―foreign-born riff-raff,‖ who were aligned 
with the domestic communist movement in the United States, which existed to slavishly serve Moscow. 
 151 
propaganda, and otherwise so generally misunderstood, that the only logical position for 
foreign observers to adopt—especially citizens of the United States—should have been 
one of absolute, ―positive impartiality.‖296  
 This stance naturally aroused an uproar from the newspaper's peers. America 
offered commentary to the effect that the Commonweal had reached absolutely false 
conclusions in respect to the war in Spain, regardless of the courage its staff might have 
had in voicing a contrary opinion. Criticizing further, this editorial went on insist that the 
Spanish issue could be explained in far simpler terms than the new staff of the 
Commonweal believed to be the case. While taking pains to de-emphasize the religious 
dynamic, America maintained its established position that the Republican government, 
under the direction of the Popular Front, existed only as a transitional stepping-stone to a 
genuine, atheistic Soviet-style state. The Nationalist rebellion, on the other hand, rose as a 
―native Spanish protest to a tyranny that had become unendurable and that was becoming 
permanent.‖297 Yet the author(s) of this piece could not yet move entirely away from the 
religious interpretation of the conflict, illuminating Franco as a Christian solider and 
statesman, who offered Spain rejuvenation based upon ―Catholic,‖ and not fascist, 
principles.
298
 Therefore, in this publication's considered opinion, it had been inexcusable 
for the shuffled staff of the Commonweal to implore ―positive impartiality‖ in respect to 
the Spanish Civil War when the choice for that country teetered between the misery of 
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vassalage to the alien ideology of Moscow, or the reinstitution of a sane social order 
grounded in centuries-old tradition.
299
 
 As for the Commonweal itself, it staff would note a wide variety of opinions in 
respect to the editorial that had aroused such fury in America. In mid-July, the publication 
would acknowledge the receipt of a great number of letters which had made it difficult to 
gauge the sum reaction of its readership to the article in question, indicating a certain 
ambivalent uncertainty in Catholic opinion on the Spanish question and the paper's 
suggestion of impartiality.
300
 A few wholeheartedly supported the suggestion, admiring it 
as a ―refreshing breeze,‖ while others seemed discomfited, if not disgusted by it, and yet 
still others clung to the idea as the Spanish struggle as a battle in the ―holy war‖ against 
the Great Satan of Moscow.
301
 But despite all of the negative commentary, the 
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 America and its contributors would continue to insist on this interpretation as the conflict passed its 
second anniversary, which the publication celebrated as the commencement of the counter-revolution 
which would be Spain's salvation. Otherwise, it would later report, without citation, that the entirety of 
the American Catholic Press rebuked the position of the Commonweal. The Sign, for its part, would 
continue to trumpet the virtues of ―Americanness‖ to be found within Franco's coalition. 
 ―Current Fact and Comment: Franco and the American Rebels,‖ editorial, The Sign, July, 1938,  
 708-709. 
 ―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 16 July, 1938, 338. 
 ―Comment,‖ editorial, America, 23 July, 1938, 362-364. 
 ―Current Fact and Comment: Catholics and Spain,‖ editorial, The Sign, August, 1938, 4-5. 
 John LaFarge, S. J., ―While Spain Burns They Strum Impartiality,‖ America, 20 August, 1938, 462-463. 
 Owen B. McGuire, ―Catholics Should Be Neutral!,‖ The Sign, September, 1938, 74-77. 
 Francis X. Connolly, ―The Fascist State Is Not Emerging in Spain,‖  America, 24 September, 1938,  
 580-582. 
 Francis X. Connolly, ―Spain Renews Itself in the National Movement,‖ America, 22 October, 1938,  
 52-54. 
300
 ―Communications: Spanish Letters,‖ letters to the editor, The Commonweal, 15 July, 1938, 324-325. 
 Or, perhaps more precisely, an ambivalent uncertainty amongst all those who took the Commonweal. 
301
 Ibid. 
 Once again, this demonstrates the falsity of the notion of any monolithic quality to Catholic opinion in 
the United States. 
 153 
Commonweal would maintain this stance of ―positive impartiality,‖ or the examination of 
the evidence of contemporary world problems beneath the cold light of reason, thereby 
stripping them of ―emotional mythology and partisan odium.‖302 
 Conversely, however, there would be indications of significant initial success on 
the campaigns proposed and staged by the Sign and America. The latter noted that, 
following its own ―Bias Contest,‖ there had been a definite upsurge in Catholic opinion 
for some greater form of action to address the ostensible anti-Catholic bias in the 
American media. Further, that weekly asserted that this bigotry had grown ever more 
insistent in its claims of harmony between the Church and fascism during the previous 
two years (a development obviously in connection to the civil war in Spain). Even though   
events in that country had led the Church to face terrible persecution, it did not receive 
the emphasis that it deserved, especially considering the contemporary coverage on the 
anti-Semitic barbarism in Hitler's Reich. The Commonweal would at least agree on this 
point, as would its former editor, M. Williams.
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 With all this, one might fairly arrive at the conclusion that there seemed to be a 
certain difficulty in these Catholic journals in seeing beyond the Spanish conflict to 
wider, and far more troubling, European development. Indeed, Spain and communism, as 
ever, seemed to endure as the absorbing problems of the day, even if some of these 
publications managed to relate that there still existed a great deal of importance in the 
Spanish arena in relation to international strategic relations, still a particular concern for 
Britain's maritime lifeline to her empire and a nearly encircled France.
304
 Nevertheless, 
there would still be some spotty reporting on the wider world, including a rather belated 
recognition of the Czech crisis, the subsequent sacrifice of the Sudetenland, and even 
some on the trouble in the Far East, where Soviet and Japanese interests were poised to 
clash. On the former development, many Catholic commentators lamented it as tragic, 
but necessary, outcome to avoid the cataclysm of war. Others did not think that the 
Munich conference had solved anything, for they had learned all too much about Hitler to 
believe that his appetite for eastward conquest had been sated. But there would be 
universal worry over the neutralization of the democratic powers of Europe as they stood 
dumbfounded, frightened, and helpless as the German dictator's gambles paid dividends. 
These happenings seemed, at least, to hint at an awakening in the Catholic press to the 
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shifting of the diplomatic center of gravity away from Spain and toward Central 
Europe.
305
 
 As demonstrated, Catholic emphases remained almost exactly the same as they 
had been over the previous months of 1938 and, indeed, throughout the course of the 
strife in Spain—albeit perhaps with an increased focus on the issue of communism, 
fascism, and the Church. This, against, might have been considered only only natural. 
However, there also seemed to be something of a desire on the part of the Catholic 
journals to wave the impending defeat of the ―Red‖ cause at the hands of ―their side‖ in 
the face of their adversaries in the secular and Protestant presses. And again, to reiterate, 
Spain endured as something of an all-consuming problem, even as developing crises 
threatened to engulf the whole of Europe.
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VI. 
 
 The first quarter of 1939 would witness the denouement of the Spanish Civil War. 
By March of that year, both Great Britain and France would recognize the legitimacy of 
the insurgent government; by the first of April, the conflict would be resolved in favor of 
Franco's Nationalist coalition, prompting the United States to follow suit. Protestant 
coverage on the struggle correspondingly declined as these few publications were forced 
to reconcile with the agonizing, piecemeal collapse of the faction that they had so heartily 
championed—a defeat which they would naturally interpret as a body blow to 
―democracy,‖ a further advance for the forces of fascism, and yet another unsettling 
tremor in a world poised upon the precipice of war. The occasion allowed for 
retrospection. The staff of the Christian Century, in particular, wrote that history would 
demonstrate that the decisive moment of the conflict would not be delineated as the then 
impending fall of both Barcelona and Madrid, but rather as the moment when Great 
Britain and France allowed Italy and Germany to make Franco's cause their own. And, 
whatever the future held for Spain, those two capitulating nations would have to face the 
immediate strategic consequences of an ascendent ―fascist‖ Spain, presumably under the 
tutelage, if not domination, of both Mussolini and Hitler.
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 Waning as it was, and though wider European events continued to take 
precedence, the battle in Spain remained an object of some attention; these Protestant 
journals would concern themselves with three particular aspects of the war. The first 
would be the continued, and, indeed, intensified attack on the United States' legal position 
of neutrality. A growing segment of the American public then believed that that the policy 
had been nothing if not destructive, perhaps as much as appeasement had been, and were 
then urging for an official revision so that the nation might take greater steps to contain 
the ―aggressor nations.‖ This line of thinking also extended to the war in Spain. Even as 
the hour grew late for the Spanish Republic, some still seemed to believe that it could be 
rescued with the immediate rescission of the embargo against that country and, further, 
that Franco's effort would crumble instantly if the United States could eliminate the flow 
of external aid to his faction by way of a stout naval blockade.
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 There would be, of course, varying degrees of response to this sentiment, 
especially as it seemed that this attitude had penetrated to the highest levels of the 
American government. Particularly horrifying to the Christian Century would be 
President Roosevelt's address at the opening of the 76
th
 Congress, in which he expressed 
his desire to more the nation further along in the direction of rearmament, 
internationalism, and interventionism—in the interest of preserving religious liberty and 
democracy against those in the Old World who would destroy them. The paper 
reasonably editorialized that such appeals should have only elicited bitter memories of 
1917.
309
 Yet others would suggest that the world had become such an unfriendly, 
unstable, and even dangerous place that perhaps the time had then come to forthrightly 
reassess the state of the American military apparatus and her role in world events.
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Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy) who, being ―on fire about Spain,‖ urged the publication to 
declare solidarity with the Loyalists. While the paper refrained from doing so, it nevertheless 
proclaimed its anti-fascist credentials and regarded the cause of the Spanish government as essentially 
American. F. D. Kershner, of the Christian Evangelist, also agreed with these sentiments. 
 ―Views and Comments: Lift the Embargo,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 5 January, 1939, 2. 
 M. W. J., ―On Fire about Spain,‖ letter to the editor, The Christian Leader, 7 January, 1939, 20. 
 Frederick D. Kershner, ―As I Think on These Things: Shades of Seventy-Six,‖ The Christian 
Evangelist, 16 March, 1939, 276. 
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 ―Invitation to a Holy War,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 18 January, 1939, 78-80. 
 The Christian Evangelist generally agreed, offering editorials that worried over the potential for the 
United States to get sucked into the frenzy of the contemporary arms race and contribute to the eruption 
of a war. For its part, the Christian Leader thought likewise. 
 ―We, the People,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 19 January, 1939, 76. 
 ―No Blank Checks for Armament,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 28 January, 1939, 80. 
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 William E. Shelton, ―A Survey of World Trends,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 12 January, 1939, 34-35. 
 Frederick D. Kershner, ―As I Think on These Things: What Would We Do?,‖ The Christian Evangelist, 
19 January, 1939, 78. 
 ―Foreign Policy and Public Opinion,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 8 February, 1939, 175-177. 
 By that April, Roosevelt had issued a message to Italy and Germany, which laid responsibility for the 
maintenance of world peace at their thresholds. Meanwhile, he continued to shift the United States into 
the Anglo-French camp, a truly bold maneuver, considering the enduring strength of American 
isolationist sentiment. 
 ―Europe and Our Neutrality,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 6 April, 1939, 535-537. 
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 Secondly, these newspapers would demonstrate a continued interest in the 
administration of relief in war-ravaged Spain. There would be significant discussion on a 
bulk purchase of American wheat by the Surplus Commodities Corporation, which turned  
the excess foodstuff to the Red Cross, which then shipped it to Spain through the 
Maritime Commission; thence it would be organized for distribution via the American 
Friends Service Committee. The discourse would be extended beyond the effort to aid 
those inside suffering Spain. These Protestant journals also highlighted the plight of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees who had been forced to flee over the jagged Pyrenees 
into France. There they had been quarantined, essentially incarcerated, in a network of 
concentration camps. Apart from the misery and squalor of such living conditions, there 
also existed the danger that these souls would be deported to a Franco-dominated Spain 
to an uncertain fate.
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 Finally, the matter of religion as it pertained to the Spanish conflict (and, indeed, 
to world developments at large general) merited continued discourse in the columns of 
these Protestant weeklies.
312
 This interest would primarily focus upon the significant 
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 ―Bok Award Is Given to Quaker Leaders,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 307-308. 
 ―Don't Forget the Spanish Refugees,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 1 April, 1939, 297. 
 These Protestant publications were vociferous in their support for the Spanish  outcasts. They believed 
that the democracies had made Franco's victory possible, and that duty and decency bound them to 
support the victims of his rebellion. 
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 See: ―The Reply to Germany,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 7 January, 1939, 3. 
 ―The Plight of the Jews,‖ editorial, The Christian Evangelist, 23 February, 1939, 195-196. 
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changes in the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church with the passing of 
Pius XI in February of that year, and the subsequent election of Cardinal E. Pacelli as the 
papal successor, who would be styled as Pius XII. These Protestant newspapers would 
commemorate the life and service of the deceased Pontiff, but could not resist the 
opportunity to level censure against the Church that the occasion provided. Even while 
acknowledging Pius XI as a lover of peace, the Christian Century attacked what it 
believed to the eternal spiritual arrogance of the authoritarian Church and that cleric's 
own relationship to Fascism in Italy and, indeed, in Spain.
313
 The Christian Evangelist 
would opine likewise, asserting that his influence had been crucial to the collapse of 
Republican Spain.
314
  
 And, as for the new Pope, there would be a great swelling of keen Protestant 
interest in this prince of the Roman Catholic Church after he had gained the Chair of St. 
Peter. They, amongst others, wondered if he could (or would) leverage the massive power 
of his office on the emerging order in Spain, especially as it seemed apparent that 
Franco's intent for the immediate future included a campaign of arbitrary ―punishment‖ 
for any and all who did not take up arms for his insurgency. These publications expressed 
their hopeful wish that the weighty moral influence of the Pontificate would at least 
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 Meanwhile, the commentary from the Christian Leader would be far more subdued. 
 See: ―Pope Pius the Eleventh,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 18 February, 1939, 151-152. 
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temper the venom of what appeared, by the early Summer of 1939, to be the development 
of a modern Inquisition.
315
 
 Apart from the Spanish conflict, on the other hand, there would be far more 
discussion on wider world events, particularly where Europe was concerned. There would 
be commentary on the seizure of the remainder of Czechoslovakia as German aggression 
reached a new peak, ostensibly a further step toward realizing Hitler's vision as laid out in  
Mein Kampf. This would be followed closely by the escalating clamor in Germany over 
the problem of Poland and Danzig as relations between those two countries descended 
into new realms of unpleasantness and, soon thereafter, the Italian invasion of Albania. 
As a consequence, the democratic powers of Europe had pledged to defend Polish 
sovereignty while shifting more definitely toward a war footing—even to the extent of 
considering the Soviet Union as a potential ally to once again encircle the Teutonic 
menace with foes.
316
 Nevertheless, the Christian Leader managed to demonstrate a little 
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hope in an atmosphere which increasingly appeared to be tainted with notions of the 
inevitability of war: despite his previous triumphs, this paper believed that with each 
fresh victory, Hitler further over-extended himself, which would ultimately be his 
undoing.
317
 
 There essentially concluded the Protestant coverage on the Spanish Civil War. The 
evidence presented above indicates that interest in the waning conflict remained, though 
perhaps rather subdued and resigned to the defeat of the Republic as it became more 
obvious that it would not survive. Even so, the Protestants never wavered in their faith to 
the Republic. Similarly, they remained convinced that had it not been for Italy, Germany, 
and the Roman Catholic Church—paired with the moral cowardice of the world's 
democratic nations—the Nationalist rebellion would not have prospered unto victory. 
And as the Spanish crisis continued to slide into a position of relative unimportance, their  
attentions would be focused upon the ominous rumblings from the Continent as the black 
clouds of war gathered above it.
318
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 ―The Hitler Speech,‖ editorial, The Christian Leader, 6 May, 1939, 415. 
 As Hitler rode his cresting wave from victory to victory, the Protestant publications also worried about 
what to them seemed to the budding of a nascent fascist movement in the United States. The Christian 
Century ran an article by one A. J. Smith, which detailed a large rally staged by the German-American 
Volksbund at Madison Square Garden, at which the Stars and Stripes flew alongside the swastika, and 
all beneath a gigantic portrait of Washington. The author did not think that this was anything to be 
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Germany, and, indeed, Spain. (This analogy, however, might not have been entirely appropriate). 
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 ―Who Won the Spanish Civil War,‖ editorial, The Christian Century, 14 June, 1939, 756. 
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 Pius XII seemed at once to disappoint the Protestant journals' hopes and yet to fulfill their worst ideas of 
the Roman Catholic Church as he ―hailed [the] Christian triumph in Spain‖ as a God-ordained victory. 
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VI. 
 
 The early months of 1939 would prove to be the concluding phase of the Spanish 
Civil War. During this time, the Nationalist rebels closed in on Barcelona, finally 
capturing it in late January of that year. This signal victory forced many of the last 
significant  holdouts of the collapsing government, including the Stalinist puppet J. 
Negrín and the communist firebrand D. Ibárruri (―La Pasionaria‖), to flee north, over the 
Pyrenees, and into France. Franco then turned his attention to the business of eliminating 
pockets of resistance and capturing Madrid, where the last vestige of Republican 
legitimacy laid; this he eventually did, bringing the conflict to an official close by 1 April, 
1939.
319
 
 Due to these developments, the Catholic journals increased the tempo of their pro-
Franco drumbeat, demanding that the time had come for the government of the United 
States to formally recognize his fledgling administration. This resolution would be 
reinforced by March, as the publications would acknowledge that some twenty other 
nations, including Great Britain and France, had already done so. Moreover, they would 
insist upon expedited recognition due to the fact that Spain had always exerted great 
cultural and social influence over Latin America, and, therefore, it would have not been a 
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prudent diplomatic decision to unnecessarily provoke Franco into unfriendliness. But 
while they would express moderate consternation that the American government had not  
embraced the emerging reality of an ascendant Nationalist Spain, these Catholic 
newspapers would express what appeared to be a tone of mocking condescension toward 
the relative silence of the non-Catholic press in the United States on the topic of the 
impending demise of ―Red‖ Republican Spain, which they attributed to frustration and 
shame. In any event, these few Catholic circulars would have their desire of America 
recognition of Franco's government fulfilled very shortly after his battered forces 
marched into Madrid.
320
 
 Further, they would criticize the petulant hypocrisy of certain segments of 
American society which had previously supported relief work in Spain—but when the 
insurgency's triumph became virtually assured, had reversed course and demanded that 
all aid be cut off immediately. These representatives of Catholic opinion would express 
incredulity that the same individuals and organizations who had endeavored to promote 
the Loyalist cause and insist upon international support for the doomed Spanish 
government would then have the audacity to beg, even demand, clemency from Franco. 
According to America, the Sign, and some of their contributors, the Nationalist chieftain 
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had the right and, indeed, the duty to mete out stern punishments to those responsible for 
tearing Spain asunder, and that leniency would have only set that country up for future 
revolutionary upheavals.
321
 
 Such a necessity would, to these Catholic papers, be made obvious following the 
capture of Barcelona (and, later, Madrid). There would be published a number of 
shocking stories regarding how those cities had festered under the increasingly 
desperate—and correspondingly violent—―Red‖ regime. For example, America would 
feature a horror story, apparently related by an escaped ―eye-witness‖ from Spain, telling 
of the destruction wrought by the radicals and their hostile, alien ideology in that 
unfortunate country. It would include what had by then become typical of Catholic 
descriptions of Republican Spain: chaos, squalid misery, and so forth. But this tale would 
also discuss the fear engendered by the SIM (Servicio de Información Militar), the 
government's internal secret service. That organization had been inspired (and partly 
established) by the Soviet NKVD in August, 1937 in the aftermath of the ―May Days,‖ 
operated under a similar doctrine, and employed equally brutal tactics.
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 Conversely, 
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 Among this number there would be some 450 American Protestant clergymen who besought the 
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however, there would be a great deal of space and ink expended on the success of 
Franco's initial efforts at restoration and reconstruction, which were working wonders to 
heal the corruption. Also these Catholic newspapers remained convinced that, despite 
what others were saying, his Spain would not be dominated by either Italy or Germany, 
and nor should his movement have been considered ―fascist,‖ as it more precisely 
represented a more benign form of Catholic-based traditionalism. Spaniards, they 
insisted, were too deeply Catholic to long tolerate anything that approximated fascism, 
which tended to make a deity out of the State.
323
 
 With these elements considered, it should have been no surprise that the Catholic 
publications continued to rail against international communism, just as they had 
throughout the course of the conflict (the volume of which, it will be remembered, 
                                                                                                                                                 
that June, purportedly relating the adventures of an American communist in Spain. This piece would 
contain all of the rhetoric that had been stated before: that the American brigadistas were recruited 
through CPUSA and its fronts, that the professions of liberty by Republican authorities were for 
international public consumption, that the appropriation of American symbolism had been cynically 
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atrocities of the miniature Stalinist state: the absolute domination of the communist commissariat and its 
secret police (after the May Days of 1937), the atmosphere of oppressive suspicion, the arbitrary arrests, 
the concentration camps, the routine executions, and so on. 
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increased into 1938). In early January, America would feature an article that seemed to 
reassert the Catholics' fear that the enemy was already within the gates, waiting to enact 
another Spanish crisis in the United States. Entitled ―Red Tactics on Fourteenth Street,‖ 
author J. Doherty discussed the ―first attack against the Catholic Church in America‖ by 
those sinister souls in solidarity with the Spanish Loyalists.
324
 
 
Finally unmasking their 
revolutionary hatred, apparently the fuel of the Popular Front, pro-Loyalist Americans in 
New York had attacked individual Catholics; later, they would picket a Catholic 
sanctuary which had come out as pro-Nationalist, denouncing its congregation as 
―fascists.‖ The church itself would be defiled with the crimson emblem of the hammer 
and sickle. Further, extortion and even violence had been leveraged against pro-
Nationalist business leaders in that same area—and those who did repent faced 
reprisal.
325
 
 Otherwise, while significantly less sensationalist, these papers maintained their 
narrative on the ―subversive‖ activities in the United States, especially regarding the 
clamor to rearm, align with the European democracies and the Soviet Union, lift the 
Spanish embargo, and begin a concerted campaign of anti-fascist action to redress the 
balance of the Old World. America believed these efforts had grown frantic to the point of 
becoming totally transparent, and that that most radical segment of American society 
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should have, by then, been thoroughly discredited. To that journal, such peoples only 
sought to promote conflict, in this case global, as a mechanism to excite revolutionary 
turmoil, just as they had done in Spain.
326
 The editorial staff of the Commonweal did not 
exactly take such a view, but nevertheless worried over what it perceived to the be the 
increasingly belligerent stance of the United States' government in respect to foreign 
relations, particularly where Germany and Japan were concerned. It believed that 
Roosevelt's government had undertaken to engage in subtle, but dangerous, forms of 
diplomatic and economic warfare against those ―aggressor nations.‖ That weekly, as well 
as the Sign, lamented this reality—in addition to American rearmament and the nation's 
friendly advances toward Great Britain and France as those countries reached out for a 
possible alliance with the Soviet Union—as only aggravating a world already tense from 
an apparently impending war.
327
 As a result, the Catholic papers grew ever more 
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determined to keep the United States neutral and isolated, especially as it appeared that 
Roosevelt and the Congress considered supporting the dying Republican cause, late 
though the hour was, in a bid to shift national policy toward interventionism and 
internationalism.
328
 
 Here, again, the Catholic press tended to cast the blame for the above phenomena 
on the activities of the Comintern, CPUSA, their overlapping front organizations, and 
their agents.
329
 The fronts and those openly affiliated with them could be dealt with, for  
they were mostly visible and their loyalties could be confirmed by the messages they 
preached. But, as before, these Catholic newspapers expressed far more concern in the 
impressive ability of communist infiltrators and their fellow travelers to dupe 
unsuspecting, otherwise innocent and well-intentioned people, into serving their cause of 
building pro-communist sympathies and constructing a domestic Popular Front 
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movement in the United States.
330
 It had been, after all, Lenin's dictum to ―build 
communism with non-communist hands.‖331 
 Yet, for all this anti-communist fixation, Catholic interest dwelt on other 
contemporary issues, the first being the issue of religion. Naturally, of course, these 
publications would discuss the death of Pope Pius XI and the transitioning of papal power 
into the hands of his successor, Pius XII. The latter Pontiff would maintain the policies of 
his precursor, and would hail the springtime victory of Franco's Nationalists as an 
essentially Christian victory.
332
 And, secondly, even with the developments inside Spain 
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standards, for it brought about a fart greater evil than that of which it sought to redress. The philosopher 
had high hopes for the future of Spain, but cautioned against a militarized Catholicism as one of the 
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and within the hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church, these publications 
managed some meager discussion of the events of the wider world. There would be brief 
acknowledgment of the German seizure of what remained of Czechoslovakia in the 
Commonweal, but comparably less said about this fresh act of Hitler's aggression 
elsewhere.
333
 On that same note, there would be a recognition of the heightening of 
tensions following the Italian invasion of Albania, which that same newspaper believed to 
be a further step toward Mussolini's ambition of dominating Yugoslavia, Greece, and the 
whole of the Mediterranean.
334
 The developing crisis of Poland, too, received some slight 
degree of commentary, though far less than it had in the Protestant papers.
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 The evidence above indicates that, without much surprise, the question of Spain 
retained a great deal of interest in the Catholic press, especially where it intersected with 
the problem of international communism and domestic subversion within the United 
                                                                                                                                                 
potential tools that Franco might employ. A certain Father Bruehl would offer likewise. Otherwise, the 
publication would receive more pieces of correspondence that would add to the variety of opinions on 
its amended position. On the other hand, the Sign would continue to condemn it. 
 See: ―An Interview with Jacques Maritain,‖ in The Commonweal,  3 February, 1939. (Pgs. 398-402). 
 ―Communications: Civil War in Spain,‖ letters to the editor, The Commonweal, 3 February, 1939. (Pgs. 
407-408). 
 ―Current Fact and Comment: Impartiality on Spain Condemned,‖ editorial, The Sign, March, 1939,  
 453-454. 
 ―The Great Cemeteries under the Moon: Approach and Conclusion,‖ editorial, The Commonweal,  
 3 March, 1939, 508. 
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 ―Chronicle: Spain,‖ America, 25 March, 1939, 592. 
 ―The European Situation: the Stop-Hitler Drive,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 31 March, 1939, 617. 
 ―Our Most Urgent Business: The Values of War,‖ editorial, The Commonweal, 31 March, 1939, 
 617-618. 
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 See also: ―Current Fact and Comment: Europe in Perpetual Crisis,‖ The Sign, May, 1939, 580. 
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States. Simultaneously, denominational developments (most pointedly with the passing of 
Pius XI and the ascent of Pius XII), might have blinded these periodicals to the emerging 
realities in Europe as the Italian and German dictators claimed fresh victories and 
appeared determined to play their dangerous game, subsequently forcing their enemies to 
adopt ever more belligerent stances, all of which incrementally increased the pressure on 
the trigger of war. 
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VII. 
 
 This final phase of the Spanish Civil War, unsurprisingly, saw but little variation 
in the opinions and interpretations offered by either the Catholic or the Protestant presses 
of the United States. By and large, the respective publications from each maintained their 
established, entrenched positions. The Catholic journals mostly remained adamantly pro-
Nationalist, while the Protestant publications determinedly defended the Republic; they 
would defend them for the same reasons that they had stated since even before Franco's 
uprising and the commencement of martial hostilities.
336
 Insisting that the Rightist 
rebellion stood as a justified uprising against an illegitimate, hostile, Soviet-directed 
government, the Catholic newspapers ever championed it as a bulwark against the spread 
of the atheistic communist blight and the defender of Christian civilization. And flawed 
though it might have been, the Protestant papers continued to assert that the embattled 
Spanish government stood as one of the last flickering lights of liberal democracy in 
Europe, finally and tragically extinguished beneath the swelling tide of fascism.
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  Excepting, of course, the Commonweal and its ―positive impartiality.‖ 
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A Brief Conclusion and Summation 
 In considering the evidence presented over the previous three chapters of this 
thesis, one can reach a number of suggestive conclusions in regard to the respective 
opinions of the American Catholic and Protestant presses on the Spanish Civil War. With 
little variation, and with but few exceptions, the selected representatives of either 
segment of the American Christian press maintained their interpretations on that highly 
controversial conflict. On either side, the selected publications came out early in favor of 
the Spanish Left or Right—months before the battle had in fact been joined.  
 Given the turbulent nature of contemporary Spanish politics and the intensity of 
anti-clerical conviction with which the political Left in that country assailed the Church, 
even from the rise of the Republic in 1931, it should not have been surprising that 
American Catholic opinion tilted heavily toward the Right. Indeed, the contentious 
elections of 1936, which gave rise to the Popular Front, would prove to be the genesis of 
the not altogether inaccurate narrative that such a political confederation stood as nothing 
more than a thinly veiled manufacture of the Comintern, a puppet of the Kremlin, and a 
malignant force bent upon fomenting revolutionary upheaval. This opinion on the part of 
the American Catholic press, as demonstrated by those few examples, seemed only to be 
reinforced as the immediate aftermath of the political season found Spain awash in 
uncontrolled and perhaps directed chaos.  
 As the attacks against the Right and the Church mounted, the Catholic papers 
expressed greater sympathy with those co-sufferers and, when the rebellion erupted in the 
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summer of that year, claimed moral solidarity with it. Their reasoning might be explained 
thus: that the Spanish government had been seized by an inherently evil force, impelled 
by atheistic Marxism and Bolshevik barbarism, which was determined to assault Western 
Civilization and Christendom itself in most Catholic Spain. The uprising, therefore, 
would be conversely defined as a patriotic movement of true-hearted Spaniards to whom 
the heinous abuses of the government had become too numerous to endure. But, early in 
the conflict there would also be strong religious connotations affixed to the insurgency, 
primarily in that it existed as something of a modern Crusade or Reconquista to reclaim 
that country from the heathen infidels.  
 The religious fixation naturally endured throughout the course of the struggle, but 
it would decline in emphatic importance as the Catholic journals and most of their 
contributors began to understand and agree upon the impropriety of insisting on the ―holy 
war‖ interpretation. Rather, the focus would increasingly be directed on the blight of 
international communism as it continued to exist in the Soviet Union and as miniature 
communist states threatened to blossom forth in Spain, in France, and even in the United 
States. 
 Yet at the other end of the discourse, the American Protestant press held 
absolutely contrary views on Spanish politics and that nation's civil struggle in nearly 
every way. Rather than condemning the Popular Front as a revolutionary conspiracy, they 
instead praised it as a democratic construct, peacefully built to take back the 
governmental apparatus away from the reactionary regime of 1933 and to once again set 
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Spain back upon the path of progressivism. And as for the pre-war suffering inflicted 
upon the Right and the Church, those few representatives of American Protestant opinion 
maintained that it had been thoroughly earned, as those targeted forces had colluded 
together for centuries to repress the mass of common Spaniards, to keep them bound to 
feudal subservience and mired in medieval superstition. 
 After the outbreak of the revolt in Spain, the Protestant publications would 
reiterate this narrative—that the reactionary Right and the traditionalist Church had risen 
to seize what they so arrogantly believed to be their God-ordained position in society—
but would quickly add that it had been organized by a certain fascist component. Those 
Protestant publications correlated the Spanish crisis to wider European events and would 
delineate it as another swelling of the fascist tide. Indeed, they insisted that the adherents 
to the curious Spanish iteration of the ideology had been emboldened by the virtually 
untrammeled successes of Italy and Germany and would, pending their victory, 
contribute to something far more menacing than the Catholics' Red bogeyman: the 
―fascist internationale.‖ 
 Such would be their stance throughout the course of the war in Spain, even as it 
became increasingly evident that the Republic and its Loyalists were doomed to a tragic 
defeat. All this would be blamed, of course, on the interference by the fascist powers, the 
moral credence lent to the insurgency by the topmost authorities of the Roman Catholic 
Church, and, not least, to the cowardly failure of the Western democratic nations to 
render aid to the beleaguered Spanish government. 
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 The climax of this Catholic-Protestant discourse in the United States, and perhaps 
its most interesting feature, would develop during the Autumn of 1937 and would play 
out until the end of that year. Lacking, it seems, the prerequisite ability to develop a 
nuanced understanding of a conflict so fundamentally foreign and confoundingly 
complicated, either side attempted to do so through the familiar lens of ―Americanism.‖ 
In short, both the Catholics and Protestants sought to attribute such traits to ―their‖ 
respective Spanish factions that befitted the revolutionary and democratic heritage of the 
United States. On the part of the Catholics, the Nationalist rebellion stood as a revolt 
against the unconscionable tyranny of an oppressive government, a repetition of the 
glorious days of 1776. Conversely, the Protestants maintained that the cause of the 
Republic and the Popular Front represented the hatred of backwardness and the fire of 
democracy that burned in the hearts of all humankind. To them, it was the the very 
passion that demanded the American patriots of old strike for their independence against 
the imperial domination of Great Britain. For the Spanish context, the Protestants merely 
substituted the ancient, repressive oligarchy of the aristocratic elite, the military officer 
corps, and the Roman Catholic Church for the English. 
 But to judge the stances of the American Catholic and Protestant presses, as 
highlighted by those few examples, historical inquiry requires that one be as objectively 
fair as possible. Either side championed its chosen belligerent coalition with little 
qualification, and neither was willing to admit the unique faults and failings thereof. Both 
the Nationalist and the Republican Loyalist camps sheltered rather unattractive elements, 
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both received the majority of their materiel and moral assistance from unpalatable foreign 
sources that sought to manipulate the Spanish contest to their respective interests, and it 
certainly could not have been said of either cause that they aligned with ―Americanism,‖ 
even in a vague sense. Neither was willing to admit that the war in Spain was far more 
tinted with gray ambiguity than they had allowed for, and neither was willing to abandon 
the static, quixotic idealism that they had invested in it. 
 Both, moreover, might be also be accused of a degree of intolerance and bigotry, 
whether they were conscious of it or not. The Spanish Civil War seemed to enable the 
American Protestant publications to give voice to that classic anti-clerical, anti-Catholic 
hatred; those selected publications constantly intoned that the conflict had definitely 
proven the Church the be the mortal enemy of liberalism and democracy. On the other 
hand, the Catholic journals seemed to be guilty of a kind of reactionary backlash against 
any progressive cause that contained even the slightest hint of communist approval or 
influence. That the Protestants had proclaimed solidarity with the Spanish Republic 
meant that they were the allies or agents of world communism and, ergo, an abettor of 
evil. 
 In a final estimation, the best, most intelligent, and perhaps most Christian stance 
that those projectors of American Catholic and Protestant opinion might have taken was 
offered by Jacques Maritain and which was later adopted by the Commonweal: that of 
―positive impartiality.‖ However, the struggle was too emotionally and ideologically 
charged for that. It was representative of the tensions of the time and of the troubles that 
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had yet to come. Both the Catholics and the Protestants took it as such and could not help 
interpreting it based upon their own prejudices and convictions. But one must never 
forget that the essential realities of the conflict escaped them and, indeed, that none of 
them spoke Spanish.
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